Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The city and stopped paying full reimbursement of certain medical expenses for former firefighters and police officers who had retired on disability pensions. The retirees alleged that the decision violated state statutes, constituted an ultra vires act, contradicted principles of equity, and offended the Due Process Clause.The district court entered summary judgment against all but three of the plaintiffs and resolved the remaining claims after trial. The First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rulings. The state injured-on-duty statute does not require the benefit and there was no evidence that the city ever authorized such a benefit on a global basis or made specific promises to retirees, other than the three that went to trial.

After a generator failed, plaintiff ordered a replacement, believing that no permit was required for changes to its hydroelectric power facility, which is located on plaintiff's property on a non-navigable Massachusetts river. The facility consists of an 87-acre-foot reservoir, a 20-foot-high, 127-foot-long concrete gravity dam, two powerhouses, and appurtenant facilities. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission concluded that plaintiff required a license under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 817(1). The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the facility is in a stream that is subject to Commerce Clause jurisdiction, the proposed changes will constitute "post-1935 construction" under the Act, and the proposed changes will affect interstate commerce. The Commission's interpretation of "construction" as encompassing the work at issue was reasonable and substantial evidence supports a finding that small hydroelectric plants have a cumulative impact on interstate commerce.

The defendant, part of a conspiracy that stole and re-sold computer parts and memory, pled guilty and was sentenced to 33 months in prison plus 36 months of supervised release and ordered to pay to the victim, jointly and severally with a co-conspirator, restitution of $800,000 plus interest. After he fell behind on the payments, the government obtained a writ of garnishment. The district court held that the government cannot meet its obligation to enforce an order of restitution to a private-party crime victim by using the garnishment procedure of the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. 3205. The First Circuit reversed, noting statutory changes that make compensation of private victims a high priority. The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C. 3613) specifically authorizes use of the FDCA to enforce private-victim restitution orders.

Plaintiff brought action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, claiming that the company used a kickback scheme and knowingly caused submission of false Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE claims by hospitals and doctors. The district court held that hospital claims at issue were not false or fraudulent, and that doctor claims were false or fraudulent, but not materially so. The First Circuit reversed. If kickbacks affected the transactions underlying the claims, the claims failed to meet a condition of payment and were false, regardless of the hospital's participation in or knowledge of the kickbacks. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the alleged misrepresentations were not capable of influencing Medicare's decision to pay the claims.

After a drug search, plaintiff, a 12-year veteran of the police force, notified his supervisor that he had $600 that had been found in the house. He followed instructions and returned the money to its owner. He was suspended without pay. The officer was acquitted of criminal charges before the suspension hearing, which occurred six months after his request. After the hearing, he was terminated from the department. The Investigation, Processing and Appeals Commission and Puerto Rico Court of Appeals affirmed. The federal district court ultimately dismissed all claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court properly applied collateral estoppel; plaintiff had a full opportunity to litigate the issues at the administrative and state court levels and a "public policy" exception does not apply. Plaintiff's due process rights were not violated by the 14-day delay between his acquittal and the administrative hearing.

In 1994 the federal government filed suit to remedy conditions in Puerto Rican juvenile detention facilities. The court approved a settlement in 1997. A 2007 order terminated some conditions and modified and retained others. The parties continued sparring over failure to achieve specified staff levels; a 2009 order required hiring of 50 staff members per month until the goal was reached. Six months later, the federal government moved for a finding of civil contempt. The district court took no action on either the contempt motion or Puerto Rico's request to modify or terminate the 2009 order before 180 days had passed, and the prospective relief provisions were stayed (18 U.S.C. 3626(a)). The court subsequently denied the motion for contempt. The Third Circuit dismissed, reasoning that there is nothing to enforce because the 2009 order was stayed as a result of the motion to modify or terminate. The two motions involve the same argument: whether Puerto Rico is financially able to comply with the 2009 order. The court urged the district court to decide Puerto Rico's motion promptly.

After a 2003 oil spill, Massachusetts enacted an Oil Spill Prevention Act (MOSPA), which the federal government challenged as preempted by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1221-1232 and parts of 46 U.S.C.) and Coast Guard regulations. While the case was pending on remand, the Coast Guard enacted a regulation pertaining to navigation on Buzzards Bay, which is claimed to expressly preempt MOSPA. The district court entered an injunction prohibiting enforcement of certain provisions of MOSPA. The First Circuit again reversed and remanded. The Coast Guard's reliance on a categorical exclusion and failure to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4332; its finding that the rule was not likely to be highly controversial was arbitrary. The error was not harmless. Because the rule is invalid, the court did not address preemption.

The Puerto Rico Examining Board of Accountants required a CPA to submit to involuntary practice review and denied a requested postponement. The CPA failed to appear at a hearing. The Board did not respond to a request to reschedule, but suspended his license. Following a request for reconsideration, the Board sent notice that did not comply with statutory requirements, held a hearing, and declined to lift the suspension. The CPA completed the practice review after the deadline; the Board again declined to lift the suspension. The Board sent another non-compliant notice, held another hearing, and revoked the CPA's license. A Puerto Rico court ordered reinstatement. The federal district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the individual Board defendants perform functions similar to judges and are protected by immunity. They act under a statute that provides for due process and their actions are reviewable in Puerto Rico courts. Although they made serious procedural errors, the Board members had jurisdiction to take the actions at issue.

After the plaintiff publicly criticized town council policies, the council denied him reappointment to an unpaid advisory commission concerned with recreational facilities. The district court rejected his 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights suit on summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed. The court assumed that the council's decision was based on the plaintiff's exercise of First Amendment rights and held that the plaintiff's former position and his comments related to policy. Analogizing to firings based on political party affiliation, the court held that the balance weighs in favor of the town's need to accomplish its policy objectives through loyal, cooperative individuals whom the public will perceive as sharing the administration's goals.

The plaintiff, employed by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, was observed taking a security pass from a car. He shredded the pass, without reporting to his superiors. The Puerto Rico Police Department arrested, charged, and investigated, but because the employee was already under investigation for misconduct, an agent of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was dispatched and observed some of the ensuing questioning and hearing, without participating. The case against the employee was dismissed. The employee's claim of malicious prosecution through the DHS agent was rejected on summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, looking to state law, as required by the Federal Torts Claims Act. The DHS agent was not actively instrumental in the investigation and there was no evidence of malice.