Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals
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Sixteen years ago Carolyn Bayless began to suffer from a mysterious illness. As her condition deteriorated, she sought to learn what caused (and how to treat) her illness. In 2008, convinced that she was the victim of exposure to nerve gas emitted by an Army testing facility, she filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. When this lawsuit followed in 2009, the Army responded that she knew of her claim by at least 2005 and had waited too long to assert it. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment dismissing the case. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that under the "unusual circumstances presented here," the period of limitation did not accrue until February 2007. Therefore, the Court reversed. View "Bayless v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

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Salt Creek Road is an unimproved 12.3-mile road intertwined with the creek bed in Salt Creek Canyon. The state and county wanted to use their claimed right-of-way to prevent the United States from closing the Salt Creek Road to vehicle traffic. The road is the primary way for tourists to reach several scenic sites within the Canyonlands National Park, including Angel Arch. Without vehicle access, the only way to access Angel Arch is to make the nine-mile trek by foot. The state and county based their claim on Revised Statute (R.S.) 2477: "[T]he right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted." Congress enacted R.S. 2477 in 1866, and it remained in effect until 1976. Even then, however, Congress preserved the rights-of-way established under the statute. This Quiet Title Act case presented to the Tenth Circuit the issue of whether the district court erred in rejecting the claims of San Juan County and the State of Utah to Salt Creek Road. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "San Juan County, Utah v. United States " on Justia Law

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In May 2011 Kansas Governor Sam Brownback signed into law an appropriations bill restricting the classes of entities eligible for Title X of the Public Health Service Act subgrants. The restriction disqualified two family-planning clinics operated by Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri (Planned Parenthood). Planned Parenthood sued Governor Brownback and Robert Moser, M.D., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), challenging the legislation: (1) that it violated Title X and was therefore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause; (2) that it violated Planned Parenthood's First Amendment rights by penalizing it for associating with providers of abortion and for its advocacy of access to abortion services; and (3) that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing an unconstitutional burden on the rights of women to choose abortion (a claim not raised on appeal). Ruling that Planned Parenthood had established a likelihood of success on the merits of the first two claims and had otherwise satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction, the district court enjoined KDHE from implementing the legislation. After review, the Tenth Circuit vacated the injunction. With regard to the Supremacy Clause claim, the Court concluded Planned Parenthood could not establish a likelihood of success on the merits because there was no private cause of action for injunctive relief for the alleged violation of Title X. With regard to the First Amendment claim, the Court held that that Planned Parenthood could not establish a likelihood of success because the legislation does not restrict the rights of speech or association of subgrantees and the motives of individual lawmakers were irrelevant. View "Planned Parenthood KS & Mid-MO v. Brownback, et al" on Justia Law

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The Internal Revenue Service and several oil companies agreed to settle a tax dispute over a jointly-developed pipeline system in a closing agreement. After entering the agreement, Phillips Petroleum Company (now ConocoPhillips Company) acquired Arco Transportation (one of the original signatories to the agreement). In 2000 and 2001, Conoco revisited the tax implications of its acquisition and claimed "going-forward" and "basis-increase" deductions on its amended consolidated tax returns. The IRS refunded Conoco's 2000 going-forward deductions, but disputed the remaining deductions. The parties took the dispute to federal district court, where the district court decided the issue on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court rejected Conoco's position and granted summary judgment to the IRS. Conoco appealed. After its review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "going-forward" deductions were impermissible for interests that Arco Transportation did not own as of July 1, 1977, and "basis-increase" deductions were impermissible because the Closing Agreement did not fix the amount of a liability or exempt that liability from section 461(h) of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the Court held that Conoco was not entitled to the going-forward or basis-increase deductions. View "United States v. ConocoPhillips Company" on Justia Law

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Defendant Richard Wyss pled guilty in December 2008 to one count of making false statements to the Federal Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Defendant concealed from TSA that he was working full-time for the Utah Department of Public Safety (DPS) while also employed full time by TSA. In his plea agreement and at his plea hearing, Defendant agreed he owed DPS $188,548.92 in restitution. The district court sentenced Defendant to three years probation. Over 40 months after his sentencing hearing, Defendant filed a motion asking the district court to grant him credit against the order of restitution. He claimed he was entitled to credit based on annual, sick, and holiday leave he earned while at DPS. DPS objected to Defendant’s motion; the Government did not submit a response. At an evidentiary hearing two weeks later, the district court squarely rejected the Government’s argument that the court lacked authority to reduce the amount of restitution Defendant owed DPS. The issue before the Tenth Circuit on appeal was whether 18 U.S.C. 3563(c) authorized the court to modify the restitution order imposed pursuant to the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) over three years after the judgment of sentence became final. The Tenth Circuit concluded section 3563(c) did not authorize the district court to modify the order and reversed. View "United States v. Wyss" on Justia Law

