Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Roark Amusement & Vending owned and leased coin-operated amusement crane machines found in supermarkets, restaurants, and shopping malls. Roark sought a refund of the sales taxes it paid on the plush toys it purchased to stock its machines for a three-and-a-half year period, arguing that the toys were exempt under the Tax Code's sale-for-resale exemption. The Comptroller of Public Accounts disputed that the exemption applied. The trial court granted the Comptroller's motion for summary judgment and denied Roark's refund request. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the toys were exempt, and remanded the case for a determination of the refund amount due Roark. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the toys were "tangible personal property" acquired by Roark "fore the purpose of transferring" the toys "as an integral part of a taxable service", and therefore, Roark qualified for a sales-tax exemption on the toys that filled its crane machines. View "Combs v. Roark Amusement & Vending, LP" on Justia Law

Southern Crushed Concrete (SCC) filed a municipal permit application with the City of Houston to move a concrete-crushing facility to a new location. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (Commission) had previously issued a permit authorizing construction of the facility at the proposed location. The City, however, denied the permit because the concrete-crushing operations would violate a city ordinance's location restriction. SCC sued the City, arguing that the ordinance was preempted by the Texas Clean Air Act (TCAA), which provides that a municipal ordinance may not make unlawful a condition or act approved or authorized under the TCAA or the Commission's rules or orders. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance was preempted by the TCAA and unenforceable. View "S. Crushed Concrete, LLC v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Respondent sued the City of Houston. After an attempted settlement, Respondent asserted that the City breached the settlement agreement. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the City filed another plea to the jurisdiction (2006 plea), arguing that it was immune from suit. The trial court implicitly denied the City's plea and set the case for trial. The City did not appeal. After Respondent died, the case was transferred to probate court. There the City filed a motion for summary judgment and an amended plea to the jurisdiction. The probate court denied the City's motion for summary judgment and, construing the City's amended plea as a motion to reconsider the 2006 plea, denied it. The City filed an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals dismissed part of the appeal but considered the merits of part of it. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding the court of appeals erred by failing to dismiss the entire appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the amended plea was a motion to reconsider the 2006 plea, and time had expired for interlocutory appeal from it. View "City of Houston v. Estate of Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner suffered an injury while in the course and scope of his employment. The employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier paid medical benefits but contested the extent of Petitioner's entitlement to impairment income benefits. The Department of Insurance's Workers' Compensation Division determined that Petitioner had an impairment rating of twenty percent. The trial court reversed the agency's decision, ruling that Petitioner had no valid impairment rating. The court of appeals affirmed. While Petitioner's appeal to the Supreme Court was pending, the Court held in American Zurich Insurance Co. v. Samudio that the absence of a valid impairment rating that had been submitted to the agency did not deprive a reviewing court of subject matter jurisdiction. In light of its decision in Samudio, the Court then reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions that the court remand the case to the Division in light of its determination that Petitioner had no valid impairment rating. View "DeLeon v. Royal Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Respondent injured his back while working, and his employer's workers' compensation insurer, Texas Mutual Insurance Company (TMIC), accepted the injury as compensable. Three years later when it was discovered that Respondent had herniated lumbar intervertebral discs, TMIC disputed whether they were causally related to the original injury. The Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers' Compensation determined that the disc herniations were related to the original injury and ordered TMIC to pay medical benefits, which it did. Respondent later sued TMIC for damages caused by its delay in paying benefits. The trial court rendered judgment for Respondent, and the court of appeals affirmed. Based on the Court's recent decision in Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ruttiger, the Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for TMIC. View "Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morris" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether taxpayers who were sued for nonpayment of property taxes lost their entitlement to contest liability based on non-ownership when the taxing authorities non-suited after the taxpayers paid the disputed taxes under protest. The taxing authorities filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the taxpayers failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Tax Code. The district court denied the plea. The court of appeals reversed and granted the plea. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the taxpayers did not lose their entitlement to contest tax liability on the basis of non-ownership when the taxing units non-suited and the taxpayers were realigned as plaintiffs. View "Morris v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the fair market value of acreage on which a gas processing facility was located. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting an expert's testimony that allegedly violated the value-to-the-taker rule, which prohibits measuring land's value by its unique value to a condemnor in determining a landowner's compensation. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the expert's testimony violated the rule because it impermissibly focused on the condemnor's interest in retaining the property and was therefore inadmissible. Remanded. View "Enbridge Pipelines L.P. v. Avinger Timber, LLC" on Justia Law

The City notified a building owner that her property was in disrepair and that, unless she repaired it, the City might demolish it. After the owner failed to remedy the problem, the City declared the property a public nuisance and condemned it. Rather than appeal the nuisance determination, the property owner asserted a takings claim after the demolition. The City field an immunity-based plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the administrative-level decision to demolish the owner's property did not preclude her from seeking a de novo review of that decision in a constitutional suit. The Supreme Court reversed in part and rendered judgment dismissing the owner's claims, holding that because the owner never appealed her nuisance determination, her takings claims were barred, and the trial court correctly dismissed them. View "City of Beaumont v. Como" on Justia Law

Respondent, a professor at Prairie View A&M University, filed a complaint with the EEOC and the Texas Workforce Commission civil rights division (TWC), alleging race and nationality-based pay discrimination, about two years after her promotion to full professor. Respondent subsequently filed suit against the University in state court under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). The University filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting Respondent's complaint was untimely filed pursuant to the 180-day limitations period under the TCHRA. The trial court denied the University's plea. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the federal Ledbetter Act, which provides that the limitations period begins anew each time a claimant receives a paycheck containing a discriminatory amount, applies to claims brought under the TCHRA, and Respondent's claim was therefore timely because she received a paycheck containing an alleged discriminatory amount within 180 days of the date she filed her complain with the TWC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Ledbetter Act does not apply to a claim brought under the TCHRA; and (2) because Respondent failed to timely file her complaint with the TWC, her suit was jurisdictionally barred. View "Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha " on Justia Law

As tasked by the Legislature, the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) identified potential reservoir sites. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. purchased some of the wetlands on one of the sites identified by the TWDB as a potential reservoir location. When the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers denied its application for a mitigation banking permit because the State had identified the site as a potential reservoir, Hearts Bluff sued the State and the Corps for a taking for interfering with its asserted right to commercially develop the land as a mitigation bank. At issue was whether a takings claim against the State may be predicated on the denial of a permit by the federal government when the State had no authority to grant or deny the permit. The trial court denied the State's plea to the jurisdiction, which alleged that Hearts Bluff failed to plead a valid takings claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that absent demonstrating bad faith, Hearts Bluff did not establish the existence of jurisdiction in this case because it did not establish a viable takings claim. View "Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law