Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

BancInsure, Inc. appealed a declaratory judgment in favor of Columbian Financial Corporation and a former director, Carl McCaffree (collectively the Insureds). The insurance policy at issue here was a "claims-made" policy covered any claim made to BancInsure against any Columbian officer or director for a "Wrongful Act" as defined by the policy. A disputed provision of the policy pertained to the scope of coverage if Columbian was placed in receivership or otherwise ceased to engage in active banking business. The parties interpreted the provision differently. The Insureds contended that if Columbian went into receivership, the policy covered all claims made through the end of the original policy period, although only for Wrongful Acts committed before the receivership. BancInsure contended that the policy covered only claims made before the receivership. The operation of the disputed provision became relevant in August 2008 when the Kansas State Bank Commissioner declared Columbian insolvent and appointed the FDIC as its receiver. Soon thereafter, Columbianâs management sent BancInsure a letter to notify it of potential claims by the FDIC and others. The parties disputed many of the claims against Columbian which led to Columbian filing suit to the district court to determine which claims were covered under the policy. The sole issue on appeal to the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court had jurisdiction. Though no party disputed jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit found that there was no actual controversy between the parties when the district court below rendered its judgment. The court therefore lacked jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower courtâs decision and remanded to case with instructions to the court to vacate its judgment.

"The Dawses' struggle with the IRS has a lengthy provenance." Decades ago, Donald and Phyllis Dawes pled guilty for failing to file their 1981 through 1983 tax returns. They also failed to pay their taxes from 1986 through 1988, and 1990. All this led to the IRS to seek and win a declaratory judgment that the Dawses fraudulently conveyed certain assets in an effort to avoid their creditors and that those conveyances were null and void. The IRS proceeded to execute this judgment to take possession of these assets, but before it could do so, the Dawses filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy protection. "And that brings us to the latest installment of this epic": with permission of the bankruptcy court, the Dawses sold several tracts of land. The sale created income tax liabilities. The Dawses submitted a bankruptcy reorganization plan in which they proposed to treat their newly incurred tax liabilities as general unsecured claims. The IRS opposed the plan "vigorously" but was unsuccessful at the bankruptcy and federal district court. The IRS brought its complaint to the Tenth Circuit, asking to "undo its earlier losses." Upon careful consideration of the lengthy record below, the Tenth Circuit found that the taxes at issue here were incurred by the Dawses after they petitioned for bankruptcy. "So it is that the Dawses must pay the tax collector his due." The post-petition income tax liabilities at issue were not eligible for treatment as unsecured claims under the Bankruptcy Code. The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower courtsâ decisions and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Angela Weigel appealed a district court order that denied her supplemental Social Security Income benefits. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, she challenged the court's findings that she was able to work despite her documented disabilities. Upon consideration of the administrative record, the Tenth Circuit found that the Administrative Law Judge's analysis of Plaintiff's case did not make the requisite findings required by law to justify the denial of benefits. The Court vacated the lower court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-Appellant Sierra Club filed a petition with the Tenth Circuit in an attempt to stop Defendant-Appellee Two Elk Generation Partners, LP (Two Elk) from building a coal-fired power plant in Wyoming. Sierra Club argued that Two Elk was building the plant in violation of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7604. For over ten years, Two Elk had planned to build the power plant, and filed the appropriate applications with the local environmental authorities to receive permission to start construction. In late 2007, state authorities notified Two Elk that its environmental permit had expired. In the process of getting the permit renewed, Sierra Club tried to intervene to stop the process. While Two Elk and Sierra Club were fighting one another in the state administrative bodies and courts, Sierra Club filed a citizen suit with the federal district court. The federal district court dismissed Sierra Club's case, holding that the state courts already decided the same issues in its suit. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Sierra Club argued that it was not a party to the permit-application proceedings, and that it should not be precluded from bringing suit now. Furthermore, the Club argued that the Clean Air Act established the circumstances under which a citizen suit may be brought, and those circumstances were not met at the state court level. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court found that Sierra Club's arguments under the Clean Air Act were indeed precluded by decisions from the state court proceedings. The Court dismissed Sierra Club's appeal.

