Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs challenged the Corps' decision to approve a permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1344, and section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (RHA), 33 U.S.C. 403, to build a mooring facility and concrete boat ramp about 3,000 feet from the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge in Virginia Beach. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's award of summary judgment to defendants. Having concluded that the Corps' grant of the permit violated the applicable National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), procedural requirements, the court was not inclined to decide whether it should not have issued on different grounds. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment, remanded for preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint, alleging that Arlington County's sign ordinance violated the First Amendment. Plaintiff had commissioned a painting described as including "happy cartoon dogs, bones, and paw prints" and the county subsequently notified plaintiff that the painting violated the sign ordinance. The court agreed with the district court that the ordinance was a content-neutral restriction on speech that satisfied intermediate scrutiny. Finding no merit to the other constitutional challenges, the court affirmed the judgment.

These appeals arose from an ALJ's order, affirmed by the Benefits Review Board, finding that Gary Looney suffered disabling obstructive lung disease arising out of his work as a coal miner and awarding his widow black lung benefits payable by Looney's former employer. The court determined that the award of benefits was supported by the record and affirmed the award of benefits to Looney, denying his former employer's petition for review.

After the Agencies approved the construction of a new 20-mile toll road in North Carolina, the Conservation Groups filed suit, seeking to enjoin construction on the toll road, contending that the process by which the Agencies approved the road violated the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the Agencies. Because the Agencies failed to disclose critical assumptions underlying their decision to build the road and instead provided the public with incorrect information, they did indeed violate NEPA. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, the Chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estate of BioniCare Medical Technologies, contested determinations of the Medicare Appeals Council (MAC) refusing to provide coverage for the BIO-1000, a device to treat osteoarthritis of the knee. Plaintiff alleged that the Secretary improperly used the adjudicative process to create a policy of denying coverage for the BIO-1000, that the MAC's decisions were not supported by substantial evidence, and that the MAC's decisions were arbitrary and capricious on account of a variety of procedural errors. The court rejected those contentions and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This appeal arose from the district court's order granting final judgment to the United States upon equitable claims of payment by mistake of fact and unjust enrichment against Tuomey arising out of alleged violations of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395nn, (the Stark Law), and awarding damages plus pre- and post-judgment interest. Because the court concluded that the district court's judgment violated Tuomey's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Because the court was remanding the case, the court also addressed other issues raised on appeal that were likely to recur upon retrial.

This case arose from the FAA's decision to suspend the airworthiness certification of a helicopter leased by plaintiff for his flight instruction business. Plaintiff brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671, et seq., alleging that he suffered financial harm as a result of the FAA's negligence in first issuing an airworthiness certificate to the helicopter. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, finding that the FAA inspector's original certification of the aircraft fell under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. In view of the fact that the discretionary function exception required the dismissal of plaintiff's action, the court need not reach the government's contention that the misrepresentation exception to the FTCA applied as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

This appeal arose from the United States' effort to forfeit the assets of C.L.P., a cigarette manufacturer, following its guilty plea to several tobacco-related charges. The United States obtained a preliminary order of forfeiture allowing it to seize funds that C.L.P. had deposited into an escrow account, which held 35 sub-accounts for the benefit of each state in which C.L.P. sold its products. Two of those states, Oregon and Wisconsin, sought to amend the forfeiture order to exclude their respective sub-accounts from the forfeiture. Because the court concluded that the states have not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that they have a legal interest that entitled them to amendment of the forfeiture order, the court vacated the forfeiture order and remanded.

Appellants, Mark McBurney and Roger Hurlbert, appealed the district court's award of summary judgment to appellees where the district court held that Virginia's Freedom of Information Act, Va. Code Ann. 2.2-3700 et seq. (VFOIA), did not violate appellants' rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause or Hurlbert's rights under the Dormant Commerce Clause. The court concluded that VFOIA did not infringe on any of appellants' fundamental rights or privileges under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The court also held that Hurlbert waived his claim under the Dormant Commerce Clause because he failed to raise any challenge in his opening brief. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Ghana-born Petitioner James Turkson asked an immigration judge (IJ) to defer his removal from the United States because he believed that he would be tortured if returned to his native Ghana. The IJ ruled that Petitioner would likely face torture in Ghana, and therefore deferred his removal. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed the IJ's ruling. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed all aspects of the IJ's decision, but erred in its review of the IJ's factual findings: the BIA reviewed the case under the de novo standard of review instead of under the "clearly erroneous standard" prescribed by its governing regulations. The Fourth Circuit therefore granted Petitioner's petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.