Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Tax Law
Terral Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma St. Bd. of Equalization
Respondent Oklahoma State Board of Equalization, assessed an ad valorem tax concerning on the property of Complainant Terral Telephone Company. The Company protested the assessment, and the Board moved to dismiss the protest, alleging the protest was non-compliant and untimely. The Court of Tax Review agreed and ruled that the protest did not comply with the statutes and rules necessary to invoke its jurisdiction. The Company appealed the ruling to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which after review, affirmed the Court of Tax Review. View "Terral Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma St. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law
United States v. State of Delaware Department of Insurance
The IRS investigated the companies to determine whether they are liable for penalties for promoting abusive tax shelters. Summonses led to the production of documents in 2014, including email chains involving the Delaware Department of Insurance, relating to the issuance of certificates of authority to the companies' clients and to a meeting with the Department’s Director of Captive and Financial Insurance Products. The IRS issued an administrative summons to the Department for testimony and records relating to filings by and communications with the companies. “Request 1” seeks all e-mails between the Department and the companies related to the Captive Insurance Program. The Department raised confidentiality objections under Delaware Insurance Code section 6920. The IRS declined to abide by section 6920's confidentiality requirements. The Department refuses to produce any response to Request 1.The government filed a successful petition to enforce the summons. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Department’s argument that, under the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA), 15 U.S.C. 1011, Delaware law embodied in section 6920 overrides the IRS’s statutory authority to issue and enforce summonses. While the MFA does protect state insurance laws from intrusive federal action when certain requirements are met, before any such reverse preemption occurs, the conduct at issue (refusal to produce summonsed documents) must constitute the “business of insurance” under the MFA. That threshold requirement was not met here. View "United States v. State of Delaware Department of Insurance" on Justia Law
Charter Communications Entertainment I, LLC v. Director of Revenue
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the administrative hearing commission (AHC) finding that Charter Communications Entertainment I, LLC (CCE I) was entitled to manufacturing exemptions with respect to its 2011 and 2012 purchases of replacement equipment used to provide telecommunications service, holding that the AHC's decision was authorized by law.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the AHC did not err in (1) finding CCE I's provision of telecommunications service qualified as "manufacturing" for purposes of the sales and use tax exemptions in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2(4) and 144.054.2; and (2) finding that CCE I was not required to establish that its replacement equipment was "substantially used" in manufacturing in addition to proving that the equipment satisfied the integrated plant doctrine and was "used directly" in manufacturing. View "Charter Communications Entertainment I, LLC v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law
Palmer v. City of Anaheim
Article XIIIC was added to the California Constitution in 1996 after the passage of the Right to Vote on Taxes Act, or Proposition 218. Article XIIIC required that any new tax or increase in tax be approved by the voters. In 2010, article XIIIC was amended when Proposition 26 passed. Since then, “'tax' has been broadly defined to encompass 'any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government.'” Several charges were expressly excluded from this definition, but at issue in this case are charges “imposed for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service or product.” The government service or product at issue was electricity: Appellant was an individual residing in the City of Anaheim (the City) who claimed her local public electric utility approved rates which exceed the cost of providing electricity. She claimed the City has been transferring utility revenues to its general fund and recouping these amounts from ratepayers without obtaining voter approval. But because voters approved the practice through an amendment to the City’s charter, the Court of Appeal concluded the City has not violated article XIIIC, and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on this basis. View "Palmer v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law
Olympic and Georgia Partners, LLC v. County of Los Angeles
Tax assessors sometimes appraise commercial property using the income method: they forecast yearly income the property will yield and discount the future stream to present value. This method requires assessors to subtract income fairly ascribed to intangible assets, including those directly necessary to the productive use of the property. (Roehm v. Orange County (1948) 32 Cal.2d 280, 285 (Roehm); Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Board of Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th 593, 614–615, 617–619 (Elk Hills). Defendant County of Los Angeles assessed a hotel owned by the protesting taxpayer, Olympic and Georgia Partners, LLC (Olympic). The County’s assessor included income from three intangibles: a subsidy, a discount; and some hotel enterprise assets.The Second Appellate District reversed the portion of the judgment concerning the subsidy and the discount. Regarding the hotel enterprise assets, the court affirmed the trial court’s remand of the case to the County’s Assessment Appeals Board (Board) for re-evaluation. The court explained that Defendant violated the Roehm and Elk Hills rules. The court explained that the County argued there is no agreement the subsidy is an intangible asset. But the Board did find it was an intangible asset. The County does not argue the subsidy is something tangible you can touch. Accordingly, the court found that this argument is ineffective. View "Olympic and Georgia Partners, LLC v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law
