Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a claim filed by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare in the probate proceeding of George D. Perry, the deceased spouse of Medicaid recipient Martha J. Perry. The Department sought to recover funds under I.C. 56-218 from the sale of the couple’s home (their only significant asset) to recoup Medicaid benefits paid to Martha during her lifetime. The magistrate court disallowed the Department’s claim for recovery, finding that Martha had no interest in the real property because George, acting for Martha under a power of attorney, conveyed the property to himself before his death. That decision was upheld on appeal to the district court. The Department appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that the district court erred in finding that federal law preempted the Department's ability to recover from George's estate what was once Martha's community property during the marriage. The Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This case concerned the ownership status of Coolwater Ridge Road in Idaho County. The predecessors in interest of appellant Paddison Scenic Properties, Family Trust, L.C. granted rights of way to the United States for a road which became Coolwater Ridge Road. In the district court, Paddison sought a declaratory judgment that the rights of way did not constitute a public road or highway under Idaho law. That court held that the rights of way were public because the criteria for common law dedication were met. Upon review, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment because it concluded this case was not ripe for adjudication.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Glass v. Gates" to answer whether the definition of "any motor vehicle" in OCGA 33-24-51(a) continued to be the broader definition of the term provided for in prior case law, notwithstanding the 2002 passage of OCGA 36-92-1. As inmates at the Troup County Correctional facility, Jonathan Glass and Tony Smith were operating tractors when Smith's tractor got stuck in a ditch. Donrell Gates, Glass' detail supervisor, instructed the men to attach a chain to the tractors so Glass could use his tractor to pull Smith's from the ditch. As Glass did so, Smith engaged his tractor's bush hog, causing a rock to take flight and pierce Glass' throat. Glass bled profusely and died later that day. Plaintiffs, Glass' minor son and the executor of his estate, brought a wrongful death and survivor action against Troup County and Gates. The county sought summary judgment, claiming plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The County asserted that by revising OCGA 33-24-51 (b) in 2002 (effective 2005), the legislature demonstrated its intent to apply the more narrow definition of "motor vehicle" found in OCGA 36-92-1 (6) in determining whether a local government waived sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance on a motor vehicle. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the county did not waive sovereign immunity because neither a tractor nor a bush hog could be deemed a "motor vehicle" under OCGA 36-92-1. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the broader definition of "motor vehicle" should have been applied under 33-24-51, and that therefore, the County waived its sovereign immunity as long as it purchased insurance for the tractor and bush hog used by Smith. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' reasoning, and affirmed by answering the appellate court's original question in the affirmative.

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action challenging 62 Pa. Stat. 1414, which was enacted to regulate special needs trusts. The comprehensive Medicaid eligibility rules enacted by Congress generally mandate that trusts be counted as assets of those seeking Medicaid, but exempt special needs trusts, which are intended to provide disabled individuals with necessities and comforts not covered by Medicaid. Plaintiffs allege Section 1414 is preempted by 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4). The district court held that all but one of the challenged provisions of Section 1414 was preempted, finding that plaintiffs had a private right of action under both Section 1983 and the Supremacy Clause. The court also held that Section 1414 was severable, certified a class, and appointed class counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that the case is justiciable and that plaintiffs have a private right of action. Section 1414's 50% repayment provision, "special needs" provision, expenditure provision, and age restriction are all preempted by federal law. The enforcement provision of Section 1414, however, when used to enforce provisions not otherwise preempted, is a reasonable exercise of the Commonwealth's retained authority to regulate trusts.

The two appeals consolidated for resolution in this case both arose from an attempt by John C. Harrison, acting as personal representative for the estate of Nolan G. Thorsteinson and trustee of The Margie (Dotts) M. Thorsteinson Trust, to avoid an order declaring abandoned a disputed 1.04 c.f.s. interest in the Mexican Ditch. Harrison appealed directly to the Supreme Court adverse rulings of the Water Court in the two cases. With regard to Harrison's Application for a Change of Water Right, the water court granted the Engineers' motion to dismiss at the close of Harrison's case, finding that he was required but failed, to establish the historic use of the right as to which he sought a change in the point of diversion. With regard to Harrison's protest to the inclusion of the interests he claimed in the Mexican Ditch on the Division Engineer's decennial abandonment list, the water court granted the Engineer's motion for abandonment, as a stipulated remedy for Harrison's failure to succeed in his change application. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Harrison neither proved historic use of the right for which he sought a change nor was excepted from the requirement that he do so as a precondition of changing its point of diversion; and because denying a change of water right for failing to prove the historic use of the right did not amount to an unconstitutional taking of property, the water court's dismissal of Harrison's application was affirmed. But because, Harrison did not stipulate to an order of abandonment as the consequence of failing to succeed in his change application, only as the consequence of failing to timely file an application reflecting historic use, the water court's order granting the Engineers' motion for abandonment was reversed.

