Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals
by
Title insurance purchasers, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated consumers, claimed that insurers collectively fixed title insurance rates in violation of the Sherman Act. Title insurers in Delaware are required to file their insurance rates with the state Department of Insurance, Del. Code tit. 18, 2504(a). Insurers may comply with the state’s rate filing requirements through a licensed rating organization. Defendants, title insurers, are members of and file their rates through the Delaware Title Insurance Rating Bureau, which is licensed by the DOI; the statutory scheme authorizes cooperative action. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint is barred by the filed-rate doctrine (which precludes antitrust suits based on rates currently filed with federal or state agencies), lack of standing, and federal antitrust liability exemptions. The Third Circuit affirmed.

by
Title insurance purchasers, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated consumers, claimed that insurers collectively fixed title insurance rates in violation of the Sherman Act and the New Jersey Antitrust Act. In New Jersey, the Department of Banking and Insurance approves and regulates title insurance rates, N.J. Stat. Ann. 17:1C-19(a)(1). Insurers may collectively file rates for approval through a licensed rating organization, thereby authorizing cooperative action. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint is barred by the filed-rate doctrine (which precludes antitrust suits based on rates currently filed with federal or state agencies), lack of standing, and federal and state antitrust liability exemptions. The Third Circuit affirmed.

by
A psychologist challenged the government's claim that he had over-billed Medicare and owed the government more than $600,000 in overpayments. At a hearing on the claim, the doctor presented extensive evidence, but the government neither appeared nor presented argument or advocacy, either written or in person. The ALJ concluded that the overpayment was actually $5,434.48. The doctor moved, under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1), to recoup tens of thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in fighting the claim. His request was denied by an administrative appeals council and the district court based on their conclusion that the hearing before the ALJ was not an adversary adjudication, as is required for a fee award under the EAJA. The Third Circuit affirmed denial, finding that the government did not engage in purposeful advocacy.

by
Married couples formed Virgin Islands corporations that were limited partners in a VI limited liability limited partnership, Four Points, and derived all of their income from Four Points. The couples assert that they were not bona fide residents of the Virgin Islands in 2006, but that a portion of their income was derived from sources there, I.R.C. 932(a)(1)(A)(ii). Both couples filed 2006 tax returns with the U.S. and with the Virgin Islands, but, rather than paying the Virgin Islands, they paid all taxes to the U.S., claiming that they believed that the IRS would pay the Virgin Islands or that the VIBIR would obtain the amounts from the IRS. The couples filed suit to compel the VIBIR to declare whether the income was derived from sources within the Virgin Islands and, against the U.S., requested refunds. The district court dismissed with respect to the Virgin Islands and transferred the claim against the U.S. to Florida. The Third Circuit affirmed. Taxpayers stated no cause of action against the Virgin Islands and any claims are not ripe, as there has been no administrative action against them. The District Court of the Virgin Islands may transfer VI tax cases to other district courts.

by
Plaintiff, 12 years old, was bitten by a barracuda while playing in shallow water near Buck Island Reef National Monument. Buck Island is accessible only by watercraft and is open to the public for recreational activities. When boat owners apply for a permit to visit, they receive a brochure detailing hazards. There are also signs posted on the Island, warning of the same hazards. The warnings indicate that barracuda should be treated with caution, but are not usually aggressive toward humans. The government was aware of only one incident in 22 years involving a barracuda bite near Buck Island. Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671, alleging negligent failure to warn. The district court dismissed, citing the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The Third Circuit affirmed. No statute, regulation, or policy mandated any particular method for warning about marine hazards. The National Park Service has discretion regarding whether to provide warnings and the extent of any such warnings, in light of the information available.

by
Taxpayers (married couples) had an interest in real estate that was condemned by Pennsylvania for construction of a highway. The state agreed to pay $40.9 million, with interest, in five yearly installments. During the first three years of the agreement, the taxpayers excluded the interest from their federal income taxes as exempt under 26 U.S.C. 103, which permits exclusion of interest payments that are obligations of the state. The IRS issued to each couple a deficiency notice for $2.3 million, which was affirmed by the Tax Court. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Negotiations between the parties transformed the state's interest obligation from mandatory to voluntary. The purpose underlying Section 103 was "well served" in this case; the state was able to obtain credit from the taxpayers at a lower rate of interest than it otherwise might have had to if the condemnation proceeding had been completed.

