Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants were convicted of honest services fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1346, mail fraud ("traditional" fraud), 18 U.S.C.1341, and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, based on a defendant (city councilman) taking official actions in exchange for gifts. Their appeal claimed that the 2010 Supreme Court decision, Skilling v. U.S., affected the law of honest services fraud. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. While the evidence was sufficient to convict on each count, the Skilling decision made jury instructions on honest services fraud incorrect. The jury should have been instructed on a bribery theory but not on a conflict-of-interest theory. The error was not necessarily harmless; the law of honest services fraud depends on intent and finding intent requires a jury to make reasonable inferences. Evidence of honest services fraud overlapped substantially evidence submitted on traditional fraud

Decedent was treated at a non-profit clinic, by volunteer physicians. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services deemed those physicians to be Public Health Service employees (Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(o)), immune from suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680. A suit against the U.S. was the exclusive remedy for alleged malpractice at the clinic. Decedent also treated at a facility where physicians did not enjoy those protections. Her estate sued the U.S., the clinic, the other facility, the doctors at that facility, and their physicians' group. The district court granted summary judgment for the clinic, predicated on immunity under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act (NJCIA), and ultimately dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, except for remanding with respect to the physicians' group. The trial court properly held that the U.S. was immune from suit under the NJCIA, which provides that a similarly-placed private employer would be entitled to the defense. The court properly held that the treatment provided constituted emergency medicine, so that N.J. Stat. 2A:53A-41 applied and one of plaintiff's experts was not qualified to testify. The court erred in not considering treatment by a physicians' assistant in considering claims against her employer, the physicians' group.

The former Pennsylvania State Senator was sentenced to 55 months' imprisonment, a $411,000 fine, and $2,340,839 in restitution, after conviction on 137 counts of fraud, tax evasion, and obstruction of justice. His former aide was sentenced to imprisonment of one year and one day, a $45,000 fine, and joint and several restitution of up to $792,802, after conviction on 45 counts. The Third Circuit affirmed the senator's conviction, but vacated both sentences. The court acted within its discretion in admitting evidence concerning the state Ethics Act. The content and enforcement of the Act were relevant to the claim that there were rules that the senator broke repeatedly, that those rules were clear enough for him to understand, and to show that he was deceiving the Senate when he misrepresented or omitted aspects of his actions and expenditures to avoid the perception that he had violated those rules. A juror's social media comments did not merit a new trial, nor did another juror's exposure to excluded evidence. The district court's failure to calculate a final guidelines range left the court unable to review the procedural and substantive bases of the sentence and affects the substantial rights of the parties; the court abused its discretion with respect to several aspects of sentencing.

The Secretary of Labor cited the refinery for nine "serious" violations of the asbestos in construction standard, which prescribes protective requirements based on measurable concentration of asbestos fibers to which employees are or may be exposed. The ALJ affirmed the violations and the classification. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission reduced the classification to "other than serious" under 29 U.S.C. 666, in part because the Secretary failed to present case-specific evidence of possible employee exposure to asbestos. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded for the citations to be affirmed as "serious." Precedent only requires that there could be exposure to asbestos that is substantially probable to lead to serious harm. Applying this standard, the violations were "serious;" there is no need for case-specific evidence. If the Secretary has shown violations of regulations involving Class II work and the presence of asbestos, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the violations were not "serious."

This appeal involved a putative class action filed by three Pennsylvania Medicaid beneficiaries subject to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare's (DPW) liens against future settlements or judgments. At issue was whether state agencies responsible for administering the Medicaid program have the authority to assert such liens and, if so, whether Pennsylvania's statutory framework was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn. The court examined the text, structure, history, and purpose of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., and held that liens limited to medical costs were not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(a)-(b). Accordingly, the court upheld Pennsylvania's longstanding practice of imposing such liens. The court also held that Pennsylvania's current statutory framework, which afforded Medicaid recipients a right of appeal from the default allocation, was a permissible default apportionment scheme.

Oyster Creek in Ocean County, New Jersey was licensed under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2133(c) in 1969 for a 40-year term and is the oldest operating commercial nuclear power plant in the country. Objectors claimed that the application for license renewal was deficient with respect to detection of corrosion in a safety structure. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board rejected the claims; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission granted the license. After examining the objectors' specific technical claims, the Third Circuit denied review. The Board and the NRC provided hundreds of pages detailing their decision-making and gave due consideration to objectors' concerns; the review was well-reasoned and within the realm of the agency's unique expertise.

The governor terminated two public employees. The district court ordered reinstatement. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. After examining the law of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the court determined that the employees were "career service," not exempt employees, but were not "regular" employees and, therefore, did not have a protected property interest in their jobs.

An Erie County resident had spoken during the public part of 14-15 council meetings before he attempted to object to a motion on an ordinance after the close of public comments. After being told that he was out of order, the resident continued to assert violation of the Sunshine Act and was escorted out. The chair sent a letter stating that the resident could be banned from future meetings if he was disruptive. The district court dismissed civil rights claims (42 U.S.C. 1983), except against the chair. A jury awarded $5,000, but the court entered judgment in favor of the chair. The Third Circuit affirmed. The meeting was a limited public forum, so the council had the right to impose narrowly-tailored, reasonable content-neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions. The resident had adequate alternatives for raising objections to procedures used in adopting ordinances; the evidence did not establish that the chair intended to suppress his message because of content or personal hostility. The only difference between the resident and other speakers at the meeting was the timing of his comments. Because the resident had waived the claim, the court declined to consider whether the council satisfied the state Sunshine Act by reserving time for public comment, but held that the Act does not change the scope of First Amendment rights.