Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Tribe and CTGW brought suit against the County for imposing property taxes on the Great Wolf Lodge located on the Grand Mound Property, which was tribal land held in trust by the government. At issue was whether state and local governments have the power to tax permanent improvements built on non-reservation land owned by the United States and held in trust for an Indian tribe. The court concluded that Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones made it clear that where the United States owns land covered by 21 U.S.C. 465, and holds it in trust for the use of a tribe, section 465 exempts permanent improvements on that land from state and local taxation. Accordingly, under Mescalero, the County was barred from taxing the Great Wolf Lodge during the time in which the Grand Mound Property was owned by the United States and held in trust under section 465. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the County. View "Chehalis Tribes v. Thurston Cnty." on Justia Law

Nancy Mick, as personal representative of the estate of Stephen Bradley, sought to have the Kent County Sheriff's Department held in contempt of court. She obtained an order from the probate court to take Stephen Bradley into custody for a psychiatric evaluation. The sheriff's department did not arrive, and Mr. Bradley shot and killed himself. Mick originally filed a wrongful-death action against the sheriff's department, but the department was granted governmental immunity from suit. Mick then filed her contempt action, arguing the estate of Mr. Bradley suffered damages as a result of the sheriff department's failure to show. The department again moved for dismissal on immunity grounds, but the probate court denied that motion. The department then appealed the probate court's decision at circuit court, which reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, finding that the governmental tort liability act (GTLA) did not apply in this case. The department appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court the department was entitled to dismissal on an immunity basis, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "In re Bradley Estate" on Justia Law

Neil Bartelson appeals from a district court order denying his petition to remove Guardian and Protective Services ("GAPS") as the personal representative of the Estate of Ralph Bartelson, an order denying his motion to vacate the order denying his petition and an order awarding attorney's fees. Ralph Bartelson had four children--Jean Valer, Jane Haught, Bartelson and Diane Fischer. In 2008, the district court approved a settlement agreement appointing Valer as guardian and GAPS as conservator. Ralph Bartelson died August 23, 2008, and GAPS was appointed the personal representative of the estate. Bartelson and Fischer alleged Valer and Haught misappropriated Ralph Bartelson's funds. GAPS did not pursue a misappropriation claim against Valer and Haught. The district court ordered it did not have jurisdiction over claims of misappropriation occurring before the court's 2008 appointment of a guardian and conservator for Ralph Bartelson. Bartelson and Fischer appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision, holding the court erred in determining it did not have jurisdiction over the misappropriation claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings and for the court to determine whether Bartelson and Fischer had standing to assert their misappropriation claims when they did not allege that GAPS breached its fiduciary duty by not filing a misappropriation claim against Valer and Haught. On remand, Bartelson filed a petition to be appointed as the successor personal representative. The district court ruled neither Bartelson nor Fischer's estate had standing to assert their misappropriation claims. The court denied a motion to reconsider. Bartelson then petitioned to remove GAPS as personal representative of Ralph Bartelson's estate, arguing GAPS breached its fiduciary duty by failing to pursue collection of assets belonging to the estate and failing to bring an action against Valer and Haught for misappropriation, but did not hold a hearing on that motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying Bartelson's petition for removal of GAPS as the personal representative without conducting a hearing. The case was remanded for a hearing on the petition. View "Estate of Bartelson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the administratrix of a Massachusetts estate appointed by a Massachusetts court. Part of the estate was a parcel of real property located in Maine that was later sold. The estate and the IRS agreed to value the back parcel at $950,000. Plaintiff later filed an amended Maine estate tax return, but insufficient funds remained in the estate to pay the Maine assessment. Plaintiff received a notice of assessment for Maine estate tax informing her that, as the estate's personal representative, she was personally liable for the money owed by the estate. Upon Plaintiff's request for reconsideration, the Assessor upheld an adjusted assessment of $98,180. The superior court vacated the Assessor's decision, concluding that the Assessor lacked jurisdiction to impose personal liability for unpaid estate taxes on a personal representative appointed by an out-of-state court to administer a foreign estate. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment against Plaintiff, holding that Maine tax law provides the Assessor with the authority to hold a personal representative appointed by an out-of-state court personally liable for unpaid Maine estate taxes resulting from the sale of real property located in Maine. View "Metcalf v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Commonwealth Court correctly interpreted 24 Pa.C.S. 8507(e) to require that the Public School Employees' Retirement System nomination of benefits form be completed in its entirely in the member/decedent's own hand in order to effectuate a valid change of beneficiary. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court erred, and held that the Board correctly determined that under the facts of this case, section 8507(e) allowed for distribution of retirement benefits at issue to the appellant. View "Snizaski v. Public School Employees' Retirement Board" on Justia Law

