Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Florida Department of Revenue (Florida DOR) and the Virginia Department of Social Services (Virginia DSS) appealed the district court's decision affirming an order of the bankruptcy court holding the agencies in contempt and awarding debtor compensatory and punitive damages for the agencies' alleged violations of the automatic stay and discharge injunction issued by the bankruptcy court. The court held that state sovereign immunity shields the the Florida DOR and the Virginia DSS from debtor's claims for violations of the automatic stay. The court also held that, although sovereign immunity did not bar debtor's claims for violations of the discharge injunction, neither the Florida DOR nor the Virginia DSS violated the discharge injunction. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to vacate the bankruptcy court's order and dismiss the action.

Plaintiff, owner and operator of a flat-rate ground transportation service, filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Hillsborough County Public Transportation Commission's (Commission) regulations required him to obtain certificates and permits for his vehicles were preempted by 49 U.S.C. 14501, also known as the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century. Specifically, plaintiff contended that section 14501(a)(1)(C) preempted the Commission's regulation regarding his 15-passenger vehicle and section 14501(c)(1) preempted the Commission's regulation regarding his 7-passenger minivan. The court affirmed the district court's decision rejecting plaintiff's first argument and adopted that court's reasoning. The court also held that, because plaintiff transported property only as an ancillary service to the transportation of passengers he was not a "[m]otor carrier of property" under section 14501(c). Consequently, it followed that the provision and its subparts did not preempt the Commission's luxury service transportation rule. Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the Commission.

The Georgia Parties, Gwinnett County, Georgia, and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) appealed from a grant of summary judgment in this consolidated suit arising from more than 20 years of litigation between the parties. All of the underlying cases related to the Corps' authority to operate the Buford Dam and Lake Lanier, the reservoir it created, for local water supply. On appeal, the parties raised several jurisdictional matters and asserted a number of substantive claims. The court held that the district court erred in finding that it had jurisdiction to hear certain parties because the Corps had not taken final agency action. The court also held that the district court and the Corps erred in concluding that water supply was not an authorized purpose of the Buford Project under the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), Pub. L. No. 79-525, 60 Stat. 634. The court also held that the district court erred in finding that the 1956 Act expired after 50 years. The court also provided certain instructions to the Corps on remand and the Corps shall have one year to make a final determination of its authority to operate the Buford Project under the RHA and the Water Supply Act, 43 U.S.C. 390b(a).

Appellant filed a complaint that Georgia Correctional Health, LLC ("Georgia Correctional") had been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs while he was detained for nine days in jail. During his detention, appellant received sixteen evaluations from nine different employees of Georgia Correctional before he received a computer tomography scan, which revealed that he had air, bleeding, and fractures in his head that required neurological surgery. At issue was whether appellant failed to present evidence that Georgia Correctional had a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of pretrial detainees in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that appellant had failed to prove a policy or custom based only on his "isolated incident" and that an isolated incident, however unfortunate, did not demonstrate evidence of the county's persistent or widespread policy. Accordingly, the district court's ruling was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued defendant, a deputy with the sheriff's office, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the deputy violated her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity because he was acting outside the scope of his discretionary authority. The court held that the deputy's actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties and were within the scope of his authority. The court also held that, under the particular circumstances of the case, the deputy's conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment and he was therefore, entitled to qualified immunity. Furthermore, assuming arguendo a constitutional violation, a reasonable officer in the deputy's shoes would not have known that his conduct was unlawful. Plaintiff had no binding precedent that clearly established that probable cause and exigent circumstances immediately evaporated once an officer performing a welfare check for a possibly suicidal person and saw that the person was merely alive. Accordingly, the district court's order denying the deputy's motion for summary judgment was reversed and remanded.

Defendants, Don Eugene Siegelman, the former Governor of Alabama and Richard Scrushy, the founder and former Chief Executive Officer of Health South Corporation ("HealthSouth"), were convicted of federal funds bribery and five counts of honest services mail fraud and conspiracy. Siegelman was also convicted of obstruction of justice. The Supreme Court of the United States remanded to the court for reconsideration in light of Skilling v. United States. Defendants raised numerous issues of error related to their convictions and sentences. The court affirmed Count 3 and 4 for Federal Funds Bribery and held that there was no reversible error in the bribery instructions given by the district court and that the evidence of a corrupt agreement between defendants was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find quid pro quo. The court affirmed Count 5, 6, and 7 for Honest Services Mail Fraud and Conspiracy and held that any error in the honest services instructions was harmless. The court reversed Count 8 and 9 for Self Dealing where there was lack of evidence from which the jury could infer that Siegelman knowingly agreed to or participated in a broader scheme that included Scrushy's alleged subsequent dealing and where, in light of Skilling, the evidence was insufficient to show self-dealing. The court affirmed Count 17 for Obstruction of Justice and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that a certain statement at issue met the United States v. Caraza standard. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that there was no reasonable possibility of prejudice to defendants that arose out of the exposure of the jury to certain extrinsic evidence and denied the motion for new trial. The court held that exposure of the jurors to media reports about the trial was harmless in view of the limited and incidental nature of the exposure and the substantial evidence of defendants' guilt. The court also agreed with the district court that defendants were not entitled to a new trial where there was no possibility that defendants suffered prejudice from any premature deliberations, discussion of penalty, or deliberation with fewer than all the members of the jury present. The court further held that Scrushy's recusal motion was untimely and without merit; that defendants' claims regarding the Middle District of Alabama's jury selection procedures were without merit and did not entitle them to any relief; and that Siegelman's upward departure in sentencing was not an abuse of discretion.

Plaintiff appealed his termination to a Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") Disciplinary Appeals Board where a summary review procedure was used to evaluate appointees such as himself under 38 U.S.C. 7401(1) while he was completing his probationary period. At issue was whether the two-year probationary period laid out at 38 U.S.C. 7403 applied to a temporary, at-will VA physician appointed under section 38 U.S.C. 7405. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendant and held that the probationary period required by section 7403 applied only to permanent appointments made under section 7401(1) and declined to rely on the plain language of section 7403 where that language would lead to an absurd result. The court also rejected plaintiff's alternative theories when they were untimely raised.