Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) against Petitioner. The notice asserted that Petitioner was removable on three separate grounds - child abuse, crime of violence, and sexual abuse of a minor. An immigration judge (IJ) ruled that Petitioner was removable on all three grounds asserted by DHS, and that, as an aggravated felon, Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. At issue was whether the endangerment offense to which Petitioner pled nolo contendere comprised an aggravated felony sexual abuse offense for purposes of the INA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the BIA's ruling insofar as it held that Petitioner was removable on the grounds that he was convicted of aggravated felony sexual abuse and that he was therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal, as Petitioner could not be held to have pled to an offense that fell within the sexual abuse rubric under the INA. View "Campbell v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner Muhammad Saleem Sheikh, a native and citizen of Pakistan, sought review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The order came after the BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal of an immigration judge's denial of a continuance in his removal proceedings. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the decision to deny the motion for continuance under the standards set forth in Matter of Hashmi; and (2) Petitioner's hopes for immigration reform did not warrant forbearance in his removal proceedings. View "Sheikh v. Holder" on Justia Law

This case required the First Circuit Court of Appeals to decide, for the first time, whether section 1101(a)(42)(B), a statute enacted to pave the way for asylum for victims of China's coercive population control policies, extends automatically to a spouse of a person forced to undergo an abortion. Petitioner, a Chinese national, petitioned for asylum, seeking to remain in the United States because of, among other things, his wife's forced abortion. Petitioner argued he was entitled to per se refugee status under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(B) "as a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy." The immigration judge rejected this argument, and the board of immigration appeals affirmed. The First Circuit Court denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review after joining several of its sister circuits in holding that, given the language of the relevant statute and the Attorney General's reasonable interpretation of it, the agency did not err in refusing to grant Petitioner's per se refugee status on the basis that the Chinese government had compelled his wife to undergo a forced abortion. View "Dong v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Venezuela, sought review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The order upheld both an immigration judge's (IJ) determination that Petitioner's asylum application was time-barred and the IJ's denial of his application for withholding of removal on the merits. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) dismissed as to the asylum claim, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review that decision, as the Court is without jurisdiction to review agency findings regarding timeliness of an asylum application unless the petitioner challenges the decision on constitutional or legal grounds; and (2) denied as to the claim for withholding of removal, as substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination. View "Cabas v. Holder" on Justia Law

On January 4, 2010, an immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding under the Convention Against Torture. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed this denial on September 8, 2011. Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that the IJ and BIA did not err by (1) concluding that Petitioner's past treatment on Ukraine did not rise to the level of persecution; and (2) concluding that Petitioner had failed to establish the requisite objective basis that a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution. View "Rebenko v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for illegally trafficking in sperm whale teeth and narwhal tusks. Specifically, the jury found Defendant's whale-tooth dealings violated CITES, an international compact implemented in the United States via the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and regulations authorized by the ESA. Defendant appealed, contending (1) the district judge should have instructed the jury on certain lesser-included offenses because he did not actually know his transactions were illegal, even if he should have known; and (2) smuggling convictions are legally wrong because his conduct violated only regulations, not statutes. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed after quoting a line from Moby Dick, holding (1) the district court did not err in failing to give the requested instructions because a rational jury could not have found that Defendant lacked actual knowledge that his whale-tooth transactions were illegal; and (2) the smuggling statute criminalizes violations of regulations like those implementing CITES because Congress intended the word "law" in the phrase "contrary to law" to include regulatory law as well as statutory law. View "United States v. Place" on Justia Law

A member of the Boston City Council was convicted of attempted extortion under color of official right (Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951) and three counts of making a false statement to FBI agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001 for accepting $1,000 in exchange for performing official acts to assist a local businessman in obtaining a liquor license for a supper club. That businessman was cooperating with the FBI. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to sufficiency of the evidence and to jury instructions on reciprocity and interstate commerce. The court upheld the 36-month sentence against a contention that the government impermissibly sought vindictively to punish defendant.

Taxpayers, who incurred tax liability as a result of a failed business, had transferred real estate to a trust for the benefit of family members. The IRS determined that, with accrued interest, their indebtedness exceeds $400,000 and, in 2004, gave notice of intent to levy, 26 U.S.C. 6330(a). The taxpayers did not dispute the amount, but requested a pre-attachment CDP hearing and offered to settle their debt for $10,000. They denied that they had any ownership interest in the property and asserted that, with their assets and income, they could never come close to satisfying their total tax liability. After gathering information and hearing arguments, the IRS rejected the offer in compromise, finding that the taxpayers were the real owners. The Tax Court reviewed the determination de novo, found that the taxpayers were not the owners of the real estate, directed the IRS to accept the offer in compromise, and ordered the IRS to pay attorneys' fees. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the Tax Court employed an improper standard of review with respect to the IRS's subsidiary determinations. Under a more deferential standard, consistent with the nature and purpose of the CDP process, the IRS acted reasonably.

Plaintiff worked for the Puerto Rico Ports Authority. In 2006, Bonilla, PRPA's executive director, named the plaintiff to a trust position within the PRPA. At the time, the Popular Democratic Party held power in Puerto Rico. In 2008, plaintiff voluntarily resigned this post in order to accept a career position at the Marín International Airport in Carolina. Within months, he transferred to another career position as a security supervisor at Aguadilla airport. The PDP lost the general election in 2008, and its rival, the New Progressive Party, assumed office. In early 2009, plaintiff began experiencing workplace harassment, including banishment from the Aguadilla airport, transfer to the Mercedita airport in Ponce (far from his home), removal of his sidearm, a series of negative performance evaluations, and threats of suspension and termination. No legitimate reason supported any of these actions. The district court dismissed his claim of political discrimination. The First Circuit reversed.

Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, denies federal economic and other benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts and to surviving spouses from those couples, by defining "marriage" as "only a legal union between one man and one woman." "Spouse" refers "only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." DOMA absolves states from recognizing same-sex marriages solemnized in other states; prevents same-sex married couples from filing joint federal tax returns, affecting tax burdens; prevents a surviving same-sex spouse from collecting Social Security survivor benefits; leaves federal employees unable to share health insurance and other benefits with same-sex spouses. DOMA may result in loss of federal funding of programs such as Medicaid and veterans cemeteries if states recognize same-sex marriages in determining income or allowing burials. The district court declared Section 3 unconstitutional. The First Circuit affirmed, but stayed injunctive relief, anticipating certiorari review. The court applied "a closer than usual review" based on discrepant impact among married couples and on the importance of state interests in regulating marriage and tested the rationales for DOMA, considering Supreme Court precedent limiting which rationales can be counted and the force of certain rationales.