Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved a regulatory action by the Department of Labor, which suspended various regulations for temporary agricultural workers and reinstated other prior regulations. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that the Department: (1) engaged in "rule making" when reinstating the prior regulations; and (2) failed to comply with the notice and comment procedures mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq. The court also concluded that the Department did not invoke the "good cause exception" provided by the APA to excuse its failure to comply with these notice and comment requirements. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in invalidating the Department's action on the ground that it was arbitrary and capricious. View "United Farm Workers v. North Carolina Growers' Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs initiated this proceeding against defendants, challenging the use of advanced imaging technology (AIT) scanners and invasive pat-downs at airport screening checkpoints in the United States. On appeal, plaintiffs maintained that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the TSA's standard operating procedures for checkpoint screenings did not constitute an "order" under 49 U.S.C. 46110. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued, that section 46110's conferral of exclusive jurisdiction in a court of appeals deprived them of due process and contravened the separation of powers rooted in the Constitution. The court held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291; on the merits, the district court did not err in ruling that the Checkpoint Screen SOP constituted an order of the TSA Administrator under section 46110; and plaintiffs' remaining contentions lacked merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blitz v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

The MTA applied to the Board to abandon freight transportation use of a right-of-way and to convert it to a recreational trail, as authorized by the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1247. The Board rejected the MTA's application, concluding that instead of assuming full responsibility for legal liability or indemnifying the MTA for any potential liability, the proposed sponsors conditioned their undertakings by subjecting them to sovereign immunity and to future state legislative appropriations. The Board explained that instead of assuming full responsibility, the proposed sponsors offered the possibility of no responsibility. The MTA subsequently filed a petition for review. The court found that the MTA's arguments were unpersuasive, especially in light of its burden to demonstrate that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the Board and denied the petition for review. View "Maryland Transit v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, natives of Somalia and members of the Isaaq clan, alleged that they or members of their families were subject to torture, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killings by government agents under the command and control of defendant, a former high-ranking government official in Somalia. At issue was whether defendant was immune from suit under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350. The court gave deference to the State Department's position on status-based immunity doctrines such as head-of-state immunity but, in contrast, the State Department's determination regarding conduct-based immunity was not controlling but carried substantial weight in the court's analysis. Because this case involved acts that violated jus cogens norms, the court concluded that defendant was not entitled to conduct-based official immunity under the common law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of both head-of-state and foreign official immunity to defendant. View "Yousuf v. Samantar" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff's claim for survivor benefits after her husband was awarded total disability benefits in 1993 under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 932, until his death in 2000. The liable employer subsequently filed a modification request seeking reconsideration of the award of benefits. In 2004, the ALJ agreed to modify the 1993 award, retroactively denying plaintiff's living miner's claim and also rejecting her survivor's claim. On plaintiff's petition for review of the ALJ's decision, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the ALJ had failed to exercise the discretion accorded to him with respect to the modification request. On remand, the ALJ again denied plaintiff's claims but the Benefits Review Board (BRB) reversed. The employer petitioned for review and the court denied the petition, affirming the BRB's decision denying modification. View "Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Sharpe" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Sean Theodore Brehm, a citizen of South Africa, pled guilty to a federal charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, on condition that he be allowed to challenge through appeal the jurisdictional basis of the indictment underlying his conviction. The grand jury accused Defendant of stabbing a British subject, "J.O.," during an altercation at Kandahar Airfield, while both men were employed with private contractors supporting the NATO war effort in Afghanistan. On appeal, Defendant argued that the indictment's reliance on the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act was misplaced, in that the statute (which Defendant admitted was valid on its face) could not be applied to him in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Defendant also asserted that the government failed to establish a sufficient nexus between him and the United States to support the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, pointing out that, prior to his arrival in Virginia as an accused, neither he nor his victim had ever set foot in this country. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's challenges to his conviction and affirmed the district court's judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Dwayne Durham was charged and jailed in southwest Virginia for more than three months before the prosecutor realized that this was a case of mistaken identity and rectified the error. As a result, Plaintiff filed suit against, inter alia, Officer David L. Horner, alleging a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, plus a state law claim for malicious prosecution. The district court awarded summary judgment to Horner on the basis of qualified immunity, and Plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff contended that Horner was not entitled to qualified immunity because he relied on and utilized unverified information to set "forth a chain of events that would lead to the indictment and arrest of the wrong individual." Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding Plaintiff was unable to establish that his seizure was "pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause," and he could not show the essential constitutional violation underlying a 1983 claim. Because there was, as a matter of law, probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest and detention, his state law malicious prosecution claim failed too.

Kevin Morrison, a resident of Maryland, was born in Jamaica and cannot read or write English. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting that Appellee Randstad terminated his employment pursuant to a requirement that its employees read and write English. Two years later, in an amended charge, Morrison asserted that the literacy policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because he has a learning disability. In investigating Morrison’s charges, the EEOC served an administrative subpoena on Randstad, which Randstad resisted, in part. When the EEOC sought judicial enforcement of its subpoena, the district court denied relief. "Once a charge has placed the Commission on notice that a particular employer is (or may be) violating Title VII or the ADA in a particular way, the Commission may access 'virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.'" The question was whether and to what extent these materials were "relevant" to the EEOC’s investigation of Morrison’s charges. The district court concluded that none of the requested materials were relevant. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s application of an unduly strict standard of relevance amounted to legal error, leading to an abuse of discretion. Applying the correct standard, with deference to the EEOC’s assessment of relevance, the Court concluded that all of the EEOC’s requested materials fell within the broad definition of relevance applicable to EEOC administrative subpoenas, and that the district court’s rejection of the EEOC’s alleged factual nexus "crossed the line" into an assessment of the merits of Morrison’s claim. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The government initiated civil commitment proceedings against Respondent-Appellee Sean Francis. The government certified that Respondent, who had numerous criminal convictions based on his repeated conduct of placing threatening and obscene telephone calls, was a "sexually dangerous person." After an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that Respondent was not eligible for commitment because the government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent would have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct if released. On appeal, the government argued that the district court erred by failing to make necessary factual findings regarding Respondent's prior sexually violent conduct and by failing to determine whether Respondent suffered from a qualifying mental condition under the relevant statutes. After reviewing the record, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, because the court appropriately considered the elements required for civil commitment and did not clearly err in determining that the government failed to meet its burden of proving that Respondent was a sexually dangerous person.

Over thirty-five years ago, the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), working with local sponsors, devised a project to provide watershed protection, flood prevention, and recreation along the Lost River Subwatershed. In 1974, the NRCS issued an environmental impact statement relating to the project, and since that time, three dams and most of the land treatment measures have been completed. After preparing a supplemental environmental impact statement in 2009, the NRCS issued a record of decision that eliminated one of the remaining dams from the project and authorized construction of the final dam for the added purpose of providing water supply. Appellants, seven individuals who alleged that their land will be adversely affected by this final dam's construction, filed this action contending that the NRCS failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). They appealed the district court's order granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment. Because the Fourth Circuit determined that the NRCS complied with the procedures mandated by the NEPA and took a hard look at the project's environmental effects, the Court affirmed.