Before Decedent's death, the Department of Human Services (DHS) expended $94,162 in medical assistance payments on Decedent's behalf. Neither administratrixes of Decedent's estate notified DHS that Decedent's estate had commenced. More than three years after Decedent's death, DHS learned Decedent's estate had been opened and filed a claim out of time with the probate court, seeking reimbursement for the medical assistance payments it had paid on Decedent's behalf prior to her death. The probate court entered an order allowing the claim. The estate appealed, arguing that DHS's claim was time barred. The superior court concluded that DHS was not precluded under the statute of limitations from filing its claims for medical assistance payments and entered summary judgment in DHS's favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations was not triggered until the date DHS received notice that the state had been opened, and therefore, its claim was not time-barred. View "In re Estate of Manchester" on Justia Law

In 2007, the decedent allegedly sustained personal injuries while disembarking from a bus operated by [defendant]. Decedent died a year later from causes unrelated to the bus accident. In 2009, more than two years, but less than three years, after the bus incident -- plaintiff, decedent's personal representative, filed a complaint alleging that [defendant] had negligently injured decedent and sought damages for the alleged personal injuries. The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether plaintiff's survival action against a public body should have been brought within two years or three years of the alleged injury. One of two statutes provided the applicable statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that ORS 30.075(1) was the governing statute that triggered a two-year limitation period of ORS 30.275(9). View "Bell v. Tri-Met" on Justia Law

In 2002, Pojoaque Tribal Police Officer Kevin Schultz drowned while rescuing a twelve-year-old boy from the Rio Grande near Pilar. On the day of the accident, he had taken the day off from work to chaperone a group of children from his church on a recreational outing. This case arose when Schultz's widow, Cheryl, filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits resulting from her husband's death, but only after the statute of limitations had expired. Notwithstanding the late filing, Mrs. Schultz contended that the conduct of the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department caused her to file after the deadline, and thus, the Supreme Court should consider her complaint timely filed. Both the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) and the Court of Appeals decided that Mrs. Schultz's complaint was not timely filed. However, upon review, the Supreme Court found that based on the fact of this case, the statute was tolled. Therefore the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Department" on Justia Law

Following an automobile accident in which Ron'Drequez Cortez White was killed by a drunk driver, Elizabeth McElroy, the county administrator for Jefferson County and appointed personal representative of White's estate, hired an attorney to file a wrongful-death action against the drunk driver. The wrongful-death action resulted in a recovery, and, following litigation on the issue of the personal representative's fee, the Circuit Court awarded McElroy a fee from the wrongful-death proceeds. Samuel Rodgers, White's father, contended in the litigation below that, as personal representative, McElroy was not entitled to be compensated for her services from the recovery in the wrongful-death action. Rodgers appealed the circuit court's judgment awarding McElroy a fee to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a personal representative may be compensated out of the proceeds recovered in a wrongful-death action. Upon review, the Court concluded that McElroy was not entitled to compensation out of the proceeds of the wrongful-death recovery for her services as personal representative and that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in awarding McElroy compensation out of that recovery. View "Rodgers v. McElroy" on Justia Law

Claimant brought a claim before the Claims Commissioner seeking damages from the State as the coadministrator of the estate of her deceased daughter, who had died while confined in a correctional institution. In the course of Claimant's case, the Commissioner issued subpoenas to the Charlotte Hungerford Hospital requesting information about the decedent's treatment there. The Hospital refused to comply with the subpoena, arguing that the Commissioner had no authority to issue subpoenas to nonparties. The trial court enforced the Commissioner's subpoena, and the appellate court affirmed. Subsequently to the Supreme Court's certification of the Hospital's appeal, Claimant settled underlying case, and consequently, the State no longer sought to enforce the subpoenas. The Supreme Court dismissed the Hospital's appeal as moot and vacated the judgments of the lower courts, as the Court could no longer grant relief. View "State v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp." on Justia Law