Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Odulene Dormescar, a native and citizen of Haiti, appealed a removal order issued by an immigration judge because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal of that order. He has petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review. His petition presented three issues: (1) whether the Eleventh Circuit had subject matter jurisdiction; if it did, then the second (2) issue was whether res judicata barred the Department of Homeland Security’s proceedings against Petitioner based on the aggravated felony conviction. If it did not, the third (3) issue was whether the Department had the authority to amend the notice to appear to charge Petitioner as "admitted to the United States, but . . . removable" when he was originally charged as an inadmissible "arriving alien." Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction over this case, res judicata did not apply, and that the Department had the authority to amend the notice to appear to charge Petitioner as admitted but removable. View "Dormescar v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

The issue before the Eleventh Circuit centered on the grant of qualified immunity to two social workers who violated clearly established federal rights during an investigation of alleged child abuse. After Plaintiff-Appellant Stephen Loftus petitioned a Florida court to help him protect his two children from his allegedly abusive former wife, social worker and Defendant-Appellee Ester Clark-Moore, investigated the safety and welfare of Loftus's children, Savonna and Dylan. In the course of her investigation, Clark-Moore allegedly interviewed Savonna without Loftus's consent, and Clark-Moore's supervisor, Myra Ferguson, allegedly twice threatened to remove both children from Loftus's care. Loftus filed a civil complaint that the social workers had violated Savonna's right to be free from unreasonable seizures and the family's right to be free from governmental interference. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that because the social workers did not violate any clearly established federal civil rights in the investigation that Loftus had invited, it affirmed the dismissal of Loftus's complaint against them.

In a consolidated appeal, Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad appealed the District Court's denial of its asserted right to victim status under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) and sought restitution. In December 2010, the United States filed a criminal information against Alcatel-Lucent, charging it with violating provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The government simultaneously filed criminal informations against three subsidiaries of Alcatel-Lucent (Alcatel-Lucent France, Alcatel Lucent Trade International, and Alcatel Centroamerica) charging them with conspiracy to violate the FCPA's accounting and anti-bribery provisions. In 2011, Alcatel-Lucent entered into a deferred prosecution agreement and factual proffer with the United States. The agreement deferred prosecution for three years, subject to Alcatel-Lucent's compliance with specific reforms in its accounting and oversight controls, and required Alcatel-Lucent to pay a penalty of $92 million. The facts proffered in Alcatel-Lucent's deferred prosecution agreement identified Appellant Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE). Alcatel-Lucent admitted that it hired and paid unusually large fees to "consultants," who in turn curried favor with ICE officials and board members to secure telecommunications contracts by offering direct bribes or kickbacks from any contracts awarded by ICE to Alcatel-Lucent or its subsidiaries. After thorough review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

In late 2008, Lou Ann Cassell inherited $220,000 from her aunt. At that time, both Cassell and her wholly owned company, J&L Arborists, LLC, were insolvent. After consulting with attorneys and accountants, she used her $220,000 inheritance to purchase a single-premium fixed annuity. She began receiving monthly payments, and under the annuity contract she is scheduled to receive those payments for the rest of her life. The contract also guarantees the payments for ten years regardless of when Cassell dies. She designated her children as the beneficiaries of the payments if she dies within the ten-year guarantee period. A year after she had purchased the annuity, Cassell and her company filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. She included the annuity as an asset in her Schedule B disclosures, and listed it as exempt under Georgia law on Schedule C. The trustee objected, contending that Cassell's annuity is nonexempt because it does not meet the requirements of the statute. The bankruptcy court held that Cassell's annuity was an "annuity" within the meaning of the Georgia bankruptcy exemption statute. The district court affirmed as to the issues that the bankruptcy court had addressed but remanded the case, leaving it for the bankruptcy court to decide in the first instance whether the annuity payments were reasonably necessary for Cassell's support. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit certified the question pertaining to the Georgia exemption to the Georgia Supreme Court.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for Darby Bank & Trust Co., appealed an order of the district court that remanded the underlying case the action to state court. The district court determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the FDIC had not been formally substituted as a party in the state court action prior to removal. After review, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's remand order. The Court held that, as a matter of federal law, the FDIC is "substituted as a party" in a state court proceeding under 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(B) once it is appointed receiver and files a notice of substitution, and may at that point remove the action to federal court."

