Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners challenged an order of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) concerning the proposed construction by the Port of Portland of a new runway at Hillsboro Airport (HIO). On appeal, petitioners argued that the decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was unreasonable for several reasons, chief among them the FAA's failure to consider the environmental impacts of any increased demand for HIO resulting from the addition of a runway. Petitioners also argued that the FAA did not afford them a public hearing within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 47106. As a preliminary matter, the court addressed the Port's and the FAA's arguments that petitioners waived their claims because they failed to raise them during the public comment period. The court held, after finding that certain precedents did not apply here, that remand was necessary for the FAA to consider the environmental impact of increased demand resulting from the HIO expansion project, if any, pursuant to the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA), 40 C.F.R. 1508.8(b). The court also held that an EIS was not warranted based on petitioners' contention that the context and intensity of the project independently required an EIS. The court further held that petitioners' arguments regarding whether the FAA afforded them a public hearing was unpersuasive where the hearing afforded petitioners was a "public hearing" within the meaning of section 47106 and FAA Order 5050.4B. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded with instructions to the FAA to consider the environmental impact of increased demand resulting from the HIO expansion project pursuant to section 1508.8(b).

These appeals involved two essentially identical actions filed in two different states by different groups of plaintiffs, each seeking to represent a class. The actions sought damages on the ground that plaintiffs' personal information was obtained by defendants in violation of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725. Joining other courts which have dealt with similar claims, the court held that defendants' actions were not unlawful under the DPPA and affirmed the dismissal of the actions by the district courts.

Petitioners filed a joint petition for review of an order of the Surface Transportation Board (Board), which found, among other things, that a railroad company's practice of charging petitioners interest on certain unpaid charges at a rate of 1-2% per month was not an unreasonable practice under 49 U.S.C. 10702(2). The Board filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that 28 U.S.C. 1336(b) vested a federal district court with jurisdiction to review the Board's determination of the interest-rate issue to the extent one of the petitioners (Railroad Salvage) raised it. The court agreed and dismissed the petition to the extent that it asked the court to review the Board's resolution of the interest-rate issue with respect to Railroad Salvage. The court held that, although its jurisdiction to review the Board's determination of the interest-rate issue as to the other petitioner (Wiedeman) was not in dispute, its resolution of the issue could moot the referring district court's resolution of the issue with respect to Railroad Salvage. To ensure that the district court was allowed a meaningful review of the issue, the court held the petition in abeyance to the extent Wiedeman sought review of the Board's determination of the interest-rate issue.

The Commission of Transportation requested a condemnation order for a portion of appellant Richard Lepak's land for the improvement and widening of a highway. After a condemnation hearing, the district court concluded that improving and widening the highway was a legitimate public purpose and that the state Department of Transportation had established a reasonable necessity. Therefore, the district court rejected the challenged to the proposed taking, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on review was whether the State had a valid public purpose for the taking because part of Lepak's land would be used to build a private road to mitigate damages to a neighboring parcel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the purpose of the taking in this case met the definition of "public use" or "public purpose" as set forth in Minn. Stat. 117.025.

The Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) issued a show cause order alleging that Bartlett Grain Company solicited for-hire motor carriers who violated several motor carrier safety laws. Bartlett answered the show cause order, contesting the KCC's jurisdiction over it with respect to its hiring of third-party motor carriers. Upon reconsideration, the KCC found it had jurisdiction over Bartlett to proceed. On review, the district court affirmed. Bartlett appealed, and the KCC stayed the ongoing agency proceedings pending judicial review. The Supreme Court transferred the case to its court on its own motion. Before considering the merits of the jurisdictional issue, the Court first addressed the issue raised sua sponte by the Court, i.e., whether the agency's order finding it had jurisdiction over the substantive violations alleged in the show cause order was a final agency action subject to judicial review. The Court held that the action from which Bartlett appealed was a nonfinal agency action and, therefore, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act prevents states and their subdivisions from imposing discriminatory taxes against railroads. 49 U.S.C. 11501. In 2008, the drainage district, a subdivision of Illinois, changed its method for calculating assessments. All other owners are assessed on a per-acre formula, but railroad, pipeline, and utility land were to be assessed on the basis of "benefit," apparently based on the difference in value between land within the district and land outside the levees; annual crop rentals being paid; and agricultural production of lands within the district. Two rail carriers brought suit under a section of the Act, which prevents imposition of "another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier." The district court held that the assessment was prohibited by the Act, but concluded that it was powerless to enjoin the tax. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the court has authority to enjoin the tax, but, under principles of comity, should eliminate only the discriminatory aspects, not the entire scheme. The assessment is a tax that, raises general revenues; its ultimate use is for the whole district. It imposes a proportionately heavier tax on railroading than other activities.

The New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) appealed from an order of the district court enjoining the enforcement of an NYCTA policy requiring third parties to obtain the consent of those contesting notices of violations before NYCTA's Transit Adjudication Bureau in order to observe such hearings. At issue was whether the public had a right to access these proceedings. The court held that the First Amendment guaranteed the public a presumptive right of access to the NYCTA's adjudicatory proceedings and that the NYCTA had not overcome that presumption.

Southwest Airlines Co. and 18 other airlines alleged that the TSA's determination of their year 2000 costs was arbitrary and capricious for purposes of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. At issue was whether the TSA should have relied on the Simat, Helliesen & Eichner, Inc. report (SH&E report) commissioned by the TSA or, at least, should have more fully explained why it rejected the conclusions of the Campbell Aviation Consultants report (Campbell report) submitted by the airlines. The court held that the TSA's determination was not arbitrary or capricious when the TSA chose the SH&E report with good reason where it sent a letter to each airline stating that it had thoroughly reviewed the Campbell report and concluded that the report was insufficient due to its limited data and broad, simplistic methodologies and the letter also explained SH&E's more extensive methodology. The court also discussed and disposed of the three other arguments the airlines raised. Accordingly, the court denied the airlines' petitions for review.

Plaintiff, owner and operator of a flat-rate ground transportation service, filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Hillsborough County Public Transportation Commission's (Commission) regulations required him to obtain certificates and permits for his vehicles were preempted by 49 U.S.C. 14501, also known as the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century. Specifically, plaintiff contended that section 14501(a)(1)(C) preempted the Commission's regulation regarding his 15-passenger vehicle and section 14501(c)(1) preempted the Commission's regulation regarding his 7-passenger minivan. The court affirmed the district court's decision rejecting plaintiff's first argument and adopted that court's reasoning. The court also held that, because plaintiff transported property only as an ancillary service to the transportation of passengers he was not a "[m]otor carrier of property" under section 14501(c). Consequently, it followed that the provision and its subparts did not preempt the Commission's luxury service transportation rule. Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the Commission.

Appellants formerly maintained railroad tracks on a parcel of land in Stockton, California, that was contaminated by petroleum. The petroleum was spilled at a nearby industrial site and migrated onto the property via an underground french drain that appellants had installed in order to remove water from the roadbed. At issue was whether appellants were liable for the contamination of the property under the law of nuisance or under California's Polanco Redevelopment Act (Act), Cal. Health & Safety Code 33459 et seq. The court held that there was no evidence that appellants actively or knowingly caused or permitted the contamination as required for nuisance liability and liability under the Act's Water Code provision, Cal. Health & Safety Code 33459(h). The court also held that appellants were not "owners" of the property under the Act's Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a), provision when the contamination occurred. The court further held that, because the record established no genuine issue of material fact as to appellants' liability, appellants were entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, the court need not reach any of the damages issues on appeal or cross-appeal.