Furst v. Rebholz
The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal affirming the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Landlord in this action he brought seeking a refund of the amount he paid after a property appraiser determined that he had improperly received a homestead tax exemption, holding that Landlord's arguments in support of the district court's decision were unpersuasive.At issue in this case was how to determine the scope of Landlord's residence for purpose of the homestead tax exemption. Landlord lived on the bottom floor, and during the entire time period in question Landlord rented a portion of the structure to at least one tenant. When the county property appraiser concluded that at least fifteen percent of the property was not being used as Landlord's residence and thus revoked the homestead exemption as to fifteen percent of the total property. After he paid $7,000 in back taxes, penalties, and interest Landlord brought this action. The circuit court granted judgment for Landlord, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the district court erred by concluding that, for purposes of applying the homestead tax exemption, the entire structure was Landlord's residence. View "Furst v. Rebholz" on Justia Law
Cultiva La Salud v. State of California
In 2018, the California Legislature passed a law titled the “Keep Groceries Affordable Act of 2018” (the Groceries Act). The Act sought prohibit charter cities, counties, and other local governments from imposing taxes, fees, or assessments on certain grocery items, including, most relevant here, on sodas and other sugar-sweetened drinks. The act also imposes a penalty—the loss of all revenue from sales and use taxes—for violations of its terms. But it imposes its penalty only on charter cities and only if the city’s “tax, fee, or other assessment is a valid exercise of [the] city’s authority under Section 5 of Article XI of the California Constitution with respect to the municipal affairs of that city.” A nonprofit health advocacy organization and a city council member appearing in her individual capacity filed suit to challenge the act’s penalty provision, arguing the provision wrongly served to penalize charter cities that lawfully exercised their constitutional rights under the home rule doctrine. The trial court ultimately agreed the Groceries Act’s penalty provision was unlawful and deemed it unenforceable. On appeal, the State of California, the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration, and the department’s director (collectively, the Department) challenged the trial court’s decision, arguing: (1) the Groceries Act’s penalty provision did not penalize a charter city only when its tax on groceries “is a valid exercise” of the city’s constitutional powers; and (2) even if the trial court properly construed the act’s penalty provision, the trial court should have severed certain words from the penalty provision rather than deem the provision unenforceable in its entirety. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Cultiva La Salud v. State of California" on Justia Law
A-1 Recovery Towing & Recovery, Inc.
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DFA) concerning its adjustments made to A-1 Recovery Towing & Recovery, Inc.'s taxable income and to its shareholders' accounts for tax years 2013-2017, holding that the circuit court failed to follow Ark. Code Ann. 26-18-406 when it affirmed DFA's decision sua sponte.Section 26-18-406 provides that a suit in circuit court to contest a DFA assessment "shall be tried de novo." On appeal, A-1 argued that the circuit court erroneously sua sponte entered its order affirming the DFA's decision because the order deprived A-1 of its right to a trial de novo under section 26-18-406. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the circuit court deprived A-1 of its opportunity to meet proof with proof prior to affirming DFA's decision sua sponte. View "A-1 Recovery Towing & Recovery, Inc." on Justia Law
Cenark Investment Group, LLC v. Walther
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court affirming a decision of the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DFA) concerning certain adjustments to Cenark Investment Group, LLC's taxable income and to its shareholders' accounts for tax years 2016-2018, holding that the circuit court misinterpreted Ark. Code Ann. 26-18-406.Specifically at issue was the circuit court's interpretation section 26-18-406, which provides that a lawsuit brought in circuit court to contest a DFA assessment "shall be tried de novo." On appeal, Cenark argued that the circuit court erred in affirming DFA's decision without holding a trial de novo pursuant to section 26-18-406. For the reasons set forth in A-1 Recovery Towing and Recovery, Inc. v. Walther, 2023 Ark.___ (CV-22-281), also decided today, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Cenark Investment Group, LLC v. Walther" on Justia Law
Citation Partners, LLC v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court reversing the judgment of the tax appeals commission concluding that the sales tax exemption in Wisconsin Act 185, which expanded an existing sales tax exemption to include the sale of aircraft parts or maintenance, did not apply to Lessees' payments for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Citation Partners, LLC owned an aircraft that it leased to Lessees. Citation Partners charged per-flight-hour rates for aircraft repairs and maintenance as part of the total amount Lessees paid to lease the aircraft, which rates corresponded to the amount Citation Partners spent on repairs and maintenance. Citation Partners argued that this portion of the lease payment was tax exempt because it was a sale of aircraft parts or maintenance. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that the payments were not exempt from sales tax under the plain language of the statutes. View "Citation Partners, LLC v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law