Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Pro se appellant John Schoppe petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of a Tax Court decision that found him liable for tax deficiencies for the years 2002-2007. While the case was proceeding before the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. That filing prompted the Court to request a supplemental briefing from the parties on whether the automatic bankruptcy stay would apply to appellant's appeal before the Tenth Circuit. Finding that 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code did not stay this appeal, the Court reviewed the Tax Court decision and affirmed it. View "Schoppe v. CIR" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA), as amended by the Reform Act of 1987, required the Secretary of the Interior to issue leases for parcels of land to the highest bidding energy company within sixty days of payment to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Appellants (collectively, "Energy Companies") sued to compel the Secretary to issue pending leases on which they were the high bidders and more than sixty days had passed since they had paid the BLM in full. The district court construed the MLA to impose a mandate on the Secretary to decide whether to issue the leases, and ordered BLM to make such decisions regarding the still pending leases of Energy Companies within thirty days. Energy Companies appealed the district court's order and asserted that the MLA required the Secretary to issue the pending leases within sixty days rather than merely make a decision on whether the leases will be issued. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court’s order was not a "final decision," and as such, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Energy Companies' appeal. View "Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant David Becker was pulled over by Defendant-Appellee Officer Jason Bateman in a parking lot in Heber City, Utah. A confrontation ensued which ended in Plaintiff being thrown to the ground and suffering a severe traumatic brain injury. Plaintiff brought suit against Officer Bateman, the Heber City Chief of Police in his official capacity, and Heber City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Officer Bateman used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He also asserted a claim for loss of consortium. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding Officer Bateman did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Because the violation of constitutional rights Plaintiff asserted was not clearly established at the time of the violation, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Officer Bateman. However, the district court erred in concluding there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether a constitutional violation occurred. The grant of summary judgment in favor of the City was therefore reversed. On remand, the district court must determine whether Plaintiff can withstand summary judgment as to the second element of his municipal liability claim. Similarly, the district court must determine whether Mrs. Becker could maintain a cause of action for loss of consortium against the City in light of the Court's ruling that a reasonable jury could conclude Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. View "Becker v. Bateman" on Justia Law

Full Life Hospice participates in the federal Medicare program. It sought reimbursement for hospice services provided to Medicare recipients from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). A fiscal intermediary, acting on behalf of HHS, later contested some of these reimbursements and demanded repayment of funds that it claimed were distributed in excess of a spending cap. Full Life unsuccessfully challenged HHS intermediary’s determination through an administrative appeal, which was denied as untimely. On appeal to the district court, the court found no basis to excuse Full Life's untimely challenge. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of Full Life's failure to file a timely administrative appeal. View "Full Life Hospice v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Amanda Addison and Melody St. Clair were tried for embezzling or converting funds from Northern Arapahoe Tribe’s Department of Social Services (DSS). On the third day of trial, the trial judge declared a mistrial as to St. Clair only and excluded her from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial. Addison was convicted. She appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether the exclusion of St. Clair violated Addison’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial; and, (2) the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate criminal intent. Because the district court had a substantial reason for excluding St. Clair, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. The evidence was sufficient to prove her knowing and intentional taking of DSS funds. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Addison" on Justia Law

Gray Peterson, a resident of Washington, applied for a concealed handgun license (CHL) from the ex officio sheriff of Denver, Colorado. Peterson's application was accordingly denied, prompting him to file suit against the Denver sheriff and Colorado's executive director of the Department of Public Safety. Peterson claimed that Colorado's policy with respect to non-resident CHL applicants violates the Second Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and several other constitutional provisions. The district court concluded that the executive director of the Department of Public Safety was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because he had no connection to the enforcement of the challenged statute. Upon review of the district court order, the Tenth Circuit agreed with that conclusion. "In light of our nation's extensive practice of restricting citizens' freedom to carry firearms in a concealed manner, we hold that this activity does not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment's protections. