Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Robert Snyder operated a business in a building that he owned in the city of Waltham, Massachusetts. After Snyder fired an employee who served as a member of the Waltham city council, the former employee complained to the city building department that Snyder’s use of his building violated a local land use ordinance. Code enforcement officers investigated Snyder’s use of his property and fined him under the ordinance. Snyder contested the fines in the district court, alleging that the city and five individuals violated his rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by singling him out for differential treatment for reasons unique to him. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of the two defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that the local government officials did not violate any clearly established federal law, and therefore, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Snyder v. Collura" on Justia Law

In 1999, Petitioner admitted to a single count of shoplifting in Massachusetts state court. In 2012, Petitioner admitted to an amended charge of larceny by inducement. The following year, Petitioner was charged with removability as an alien who has been convicted of or admits to having committed "a crime involving moral turpitude.” Petitioner applied for special rule cancellation, arguing that he fell within the petty offense exception because his shoplifting conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, concluding that the IJ properly found that Petitioner’s shoplifting conviction was, in addition to the larceny conviction, a crime involving moral turpitude, making him ineligible for the petty offense exception. The First Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not provide a comprehensive analysis to support its conclusion Petitioner’s shoplifting conviction was also a crime involving moral turpitude, and therefore, the case must be remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Mejia v. Holder" on Justia Law

In this insurance coverage dispute, the driver involved in an accident filed a claim with the Insurer of the other vehicle involved in the accident. The Insurer denied the claim. The Office of the Insurance Commissioner reviewed the denial and ordered the Insurer to adjust and resolve the claim. The Insurer did not file an appeal and instead filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the federal district court. The district court dismissed the federal court action on res judicata grounds. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that res judicata barred this action and no exceptions to res judicata applied. View "Universal Ins. Co. v. Office of the Ins. Comm'r" on Justia Law

In 2013, the City of Worcester, Massachusetts adopted the Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance and the Pedestrian Safety Ordinance, which prohibited coercive or risky behavior by panhandlers, other solicitors, and demonstrators seeking the attention of motor vehicle drivers. Two plaintiffs were homeless people who solicited donations from the City’s sidewalks. The third plaintiff was a City school committee member who had customarily displayed political signs near traffic during the campaign season. Plaintiffs brought suit challenging the new ordinances as violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied a preliminary injunction against enforcing the ordinances, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of any of their constitutional claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction as to all provisions of the ordinances except for the Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance’s prohibition against nighttime solicitation, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "Thayer v. City of Worcester" on Justia Law

Plaintiff received coverage under Johnson & Johnson’s Long-Term Disability Plan while working for a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson. Later, Johnson & Johnson and Medical Card System, Inc. (together, Appellees) terminated Plaintiff’s long-term disability benefits. The district court upheld the denial, holding that the plan administrator had ample basis for finding Plaintiff did not cooperate fully during the Functional Capacity Examination (FCE) and was thus ineligible for continuing benefits. Plaintiff again appealed, arguing, among other things, that the plan administrator abused its discretion in crediting an examination by a physical therapist over the opinion of his treating physician. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the plan administrator’s finding that Plaintiff was uncooperative during his final FCE was supported by substantial evidence, and therefore, the administrator’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s long-term disability benefits was neither arbitrary nor capricious; and (2) the administrator did not abuse its discretion in determining whether there existed grounds for termination of Plaintiff’s benefits. View "Ortega-Candelaria v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Guatemala, entered the United States without inspection sometime in 1999 or 2000. In 2006, Petitioner was charged with removability. In 2011, Petitioner conceded removability and filed an application for withholding of removal, arguing that he would be targeted for extortion and violence by Guatemalan gangs because he had stayed in the United States for an extended period and thus would be perceived as wealthy upon his return to Guatemala. An Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application, concluding that Petitioner had failed to show that he was a member of a particular social group and could not show a “clear probability” that he would likely be persecuted upon returning to Guatemala. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA’s judgment was reasonable and consistent with the Court’s past precedent, as well as with its own. View "Sam v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, came to the United States without a visa or other valid entry document. Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, asserting that she opposed China’s population control policy and would be forced to undergo involuntary sterilization if she were returned to China. After a hearing, an Immigration Judge found that Petitioner was not credible, denied all forms of relief, and ordered Petitioner removed to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings, which the BIA denied as untimely. More than seven years after her first untimely motion and almost twelve years after she was first ordered removed to China, Petitioner filed a second motion to reopen, alleging a material change in country conditions. The BIA denied Petitioner’s motion, concluding that Petitioner’s second motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred under 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(2) and not subject to any exceptions. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s petition. View "Lin v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Indonesia, was charged with removability because he was a noncitizen who overstayed his tourist visa. Petitioner conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, asserting that he feared returning to Indonesia because he believed he would be subjected to persecution due to his Christian faith. The Immigration Judge denied all relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen asylum proceedings, concluding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a change in country circumstances that would excuse the untimeliness of his motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen. View "Simarmata v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought insurance coverage for gastric lap band surgery. Defendant, a health-care insurer that covered Plaintiff by virtue of Plaintiff’s husband’s employment with the federal government, refused to cover the full cost of the surgery. Plaintiff brought tort and breach of contract claims against Defendant in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance. Defendant removed the action to the federal district court, asserting, inter alia, that the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA) completely preempted Plaintiff’s local-law claims, thus conferring original jurisdiction on the federal court. Defendant then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the FEHBA demanded exhaustion of administrative remedies. Plaintiff, in the meantime, requested that the district court remand the case to the Court of First Instance. The district court (1) denied Plaintiff’s motion to remand, holding that the FEHBA completely preempted Plaintiff’s claims and, thus, federal jurisdiction attached; and (2) dismissed the action for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s judgment of dismissal and its order denying remand, holding that the court erred in concluding that the FEHBA afforded complete preemption. View "Lopez-Munoz v. Triple-S Salud, Inc. " on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Haiti, was charged with removability. An Immigration Judge (IJ) eventually ordered Petitioner removed to Haiti. Petitioner filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that because he had been granted temporary protected status (TPS) he was no longer removable, and that, at a minimum, his case should be administratively closed. The IJ denied the motion, concluding that Petitioner’s receipt of TPS was not a material change justifying reopening his case and that Petitioner’s TPS status did not warrant reopening the case so that the proceedings could be administratively terminated. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s subsequent appeal. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not commit legal error when it refused to reopen Petitioner’s removal proceedings so that they could be administratively closed based on Petitioner’s grant of TPS. View "Donnee v. Holder" on Justia Law