Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Muir, who has a congenital birth defect presenting as a hernia in his right scrotum, challenged the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Final Rule authorizing the use of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) scanners at airport security checkpoints. Muir argued that the scanners, which use electromagnetic radiation, flag his hernia as a threat, leading to painful and potentially life-threatening pat-downs. He claimed that the Final Rule and TSA’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) are arbitrary and capricious, contrary to TSA’s statutory authority, and violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court found that Muir had not raised his statutory challenges during the rulemaking process, resulting in forfeiture of those claims. However, the court agreed with Muir’s Rehabilitation Act claim, noting that TSA’s failure to provide an accommodation for his disability could be a violation of the Act. The court determined that Muir had identified a reasonable accommodation—screening with a walk-through metal detector (WTMD)—and remanded the case to TSA to determine if this accommodation would impose an undue burden on the agency.The court denied Muir’s other challenges to the Final Rule and his motion to supplement the record. The court emphasized that TSA must conduct the appropriate administrative process to address the implementation of Muir’s reasonable accommodation and explore alternative accommodations if necessary. View "Muir v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Crowley Government Services, Inc. ("Crowley") entered into a contract with the Department of Defense United States Transportation Command ("USTRANSCOM") in 2016 to provide transportation coordination services, which involved hiring motor carriers to transport freight. The General Services Administration ("GSA"), not a party to the contract, began auditing Crowley's bills under a provision of the Transportation Act of 1940, claiming Crowley overbilled USTRANSCOM by millions of dollars. GSA sought to recover these overcharges by garnishing future payments to Crowley.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Crowley's Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") claims, holding that the claims were essentially contractual and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that Crowley's suit was not a contract claim and remanded the case. On remand, the District Court held that GSA could audit both carriers and non-carriers but agreed with Crowley that the USTRANSCOM Contracting Officer's interpretations governed any GSA audits. The court enjoined GSA from issuing Notices of Overcharge ("NOCs") contrary to the Contracting Officer's determinations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that 31 U.S.C. § 3726(b) allows GSA to audit only bills presented by carriers and freight forwarders. The court found that Crowley is not a carrier because it does not physically transport freight nor is it contractually bound to help perform the movement of goods. Consequently, the court reversed the District Court's decision on the scope of § 3726(b) and remanded for further proceedings, permanently enjoining GSA from conducting postpayment audits of Crowley's bills. View "Crowley Government Services, Inc. v. General Services Administration" on Justia Law

Axalta Coating Systems LLC ("Axalta") provided a can of flammable paint to FedEx for air shipment. The paint spilled during transit due to a loose lid. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) filed an administrative complaint alleging Axalta failed to package the paint according to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Axalta in violation and imposed a $1,900 penalty, which the FAA Administrator affirmed. Axalta petitioned for review, arguing the administrative adjudication violated the Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Jarkesy.The ALJ denied Axalta's motion to dismiss the complaint and a motion to disqualify the ALJ. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded Axalta violated 49 C.F.R. § 171.2(e) and 49 C.F.R. § 173.24(b)(1), assessing a $1,900 penalty. Axalta appealed, and the FAA cross-appealed for a higher penalty. The Administrator affirmed the ALJ's decision. Axalta then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for review.The Third Circuit held that the administrative adjudication did not violate the Seventh Amendment. The court distinguished the case from Jarkesy, noting that the HMR's technical standards were not derived from common law, unlike the securities fraud provisions in Jarkesy. The court concluded that the FAA's enforcement action was a public right that could be adjudicated administratively without a jury. The court also rejected Axalta's additional arguments, including claims of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, improper ALJ appointment, statute of limitations issues, and due process violations. The petition for review was denied. View "Axalta Coating Systems LLC v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

