Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs William B. Elliott, Tommy J. Evaro, and Andria J. Hernandez were all targets of investigations by a Dona Ana County grand jury. Under New Mexico law they were entitled to target notices that advised them of the right to testify before the grand jury. But the notices they received may not have complied with state law. They filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in federal district court alleging that District Attorney Susana Martinez violated their due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court granted the District Attorney’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the New Mexico statute did not establish a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs appealed. Upon review the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding the statutory right to particular procedures was not a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Sabourin sued the University of Utah in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, claiming, among other things, that it had violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by deciding to eliminate his position and then fire him for cause while he was on leave for childcare in 2006. The district court granted the University summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his FMLA claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: all of Plaintiff’s claims failed because the undisputed facts showed that the University’s adverse decisions were not based on Plaintiff’s taking FMLA leave. The decision to eliminate his position was made before he sought FMLA leave; and he was fired for engaging in a course of insubordination.

Plaintiff-Appellant Anne George wanted to corral her horse on her property with a fence. The United States Forest Service held an easement across Plaintiff's land. Plaintiff offered to leave a gate across the road unlocked, but the Service rejected this option, arguing that the public needs unfettered access to the adjacent Gila National Forest. The parties' wrangling dragged on for years but led nowhere until Plaintiff filed suit to quiet title in 2009. In the end, the Tenth Circuit ruled against her. "Whatever legal entitlement she might have had to build a fence across the Forest Service's road she lost years ago thanks to an even less permeable barrier to entry: the statute of limitations." Plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest to the land granted the government an easement for access to the forest, and each time Plaintiff attempted to fence her property, the government promptly removed it. That, she argued, was inadequate for the government to assert its claim to the easement as being fence-free. Under the plain terms of the Quiet Title Act, the statute of limitations began to run whenever a plaintiff or her predecessor-in-interest knew or should have known of the government’s claim: "[o]ne can be on notice of a claim even if that claim lacks any legal merit. . . . [o]ur precedent does not allow plaintiffs to wait until the adverse claims of the title asserted by them and the United States crystallize into well-defined and open disagreements before commencing a quiet-title action."

In 1997, environmental and recreational groups began seeking to limit the daily number of snowmobiles permitted in Wyoming national parks. In several consolidated cases, Petitioners the State of Wyoming and Park County, Wyoming filed petitions for review of agency action, challenging the 2009 rules governing snowmobile use in the parks. The district court dismissed the petitions for review, holding Petitioners lacked standing to pursue their claims. Snowmobile proponents filed suit in a Wyoming district court to challenge a 2001 National Park Service (NPS) rule limiting snowmobiles in the parks. That suit was settled, but ultimately the resolution of the suit brought the promulgation of another rule (the 2003 rule) that set limits on snowmobiles allowed in the parks. A Washington, D.C. district court invalidated the 2003 rule and reinstated the 2001 rule. Another lawsuit was filed in Wyoming district court, the result of which invalidated the D.C. court's ruling. NPS then promulgated a series of rules which contained "sunset clauses" set to expire at end of each subsequent winter season. "Unsuprisingly," the proponents and opponents filed simultaneous challenges in both Wyoming and D.C. to challenge the rules. While the two courts fought on jurisdiction, NPS formulated another new rule (2009 rule). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that Petitioners' argument was moot: "Even if [the Court] were to conclude Petitioners had standing to challenge the procedure and analysis used to adopt the 2009 rule, and if the district court then found NPS had violated NEPA or the APA in promulgating that rule, [the Court's] decision would still have no effect. [The Court] reach[ed] this conclusion because the analytical and procedural aspects of the 2009 rule have been superseded by the new analysis and procedure underlying the new one-year rule. Because the procedural challenge in this case[was] to the analysis underlying the 2009 temporary rule and that analysis has been redone, [the Court held] that the procedural challenge to the 2009 temporary rule [was] moot."

In 2005, pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act's administrative provisions, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded lifetime benefits to Merrill Lambright and survivor benefits to his widow, Delores Ashmore. Lambright's claims arose out of his employment with Petitioner Bridger Coal Company. In 2006, a three-member panel of the U.S. Department of Labor Benefits Review Board vacated the ALJ's decision and remanded to the ALJ for reconsideration. In 2008, the ALJ denied benefits on both the lifetime and survivor claims. In 2009, a three-member panel of the Board reversed this decision and reinstated the 2005 award of benefits. The issue on appeal was the characterization of Ms. Ashmore's 2002 request for a modification in her survivor benefits: "it appears the director interpreted Ashmore's motion as a motion for modification based on change in conditions, but only to the extent Ashmore alleged she was entitled to additional (survivor) benefits due to Lambright's death. To the extent the order granting modification was based on a change in conditions, the ruling only implicated the claim for survivor benefits, not Lambright's original claim for lifetime benefits." On reconsideration en banc, the full five-member Board was unable to reach a disposition in which at least three permanent members concurred. As a result, the 2009 panel decision stood. Petitioner appealed, challenging the scope of the 2009 panel's authority to review the 2008 ALJ decision, the standard used in determining whether to award benefits, and the onset-date determination. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the 2009 panel decision.

