Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Chamber sought final review of the Board's rule, which required employers subject to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151-169, to post an official Board notice informing employees of their rights under the Act. The court held that the Board exceeded its authority in promulgating the challenged rule and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The rulemaking function provided by the Act only empowered the Board to carry out its statutorily defined reactive roles in addressing unfair labor practice charges and conducting representation elections upon request; there was no function or responsibility of the Board not predicated upon the filing of an unfair labor practice charge or a representation petition; and Congress never granted the Board the statutory authority to do so. View "Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Board petitioned for review of the FTC order finding that it violated the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45, by engaging in unfair competition in the market for teeth-whitening services in North Carolina. The court concluded that the Board was not exempt from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine; the Board engaged in a combination or conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; and substantial evidence supported the FTC's factual findings regarding the economic effects of the Board's actions and that those findings supported the conclusion that the Board's behavior violated section 1. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "The NC State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of Medicaid beneficiaries who suffered from severe developmental disabilities, sued the NCDHHS, PBH, and the director of PBH, alleging that defendants violated their rights under the Medicaid statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by reducing their health care services without notice and an opportunity for a hearing. On appeal, PBH and the director challenged the district court's entry of a preliminary injunction. However, the NCDHHS did not join the appeal. Given that the NCDHHS had decided not to litigate the appeal, the court concluded that the Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(5), and accompanying regulations precluded PBH from appealing in the absence of the NCDHHS. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "K.C. v. Shipman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request with the DEA for documents concerning the federal government's regulation of the drug carisoprodol. After nearly two and a half years of pursuing his request through the administrative process to no avail, plaintiff filed this action against the DEA seeking production of the documents he originally requested. Because the DEA violated its statutory deadline for responding to plaintiff, the court held that he has exhausted his administrative remedies in this matter and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Coleman v. DEA" on Justia Law

In this case, a federal jury found that the defendant properties were subject to civil forfeiture. The jury found that each property derived from the proceeds of a health care fraud and money laundering scheme committed by Dr. Mert Kivanc - the son of Turan and Duygu Kivanc (Claimants). The court concluded that the district court correctly denied Claimants' motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations; the district court did not err in denying Claimants' motions to permit Turan and Dr. Kivanc to testify remotely from Turkey; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr. Kivanc's statements and two documents at issue; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Claimants' proposed jury instructions; and Dr. Kivanc's statements and transfer of defendant properties to Claimants and money to Turan were sufficient evidence of his intent to conceal his unlawful activities to withstand Claimants' Rule 50 motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Kivanc" on Justia Law

South Carolina requested a waiver of its maintenance-of-effort condition under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(18), for approximately $67.4 million for its fiscal year 2010. The Secretary granted the waiver in part, but denied it to the extent of the $36.2 million. South Carolina subsequently filed this petition for review, challenging the Secretary's denial of its request for a full waiver and its request for a hearing. The court concluded that the Secretary's action in partially denying the request for a waiver was a determination made with respect to the eligibility of the State for funding and that therefore the court had jurisdiction to consider the State's petition for review. The court also concluded that the Secretary's denial of the State's request for a full waiver was a determination that South Carolina was not eligible to receive a grant in the amount of $36.2 million and that therefore the Secretary was required to provide the State with notice and an opportunity for a hearing before he made a final determination with respect to the waiver request. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "SC Dept. of Educ. v. U.S. Sec. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of NGA with a top secret security clearance, informed the NGA of his marriage after the investigation for his security clearance had been completed but before he had begun work. The NGA conducted a reinvestigation into his security clearance and then revoked the security clearance. Plaintiff commenced this action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., against the NGA and its Director to reverse the NGA's decision, to reinstate his security clearance, and to award him back pay, benefits, and attorneys' fees. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to review a security clearance determination. The court concluded that plaintiff's speculative and conclusory allegations of constitutional violations were essentially recharacterizations of his challenge to the merits of the NGA's security clearance determination and that the court did not have jurisdiction to review such a determination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hegab v. Long" on Justia Law

The Village commenced this action against the Corps to require it to honor commitments made to the Village and other North Carolina towns when developing its plan to widen, deepen, and realign portions of the Cape Fear River navigation channel. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court's holding that the Corps' failure to implement "commitments" made to the Village during development of the plans for the project was not final agency action subject to judicial review. The court also concluded that the alleged contracts on which the Village relied for its contract claims were not maritime contracts that justified the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Village of Bald Head Island v. U. S. Army Corps" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Washington Gas' request to expand a natural gas substation (County Zoning Plans). On appeal, Washington Gas challenged the district court's order dismissing Washington Gas' mandatory referral claim and the district court's subsequent order granting summary judgment on Washington Gas' federal preemption claims. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the mandatory referral claim pursuant to Burford v. Sun Oil; the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act (PSA), 49 U.S.C. 60102, 60104, did not preempt the County Zoning Plans because the PSA only preempted safety regulations and the County Zoning Plans were not safety regulations; and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717, did not preempt the County Zoning Plans because Washington Gas was a local distributor of natural gas and, therefore, was not subject to the NGA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Washington Gas Light Co. v. Prince George's County Council" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting, inter alia, that Maryland's good-and-substantial-reason requirement for obtaining a handgun permit contravened the Second Amendment. The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of section 5-306(a)(5)(ii) of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code, to the extent that it conditions eligibility for a permit to carry, wear, or transport a handgun in public on having "good and substantial reason" to do so. Because the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement could not pass constitutional muster, the court reversed the judgment. Under the applicable intermediate scrutiny standard, the State had demonstrated that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement was reasonably adapted to Maryland's significant interests in protecting public safety and preventing crime. The court also rejected plaintiffs' facial challenge. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Woollard v. Gallagher" on Justia Law