Several rail carriers challenged a Final Rule issued by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) that allows a railway shipper or receiver to request a "reciprocal switching agreement." This agreement requires a rail carrier with a monopoly over a certain rail line to compete with another carrier for specific rail traffic. The carriers argued that the Final Rule exceeded the STB's statutory authority under the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, which grants the agency authority to prescribe reciprocal switching. They also contended that aspects of the Final Rule exceeded the Board's ancillary powers and were arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by the record.The STB issued the Final Rule after a notice-and-comment period, aiming to address service performance issues of Class I rail carriers, which were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Board held a hearing in April 2022 and required several Class I carriers to submit service recovery plans. Subsequently, the Board proposed new regulations to improve service by increasing competition, leading to the Final Rule. The rule establishes procedures for shippers or receivers to request reciprocal switching agreements if the incumbent carrier fails to meet certain performance standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Final Rule exceeded the STB's statutory authority because it did not require a finding of inadequate service by the incumbent carrier before prescribing a reciprocal switching agreement. The court emphasized that the Staggers Rail Act requires such a finding to determine that a reciprocal switching agreement is "in the public interest." Consequently, the court granted the petition, vacated the Final Rule, and remanded the case to the STB for further proceedings. View "Grand Trunk Corporation v STB" on Justia Law

Michael Solondz, a commercial airline pilot, was diagnosed with anxiety and prescribed mirtazapine after experiencing side effects from another medication. Mirtazapine effectively managed his anxiety without significant side effects. Solondz sought medical clearance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to resume flying, but the FAA categorically disallows pilots from flying while taking mirtazapine, despite allowing conditional approvals for other antidepressants.The FAA denied Solondz's request for a Special Issuance medical certificate multiple times, citing his use of mirtazapine, anxiety, sleep apnea, optic neuritis, and a history of atrial fibrillation. Solondz provided evidence that his conditions were well-managed and that mirtazapine did not cause significant side effects. The FAA's final denial letter reiterated these reasons and added a concern about a potential malignant melanoma diagnosis, which Solondz disputed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FAA failed to provide a reasonable explanation for categorically disallowing pilots taking mirtazapine from obtaining medical certification. The court noted that the FAA's process for conditionally approving other antidepressants involves a six-month waiting period and individualized medical assessments, which could also apply to mirtazapine.The court vacated the FAA's final denial letter and remanded the case for further explanation. The court emphasized that the FAA must articulate a clear rationale for its policy and avoid offering explanations that contradict the evidence. The petition for review was granted, and the case was remanded to the FAA for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Solondz v. FAA" on Justia Law

A group of seven Utah counties, known as the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition, applied to the U.S. Surface Transportation Board for approval to construct an 88-mile railroad line in Utah's Uinta Basin. This project aimed to connect the oil-rich region to the national freight rail network, facilitating crude oil transportation to Gulf Coast refineries. The Board prepared a 3,600-page Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) addressing the project's significant environmental effects and feasible alternatives. However, the EIS did not fully analyze the potential environmental impacts of increased upstream oil drilling and downstream oil refining.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reviewed the case after petitions were filed by a Colorado county and several environmental organizations. The D.C. Circuit found numerous violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the EIS, specifically criticizing the Board for not sufficiently analyzing the environmental effects of upstream oil drilling and downstream oil refining. Consequently, the D.C. Circuit vacated both the EIS and the Board's final approval order for the railroad line.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision. The Court held that the D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases. The Supreme Court clarified that NEPA requires agencies to focus on the environmental effects of the proposed project itself, not on separate projects that are distinct in time or place. The Court concluded that the Board's EIS complied with NEPA's procedural requirements by addressing the environmental effects of the 88-mile railroad line, without needing to evaluate the impacts of upstream oil drilling or downstream oil refining. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) increased the rental fees for hangar space at state-owned airports. Five tenants, who own hangar facilities at the Northeast Kingdom International Airport and the Stowe-Morrisville State Airport, appealed the rate increases to the Transportation Board. They argued that the rent increase did not comply with the terms of their leases and was arbitrary. The leases allowed AOT to adjust rent based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), current market value for the land, and maintenance costs for the airport. The tenants contended that AOT improperly considered changes outside the previous lease term.The Transportation Board consolidated the tenants' appeals and reviewed the administrative records and memoranda submitted by both parties. The Board found that AOT had invested significantly in airport improvements and conducted a market-value analysis for leased space. However, the Board noted that details of the analysis were not included in the administrative record. The Board concluded that AOT was permitted to consider changes to market value and maintenance costs outside of the prior lease term but admonished AOT to provide a clearer analysis in the future.The tenants appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the rent increases were arbitrary and capricious due to a lack of transparent methodology. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's conclusion that AOT could consider changes outside the prior lease term but reversed and remanded the decision concerning the fairness of the rent increases. The Court held that the Board should have sought a complete record from AOT to determine whether the rent levels were fair and conducted a new adjudication consistent with this opinion. View "In re State Airport Hangar Lease Disputes" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in 2020, which authorized the transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by rail in newly designed tank cars without requiring a permit. LNG is a hazardous material that poses significant risks if released, including explosions, fires, and the formation of ultra-cold gas clouds. The rule did not limit the number of LNG tank cars per train or set a mandatory speed limit, raising safety concerns among various stakeholders.The rule was challenged by a coalition of environmental nonprofits, several states, and the Puyallup Tribe of Indians. They argued that PHMSA did not adequately consider the safety risks and that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) required the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The petitioners contended that the decision not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that PHMSA's decision not to prepare an EIS was indeed arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that transporting LNG by rail poses a low-probability but high-consequence risk of derailment, which could result in catastrophic environmental impacts. The court emphasized that PHMSA failed to adequately consider the probability and potential consequences of such accidents and did not impose sufficient safety measures, such as a mandatory speed limit or a cap on the number of LNG tank cars per train.The court held that PHMSA's failure to prepare an EIS violated NEPA and vacated the LNG Rule, remanding the case to PHMSA for further proceedings. The court's decision underscores the importance of thoroughly assessing environmental risks and adhering to NEPA's requirements in rulemaking processes. View "Sierra Club v. DOT" on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco County Transportation Authority challenged a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to issue a phase I driverless autonomous vehicle (AV) deployment permit to Waymo, LLC for fared passenger service in San Francisco and parts of San Mateo County. The petitioners argued that the PUC failed to follow the law and disregarded significant public safety issues. However, the record showed that the PUC considered and responded to the safety concerns raised by the petitioners, noting that few incidents involved Waymo driverless AVs, each was minor, and none involved injuries.The PUC had previously issued a decision establishing a pilot program for the regulation of AV passenger carriers, which included both drivered and driverless AVs. The petitioners participated in these proceedings but did not challenge the decision at that time. Waymo submitted an advice letter in December 2022 seeking a phase I driverless AV deployment permit, which was protested by the San Francisco entities. The PUC's Consumer Protection and Enforcement Division circulated a draft resolution authorizing Waymo's permit, and after considering comments and holding meetings, the PUC issued a final resolution in August 2023, authorizing Waymo to provide fared driverless AV service.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and found that the PUC acted within its authority and did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that the PUC's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including data showing that Waymo driverless AVs had not been involved in any collisions resulting in injuries. The court also upheld the PUC's use of the advice letter process, as it was authorized by the PUC's prior decision. The court denied the relief requested by the petitioners, affirming the PUC's decision to issue the phase I driverless AV deployment permit to Waymo. View "City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Donald Blazer was involved in a vehicle accident and voluntarily submitted to a preliminary breath test (PBT), which showed a blood alcohol content of .102 percent. However, he refused to submit to a blood draw. The South Dakota Department of Public Safety (Department) notified Blazer of its intent to disqualify his commercial driver’s license (CDL) for life, citing this refusal as a second violation of SDCL 32-12A-36, with the first being a 2014 DUI conviction. Blazer requested an administrative hearing, and the Department affirmed the disqualification of his CDL for life.Blazer appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the Department’s decision. The circuit court concluded that Blazer’s voluntary submission to the breath test constituted a submission to a chemical analysis, meaning his refusal to submit to the blood draw could not result in the disqualification of his CDL. The Department then appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Court held that under SDCL 32-23-1.2, a preliminary breath test (PBT) is permitted and may be required in addition to a chemical test. The Court determined that Blazer’s refusal to submit to the blood draw constituted a refusal to submit to a chemical analysis as required by SDCL 32-12A-46. This refusal was a second violation under SDCL 32-12A-36, justifying the disqualification of Blazer’s CDL for life under SDCL 32-12A-37. The Court emphasized that a PBT is a preliminary test and does not fulfill the requirement for a chemical analysis under the implied consent laws. View "Blazer v. Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law