The Muscogee (Creek) Nation (MCN) sued the Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC), three commissioners and the Oklahoma Attorney General (collectively, State), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on numerous claims challenging three Oklahoma statutes that tax and regulate the sale of cigarettes and other tobacco products as a violative of federal law and tribal sovereignty. The OTC and the Attorney General brought motions to dismiss. The district court dismissed MCN's claims against all Defendant's based on the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity, or alternatively, for failing to state a claim under Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude MCN's suit, but that in its complaint, the Nation failed to state a claim.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) appealed a judgment of the district court that declined to enforce an administrative subpoena against Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad (BNSF). On appeal, the EEOC argued the district court abused its discretion because it "applied erroneous legal principles and ignored record evidence." This case arose from an ADA discrimination claim filed by Gregory Graves and Thomas Palizzi. Each alleged they were not hired as conductors or conductor trainees based on a perceived disability. The EEOC launched an investigation and issued a subpoena to BNSF. During the course of its investigation, the EEOC expanded the parameters of its investigation without notice or explanation. BNSF did not comply with the administrative subpoena, and the EEOC applied to the district court for enforcement. Finding no abuse of discretion or a misapplication of the law, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court: "Nothing prevent[ed] the EEOC from investigating the charges filed by Mr. Graves and Mr. Palizzi, and then . . . expanding its search. Alternatively, nothing prevent[ed] the EEOC from aggregating the information it possesses in the form of a Commissioner's Charge. . . . But nationwide recordkeeping data is not 'relevant to' charges of individual disability discrimination filed by two men who applied for the same type of job in the same state, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in reaching that conclusion."

Decedent Charles Gray sought treatment for epilepsy at Defendant University of Colorado Hospital. In the course of his withdrawal from medication, hospital staff left Decedent unattended and he died after suffering a seizure. Plaintiffs, decedent’s estate and family members, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging that the hospital (and affiliated doctors, nurses, and staff) deprived Decedent of life without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a constitutional claim. Plaintiffs appealed. Applying the appropriate legal standards, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but for reasons somewhat different than those of the district court: "The state actor’s affirmative act creating the danger or rendering the victim more vulnerable to it does not constitute a constitutional deprivation."

Plaintiff Donna Morris brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for unlawful arrest and excessive force on behalf of her deceased husband, William Morris III, against Defendants Officer Jaime Noe and the City of Sapulpa, Oklahoma. She alleged Defendants violated her husband's rights when Noe forceably arrested him and caused him injury. Defendant Noe moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the district court denied his motion. Defendant Noe then appealed. Finding that Mr. Morris "posed no threat to Noe or others," and that the officer had reason to believe Mr. Morris was "at most, a misdemeanant," the Tenth Circuit held Defendant was not entitled to qualified to immunity on either of Plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant Salvador Mendoza-Lopez appeals his sentence, arguing the district court denied him his right of allocution. Mendoza-Lopez pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful re-entry after removal. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a sentence of seventy months. Defendant filed motions for departure and variance, seeking a forty-month sentence. He argued he qualified for a downward departure under the Guidelines because his criminal history category over-represented the seriousness of his prior record. At sentencing, Defendant's counsel reiterated at length his arguments for a departure and variance. The district court, in a lengthy statement from the bench, denied both motions and accepted the PSR's recommended Guidelines range of seventy to eighty-seven months. Immediately thereafter the court said: "[i]t's the Court['s] intention to sentence within that Guideline range." It then invited both Defendant's counsel, and Defendant himself to address "where within that range this Court should sentence." The court assured defense counsel it had taken into account the Guidelines' factors and would continue to do so when it imposed sentence. At his opportunity to speak, Defendant said: "I would simply like to say that I apologize, I’m sorry for having come back. I’d like you to know that I have small children in Mexico who need me to support them by working. That’s really all." The district court sentenced Defendant to seventy months, stating that it was "sympathetic with the fact that the defendant has a wife and two small children that very much need him back home." Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing the district court violated his right of allocution by definitively announcing its intention to impose a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range before inviting him to speak. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred by inviting Defendant to speak with respect to where within the Guidelines range the court should sentence him. This error, however, did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, and the Court affirmed Defendant's sentence.