by
In 2007, the HHS Office of Inspector General conducted a nationwide audit to determine whether states were complying with the requirements to reimburse the federal share of recovered AFDC overpayments made before October 1, 1996. The audit found that the Pennsylvania DPW had recovered $10,598,095 in AFDC overpayments from October 1, 1996 through June 30, 2006, but had not reimbursed ACF for the federal share of $5,609,572. DPW appealed a reimbursement request, challenging HHS authority to conduct the audit, but not the audit findings. The appeals board and district court upheld the HHS determination, rejecting an argument that the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C. 601, designates a procedure established by the Single Audit Act, 31 U.S.C. 7501-7507 as the exclusive audit procedure. Under the SAA, "[e]ach non-Federal entity" that expends at least $300,000 of federal awards in a fiscal year "shall have either a single audit or a program-specific audit made for such fiscal year in accordance with the requirements of this chapter." The Third Circuit affirmed, also rejecting claims under FOIA and that DPW was entitled to retain the federal share of the AFDC overpayment recoveries under substantive law.

by
Petitioner left Syria because of fears relating to indebtedness and was admitted to the U.S. as a nonimmigrant in 2000. He became acquainted with men involved in the September 11 attacks and later voluntarily provided the FBI with information. In October 2001 the INS issued a Notice to Appear charging petitioner as removable. He sought asylum and withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture and was transferred to FBI custody on a material witness warrant. The IJ granted the application for asylum (8 U.S.C. 1158), withholding of removal (8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A)), and withholding of removal pursuant to the CAT, finding that he belonged to the social group of "hopeless debtors," persecuted in Syria. Three years later, ICE indicated that his application might have been fraudulent and that petitioner might pose a threat to national security. The BIA reopened "sua sponte" and remanded. The district court dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Stay of Removal Proceedings." The Third Circuit reversed concluding that, under these unusual circumstances, the district court has jurisdiction to review the BIA decision to reopen pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701.

by
The company, which issues preprinted travelers' checks, challenged 2010 N.J. Laws Chapter 25, amending New Jersey's unclaimed property statute, N.J. Stat. 46:30B, to retroactively reduce the period after which travelers checks are presumed abandoned from 15 years to three years, after which the funds must be turned over to the state. The district court denied an injunction. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the Due Process Clause, the Contract Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Commerce Clause. The law has a rational basis. It does not substantially impairment contractual relationships; while the company has the right to use and invest TC funds until the date the TC is cashed or sold, the duration of use is further subject to the lawful abandonment period set by unclaimed property laws. The company has no investment-backed expectation with respect to the longer period of investment.The law does not directly regulate sales in other states.

by
Merchants challenged 2010 N.J. Laws Chapter 25, amending the unclaimed property statute, N.J. Stat. 46:30B, to provide for escheat of stored value cards (gift cards). Chapter 25 presumes cards to be abandoned after two years of inactivity and requires issuers to transfer remaining value to the state. Issuers must obtain name and address of the purchaser or owner of each card. If the issuer's state exempts cards from its unclaimed property statute, unredeemed balances of cards previously-issued in New Jersey, where information was not recorded, must be reported to New Jersey. The address where the card issued or sold is presumed to be the owner's domicile. The district court enjoined retroactive application of Chapter 25 and prospective enforcement of the place-of-purchase presumption, but declined to enjoin data collection and two-year abandonment provisions. The Third Circuit affirmed. Chapter 25 substantially impaired contractual relationships by imposing unexpected obligations and did not reasonably accommodate the rights of the parties in light of the public purpose. The abandonment period is not preempted by the Credit CARD Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693l-1(c). The place-of-purchase presumption is preempted by federal common law, under which the first opportunity to escheat belongs to the state of the last known address of the creditor, shown by the debtor's records. If the primary rule does not apply, the right to escheat is with the state in which the debtor is incorporated.