Michael Joyce, who was frequently exposed to airborne asbestos while working, died of lung cancer. His last documented exposure to asbestos dust was while working for Commercial Welding. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer later awarded the estate of Joyce benefits on a petition for an award of compensation and ordered benefits paid to Mary Joyce, Michael's widow, on a petition for death benefits. Commercial Welding appealed the hearing officer's decision as well as the hearing officer's determinations that (1) it had not cured a previously established violation of the Board's "fourteen-day-rule" because it had not paid interest on the required payment imposed for the violation, and (2) it was not permitted to offset the amount of the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary by the amount of the payment for the fourteen-day rule violation. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the hearing officer's decision. The Court (1) disagreed with the hearing officer's decision that interest was due on the required payment to the Estate, but (2) agreed that the required payment amount could not be used to offset the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary.

This case addressed the effect of a pooled special-needs trust created by an over-65-year-old beneficiary on his medicaid benefits. The Center for Special Needs Trust Administration appealed a summary judgment in favor of the North Dakota Department of Human Services. Invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, the Center alleged that North Dakota's demand for reimbursement and its state regulations violated a paragraph of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4)(C). The court held that the district court properly determined that section 1396p(d)(4)(C) afforded the Center a right of action under section 1983; that North Dakota did not waive its claim to recover for reimbursements and should not be estopped from making that claim; that the Center's claim was without merit; and that preemption did not apply.

Pooled Advocate Trust, Inc. (PATI), the managing corporation for a Medicaid pooled trust, brought a declaratory judgment action on Medicaid eligibility issues associated with the trust and named the South Dakota Department of Social Services (DSS) as a necessary party. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment for PATI. Fred and Gladys Matthews transferred assets to the pooled trust. When the Matthews subsequently applied for Medicaid long-term care benefits, DSS imposed a penalty period because they were over age sixty-five at the time of the transfers. PATI petitioned for further relief, seeking a declaration that DSS could not impose penalty periods for transfers made by pooled trust beneficiaries age sixty-five or older. The circuit court granted PATI's petition. The Matthews also appealed DSS's application of a penalty period, but an ALJ upheld the decision and another circuit court affirmed. DSS appealed the circuit court's order granting PATI's petition and the Matthews appealed the other circuit court's affirmance of the ALJ's ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed the administrative appeal and reversed the declaratory judgment, holding that transfers of assets into pooled trusts by beneficiaries age sixty-five or older may be subject to a transfer penalty period for Medicaid eligibility purposes.

Plaintiff Donna Morris brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for unlawful arrest and excessive force on behalf of her deceased husband, William Morris III, against Defendants Officer Jaime Noe and the City of Sapulpa, Oklahoma. She alleged Defendants violated her husband's rights when Noe forceably arrested him and caused him injury. Defendant Noe moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the district court denied his motion. Defendant Noe then appealed. Finding that Mr. Morris "posed no threat to Noe or others," and that the officer had reason to believe Mr. Morris was "at most, a misdemeanant," the Tenth Circuit held Defendant was not entitled to qualified to immunity on either of Plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court.

In May 2008, seven-year-old Jordan Alexander Robertson was placed in foster care at the home of Verlin Spurgeon and Carol Spurgeon. In June 2008, Jordan drowned in the Spurgeons' swimming pool. James Brakefield, as administrator of Jordan's estate, sued the Spurgeons, among others, in circuit court alleging that they had negligently and/or wantonly caused Jordan's death. The Spurgeons moved the circuit court for a summary judgment, alleging, among other things, that the claims were barred by the doctrines of parental, State, and State-agent immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. The Spurgeons petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against them. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted their petition in part and issued the writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss the negligence claims against the Spurgeons. In all other respects, the Court denied the petition.