Plaintiff Cristobal Ramirez brought a Title VII employment discrimination case and represented himself in district court. He survived summary judgment (in part) and proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the presentation of his evidence, Defendant, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), orally moved for judgment as matter of law. The district court granted the motion on the sole ground that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred because he did not contact an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff, still appearing in the case pro se, appealed to the Eleventh Circuit where he was appointed counsel. Upon review, and with the benefit of counseled briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court. Because the EEOC found that there was a satisfactory reason for Plaintiff's delay in making initial contact with the EEO Counselor, and because the DOT did not challenge that finding, but, instead, undertook investigation and conciliation, the DOT and the district court were bound by the EEOC’s finding.

The narrow question presented to the Eleventh Circuit concerned whether a Tax Court petition that challenged a notice of deficiency as invalid, "was a proceeding in respect of the deficiency" so as to suspend the limitations period. The IRS selected Petitioner-Appellant Shockley Communications Corporation's (SCC) return for audit. SCC was closely held, and Petitioners-Appellants Terry Shockley, Sandra Shockley and Shockley Holdings, LP were shareholders in SCC. The IRS began the statutory procedures required prior to formal "assessment" of SCC's tax. If a proceeding regarding the taxpayer's deficiency is placed on the Tax Court docket, the IRS must wait to assess until the Tax Court decision becomes final, plus 60 days thereafter. Receipt of the notices was the issue before the Tax Court. After review and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit held that the petition at issue here suspended the running of the statute of limitations, and reversed.

Polypore International appeals the Federal Trade Commission's decision finding a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act and ordering divestiture. The Commission held that Polypore's February 2008 acquisition of Microporous would substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in relevant markets. Polypore and the acquired Microporous Products are producers of battery separators. Polypore internal memos reveal that it had developed an "MP Plan," which was a response to competition from Microporous. The MP Plan sought to secure long-term contracts with customers that Polypore thought were in danger of switching to Microporous. Polypore's 2008 budget projected that it would lose increasing amounts of business to Microporous and would be forced to reduce prices if it did not acquire Microporous. The Commission issued an administrative complaint charged that Polypore's acquisition of Microporous may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly for several types of battery separators, in violation of the Clayton Act. After a four-week hearing, the ALJ issued an extensive opinion holding that the acquisition was reasonably likely to substantially lessen competition in four relevant markets. Upon review, the Eleventh circuit concluded the Commission did not err when it treated the acquisition as a horizontal merger, found that there was a single market for deep-cycle separators, and included Microporous's Austrian plant in its divestiture order.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Curves, LLC d.b.a. Curves Bar & Grill and James Gann operated an alcohol-selling nightclub in Spalding County, Georgia. Defendant Spalding County’s ordinances prohibit nude dancing where alcohol is sold. Plaintiffs sued, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinances and asserting claims for malicious arrest and malicious prosecution. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. The District Court also granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ malicious arrest and malicious prosecution claims. Plaintiffs appealed the District Court’s summary judgment ruling on the merits. In addition, Plaintiffs also question the impartiality of the District Judge and sought retroactive recusal and vacatur of summary judgment. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit declined to reach the constitutionality of the ordinance at question here, and finding no evidence of malice, the Court affirmed District Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

Plaintiff-Appellant Valinda Kornhauser filed suit to challenge the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that denied her claim for disability benefits. The District Court referred the case to a Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation ("R&R"). After receiving and considering memoranda on the matter, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R recommending that the District Court vacate the Commissioner's decision and remand the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. In his R&R, the Magistrate Judge, in addition to explaining why Plaintiff was entitled to a vacatur, observed that the memorandum her attorney had submitted failed to comply with Middle District of Florida Local Rule 1.05(a). The non-compliance, according to the Magistrate Judge, consisted of "smaller margins than authorized" by the rule and "footnotes . . . smaller than ten-point type." In a footnote to this observation, he stated: "These intentional violations would justify striking the memorandum. However, this sanction would unfairly punish the plaintiff. Consequently, I propose that, when plaintiff's counsel seeks attorney's fees, that the typical request for a cost-of-living increase be denied." Following the entry of judgment, Plaintiff petitioned the District Court for an award of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). The parties stipulated to the amount of attorney fees, but after its consideration of the petition, the Magistrate Judge issue an R&R recommending that the district court award a lower amount in fees as have been stipulated because of Plaintiff's brief being submitted with small margins and unacceptable font sizing. Plaintiff's attorney filed an objection to the R&R, asking the district court not to adopt it because she did not intend to violate the local rule. Finding that the sanction was a reasonable exercise of the Magistrate Judge's disciplinary authority, the district court adopted the R&R with the sanction. Plaintiff appealed the imposition of the sanction. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the sanction, finding "no procedural rule that sanctions the conduct involved" in this case.