Plaintiff-Appellant Jason Fowler appealed the district court's determination that the government was entitled to summary judgment on a tort action he filed against the US and an employee of the US Air Force. Mr. Fowler was injured when a car driven by Sean Garrick collided with Mr. Fowler and his motorcycle. Mr. Garrick was an active-duty member of the U.S. Air Force. Mr. Garrick was on break at the time of the collision. During breaks, the Air Force does not require employees to spend their time in specific ways. Typically when employees get a break, they go somewhere to relax. Mr. Fowler filed suit against Mr. Garrick and the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Mr. Fowler contended that the government should be liable for the collision because it was "liable for the negligent acts of its employees committed in the scope and course of their employment." Under the FTCA, the Attorney General may certify that an employee is acting within the scope of his office or employment. If the Attorney General declines to make such a certification, the employee may petition the trial court to find and certify that the employee is acting within the scope of his employment. If such certification is granted, the United States is substituted as a defendant in place of the employee, and litigation proceeds under the FTCA. The Attorney General and the trial court declined to certify that Mr. Garrick acted under the scope of his employment while on his break. The government then moved to dismiss the claim. The trial court dismissed the government from the case. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Mr. Fowler argued that the trial court erred in denying the certification necessary for him to maintain his suit against the government. Upon consideration of the arguments, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The Court concluded that summary judgment in favor of the government was improper in this case. The Court vacated the district court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This case stems from Plaintiff Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C.'s (Crowe) legal representation of the Thlopthlocco in the Muscogee (Creek) Nation District Court in 2007. Nathan Anderson, a member of the Thlopthlocco Nation attempted a coup d'etat by declaring himself the only valid leader and purported to appoint a new government. While the "coup" proceeded through the tribal courts, the matter of paying the legal bill for Crowe's representation came up. With the "official" government in dispute, and tribal business halted from an injunction issued until the case was resolved, Mr. Anderson argued that his legal fees should be paid from the tribal treasury. The tribal district court dismissed his claim, reasoning that until the litigation was resolved, no one knew who had authority to spend Thlopthlocco funds. The court then ordered that any attorney fees paid from the tribe's treasury be refunded. Instead of complying with the order, Crowe filed suit with the federal district court, seeking to enjoin the tribal court from ordering a return of the legal fees. The federal court ruled in favor of Crowe, and the tribal judge, Defendant Judge Gregory Stidam, appealed. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Judge Stidham argued the case should have been dismissed because he was entitled to sovereign and judicial immunity. The Tenth Circuit found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction against Judge Stidham's order. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellant Carl Sheppard appealed the district courtâs order which denied his applications for disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits under the Social Security Act. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Plaintiffâs applications for benefits in January, 2008 because the part-time work Plaintiff was doing at the time of his application was âsubstantial gainful activity.â The Tenth Circuit found that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards in arriving at his conclusion. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A jury acquitted Defendant Kenneth Lain on firearms charges. After his acquittal, Defendant filed a motion for attorneyâs fees under the Hyde Amendment, 18 U.S.C. 3006A. The district court denied his motion, and Defendant appealed. The issue for review by the Tenth Circuit centered around whether the court could review the district courtâs denial of attorneyâs fees under the Hyde Amendment. The Hyde Amendment provides fee awards only in cases where the court abused its discretion. Upon review of the district courtâs record, the Tenth Circuit could not conclude that the lower court abused its discretion. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision to deny Defendant an award of attorneyâs fees.

Plaintiff-Appellant the United States appealed the district courtâs award of attorneyâs fees and costs to the Plaintiffs-Appellees Edward and Cynthia Poche. Mr. Poche suffered from abdominal pain that was treated by three doctors. After surgery, his condition worsened, and he was transferred to the National Naval Hospital, where the United States covered his $1.13 million hospital bill. Mr. Poche sued the original treating doctors for malpractice. The United States intervened in Mr. Pocheâs lawsuit. Eventually a jury awarded Mr. Poche $1.59 million, and $380,000 to the United States. The Poches filed a motion to require the United States to pay a portion of their costs and fees. They maintained that the United States bore none of the risks or costs of the case, and would not have received a favorable jury verdict without them. The United States contended that its sovereign immunity divested the district court of jurisdiction to award fees and costs against the United States, and that, even if the district court had jurisdiction, the amount awarded was the courtâs abuse of its discretion. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the United Statesâ argument, and reversed the lower courtâs order directing it to pay the Pochesâ attorneyâs fees.

In the early 1990s, Colorado state prisoners initiated a class action lawsuit alleging that state officials were committing ongoing violations of disabled prisonersâ rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In 2003, the parties entered into a consent decree setting forth the actions the government officials would take to bring the prison system into compliance with these laws. Claimant Larry Gordon filed an individual claim for damages under the plan devised by the inmates and officials. Mr. Gordonâs claim was denied, and he filed an appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Because the class action suit covered the issue Mr. Gordon raised in his appeal, his case was remanded to a panel that was working on the logistics of enforcing the plan. The parties could not resolve their disagreements concerning enforcement of the plan, and took their disagreement to the district court. The court ruled that its orders on appeal from the panelâs decisions would be final and not appealable to the Tenth Circuit. Mr. Gordonâs claim for damages would eventually be denied by the district court, and he appealed despite the courtâs earlier ruling. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether it could actually review appeals from denied claims of damages that stemmed from the consent decree and plan. The officials wanted the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, Court held that even if the language of the agreement provided that the lower courtâs review would be final, an appeal could be made to the Tenth Circuit since the Courtâs jurisdiction is invoked by statute. The Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decision to dismiss the officialsâ motion, and Mr. Gordonâs claim for damages.