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Peterson's claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which is coterminous with his right to travel claim." View "Peterson v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Laura Conroy filed this Title VII lawsuit against her employer, the United States Forest Service, after it (among other things) filled an open position with a male employee, instead of her. The district court excluded the testimony of Petitioner's two experts and granted summary judgment to the Forest Service. Petitioner did not have a college degree. She applied for the INFRA Program Manager position in the administrative series. She was found to be qualified, and her name, along with that of one other qualified applicant, was passed on to Larry Larson, the head of the group where the new position would be located. Mr. Larson, however, decided to readvertise the position. He would later explain that his reason for doing so was to broaden the pool of applicants. A revised announcement was issued modifying the job requirement noted above, replacing the words "[c]omprehensive knowledge and skills in" with simply "[k]nowledge of." The new advertisement drew interest from a greater number of applicants, and four were certified as sufficiently qualified for the position. Petitioner was certified under the administrative announcement, and three others were certified under the professional announcement. Among the latter three candidates was Daniel Hager, who had not applied when the position was originally advertised. Petitioner filed a grievance when she did not receive the position. Mr. Hager left the INFRA Program Manager position, and the position was readvertised. The position was advertised solely in the professional series. Although Petitioner applied again, she was deemed not qualified, and management ultimately selected Andrea Gehrke. Petitioner filed a second formal grievance, alleging that the decision to advertise the position solely in the professional series was made in order to retaliate against her for filing the first grievance. After exhausting administrative remedies, Petitioner filed suit in federal district court pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. She asserted various individual and class claims arising out of the agency's hiring decisions. The district court ultimately ruled in the agency's favor. Upon review, finding no abuse of the district court's discretion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Petitioner's claims. View "Conroy v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roger Schanzenbach owned several properties in the town of Opal on which he intended to install mobile manufactured homes. He applied for permits with town authorities. The town council issued several building permits to Plaintiff but shortly thereafter enacted an ordinance that included a provision banning the installation of any manufactured home that was older than 10 years at the time of the relevant permit application (the 10-Year Rule). When the permits were about to lapse and Plaintiff requested an extension, the town council denied his request. It also rejected his applications for new permits because the proposed houses were more than 10 years old. Plaintiff then sued the town and town council asserting that the 10-Year Rule was preempted by the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 as well as a variety of constitutional claims. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff raised claims based on preemption, equal protection, and substantive due process. Upon review, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on these claims. The 10-Year Rule was not preempted and the rule was sufficiently rational to survive an equal-protection or substantive-due-process challenge. View "Schanzenbach v. Town of Opal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roger Schanzenbach owned several properties in the town of LaBarge on which he intended to install mobile manufactured homes. He applied for permits with town authorities. The town council initially granted him a building permit for one property but revoked it about two weeks later and then enacted an ordinance that included a provision banning the installation of any manufactured home older than 10 years at the time of the relevant permit application (the 10-Year Rule). Both of Plaintiff's homes were more than 10 years old. The town council denied Plaintiff's applications for a building permit, a variance, and a conditional-use permit to enable him to install the homes despite the 10-Year Rule. Plaintiff thereafter sued, arguing a variety of constitutional claims as well as a claim that the 10-Year Rule was preempted by the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff raised issues regarding the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, procedural due process, preemption, municipal authority to enact the 10-Year Rule, and attorney fees. Upon review, the Court held that the takings claim was unripe, the due-process claim failed because Plaintiff did not have a protected property interest, the 10-Year Rule was not preempted, the town had authority to enact the rule, and the attorney-fee issue was moot. View "Schanzenbach v. Town of La Barge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Allstate Sweeping, LLC (Allstate) is owned and operated by two white women: Martha Krueger and Barbara Hollis. In January 2006 it began performing pressure-washing services at Denver International Airport (DIA) under a contract with the City and County of Denver (Denver). Although the contract term was through July 2008, it was terminated by Denver July, 2007. Defendant Calvin Black, a contract-compliance technician at DIA, was assigned to monitor Allstate’s contract. Black is an African-American male. Allstate claimed that it was subjected to gender- and race-based discrimination and to retaliation for its complaints of discrimination. It filed suit in the federal district court in Colorado against Denver and four DIA employees, including Black, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 2000d (Title VI), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants except Black, holding that there were genuine issues of fact regarding whether Black was motivated by racial and gender bias and whether Black created a hostile work environment in such a way as to make plaintiff’s contract "unprofitable and its owners miserable." It did not address Allstate’s retaliation claim. Black appealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment, contending that he was entitled to qualified immunity and that the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the denial under the collateral-order doctrine. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s determinations because such sufficiency determinations are not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. The Court did, however, have jurisdiction to review the legal sufficiency of the claim that Black made Allstate’s owners "miserable" and to review the sufficiency of the evidence of the retaliation claim (which the district court did not consider). The Court reversed the denial of summary judgment on those claims. View "Allstate Sweeping, LLC v. Black" on Justia Law