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Denver police arrested Marvin Booker on a warrant for failure to appear at a hearing regarding a drug charge. During booking, Booker died while in custody after officers restrained him in response to alleged insubordination. Several officers pinned Booker face-down to the ground, one placed him in a chokehold, and another tased him. The officers sought medical help for Booker, but he could not be revived. Booker’s estate sued Deputies Faun Gomez, James Grimes, Kyle Sharp, Kenneth Robinette, and Sergeant Carrie Rodriguez, alleging they used excessive force and failed to provide Booker with immediate medical care. Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied their motion because disputed facts precluded summary judgment. The Defendants appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Estate of Marvin L. Booker, et al v. Gomez, et al" on Justia Law

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Petitioners-Appellants Esgar Corporation, George and Georgetta Tempel, and Delmar and Patricia Holmes appealed two United States Tax Court decisions, arguing that the Tax Court erred in valuing conservation easements they claimed as charitable deductions and in determining the holding period of state tax credits they sold. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case and the Tax Court's decision, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed that court's decision. View "Esgar Corporation, et al v. Comm'r of Internal Rev." on Justia Law

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Rolland Goodin worked in coal mines for 25 years, and smoked cigarettes for more than 40 years. He developed a respiratory condition and filed for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA). An Administrative Law Judge awarded Goodin benefits. His employer, Antelope Coal Company/Rio Tinto Energy America appealed, but the Department of Labor Benefits Review Board affirmed. Antelope's primary argument on appeal to the Tenth Circuit was that the ALJ wrongly limited its options to rebut a regulatory presumption that Goodin's work as a coal miner caused his respiratory condition. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the award of benefits: "Antelope's arguments are more a matter of disagreement with the ALJ's assessment of the evidence as opposed to whether he considered the evidence at all. We may not reweigh the evidence but can only determine whether substantial evidence supported the decision." View "Antelope Coal Company/Rio v. Goodin" on Justia Law

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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought a civil enforcement action against Defendant-Appellees GeoDynamics, Inc., its managing director Jeffory Shields, and several other business entities affiliated with Shields, alleging securities fraud in connection with four oil and gas exploration and drilling ventures Shields marketed to thousands of investors as Joint Venture Agreements (JVAs). The district court granted defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The SEC appealed, contending that despite their labels as JVAs, the investment agreements were actually "investment contracts" and thus "securities" subject to federal securities regulations. Because it could not be said as a matter of law that the investments at issue were not "investment contracts," the Tenth Circuit reversed. View "SEC v. Shields, et al" on Justia Law

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Pro se defendant-appellant Charles Baldwin was convicted for violating two federal regulations: failing to comply with directions of federal police officers, and for "loitering, exhibiting disorderly conduct or exhibiting other conduct" on federal property that "imped[ed] or distrup[ed] the performance of official duties by" government employees. Defendant worked as an attorney for the Department of the Interior. The charges arose when, leaving for work, defendant sped through the parking lot, and swerved to miss hitting a bicyclist. A Federal Protective Service officer wanted to issue defendant a warning, but before he could finish, defendant drove off, ignoring the officer's commands to stop. The officer followed defendant off federal grounds, stopped defendant again, and asked for license, registration and proof of insurance. Defendant refused to comply, had to be forced from his vehicle, and was eventually restrained with handcuffs. Among other things, defendant argued that violating the two federal regulations wasn't a crime; they were administrative rules or policies that carried no penalty. And that even if they were crimes, defendant contended he didn't act with the sufficient mens rea to be held criminally culpable. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the circumstances of this case. And while the regulations "certainly do delineate policy, . . .that isn't all they do. Another section of the same regulatory 'subpart' expressly provides that the very sections Mr. Baldwin violated can be enforced through criminal sanctions." Furthermore, the Court found that "a law's silence about mens rea doesn't necessarily mean violating it isn't a crime." The Court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Baldwin" on Justia Law