Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of its civil action brought against defendants for alleged Fourth Amendment violations in conjunction with warrantless searches of plaintiff's mining facility. From December 2007 to June 2008, defendants conducted approximately 25 warrantless inspections of plaintiff's mining operation after receiving anonymous tips that the mine was not in compliance with Virginia regulations. The court held that Virginia's Mineral Mine Safety Act, Va. Code Ann. 45.1-161.292:54(B), was constitutional under the New York v. Burger test; there was no Fourth Amendment violation where the searches were objectively supported by multiple complaints to which the inspectors were responding and there was no indication that the inspections were pretext for harassment or other improper conduct; Virginia Code 19.2-59 must be interpreted not to apply to the type of searches at issue here; and having found no constitutional violation, the court concluded that defendants were protected by qualified immunity. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order affirming the Commissioner's denial of her application for supplemental security income (SSI). The court found that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Commissioner.

The Commonwealth of Virginia brought suit against the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, challenging one provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power. Virginia maintained that the conflict between this provision and a newly-enacted Virginia statute provided it with standing to pursue this action. The court held that Virginia, as the sole plaintiff here, lacked standing to bring this action because the challenged provision, the individual mandate, imposed no obligation on Virginia and the Virginia statute did not confer on Virginia a sovereign interest in challenging the individual mandate. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs brought this suit to enjoin, as unconstitutional, enforcement of two provisions of the recently-enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119. The challenged provisions amended the Internal Revenue Code by adding: (1) a "penalty" payable to the Secretary of the Treasury by an individual taxpayer who failed to maintain adequate health insurance coverage and (2) an "assessable payment" payable to the Secretary of the Treasury by a "large employer" if at least on of its employees received a tax credit or government subsidy to offset payments for certain health-related expenses. The court held that because this suit constituted a pre-enforcement action seeking to restrain the assessment of a tax, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, stripped the court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) petitioned for review of a final rule promulgated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) setting forth energy conservation standards for electric induction motors ranging in power output from .25 to 3 horsepower (Final Rule). In promulgating the Final Rule, the DOE invoked its authority to establish energy conservation standards for "small electric motor[s]," a term defined by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 42 U.S.C. 6311(13)(G). NEMA contended that the relevant statutory definition unambiguously excluded all such motors exceeding 1 horsepower, as well as certain motors rated at and less than 1 horsepower, from being regulated as small electric motors. The court held that the Final Rule embodied a permissible interpretation of the statutory definition and therefore, denied the petition for review.

Plaintiffs filed suit against the county, alleging that the December 17 prayer at the Forsyth County Board of Commissioners (Board) meeting represented one instance of the Board's broader practice of sponsoring sectarian opening prayers at its meetings. After conducting a thorough review of the factual record, the district court concluded that the Board's legislative prayer policy violated the Establishment Clause by advancing and endorsing Christianity to the exclusion of other faiths. The court held that the district court's ruling accorded with both Supreme Court precedent and the court's own precedent where those cases established that in order to survive constitutional scrutiny, an invocation must consist of the type of nonsectarian prayers that solemnize the legislative task and seek to unit rather than divide. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Employees of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services filed suit against defendants, alleging principally that the searches conducted on them as a result of a portable ion scanning machine, which was capable of detecting minute amounts of controlled substances, violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The district court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the suit. The court affirmed and held that, although it was clearly established that intrusive prison employee searches required reasonable suspicion, it was far from clear that the devices at issue could not meet that standard. The court further held that because no clearly established federal law placed the officers on notice that fighting contraband in the prison environment in this manner was unlawful, the district court correctly held that immunity attached.

Plaintiff, operator of an electricity plant, sued defendant ("the county"), seeking to enjoin Expedited Bill 29-10, which imposed a levy on large stationary emitters of carbon dioxide within the county, on the ground that it violated the United States and Maryland Constitutions. At issue was whether a Montgomery County exaction on carbon dioxide emissions, levied only upon plaintiff's electricity-generating facility, was a tax or a fee. The court held that the carbon charge, which targeted a single emitter and was located squarely within the county's own "programmatic efforts to reduce" greenhouse gas emissions, was a punitive and regulatory fee over which the federal courts retained jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The under seal appellant ("Company 1"), a foreign company, appealed the district court's denial of its motion to quash the government's grand-jury subpoenas served on the under seal intervenor ("Company 2") where the subpoenas sought documents that Company 1 delivered to Company 2 in response to discovery requests that arose during the course of civil litigation between the two companies in district court. The court affirmed the denial of Company 1's motion to quash the government's subpoenas and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the subpoenas passed muster under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Company 1 provided no basis for the court to craft a new procedural rule in support of its position. The court also held that there were no clearly erroneous rulings by the district court in resolving the factual issue regarding the nature of Company 2's interaction with the government and Company 1 failed to show that the issue merited any further investigation or an evidentiary hearing. The court rejected Company 1's remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's denial of Company 1's motion to quash.

Appellants challenged the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988 to appellee where appellants served an offer of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a) on appellee, which she timely accepted. At issue was whether the district court erred in holding that the amount appellants offered to settle the dispute did not include her attorney's fees and costs. The court affirmed and held that the district court properly enforced the offer of judgment as drafted and served by appellants because the offer contained no language limiting appellant's liability for appellee's recoverable pre-offer costs, including attorney's fees.