Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Oaks, a nursing facility, initiated contempt proceedings against the government because the government failed to abide by the district court's order enjoining the government from acting in accordance with a Notice of Termination relative to Oak's Medicare and Medicaid Provider Agreement. The court vacated the finding of contempt and reversed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the government complied with the injunction by delaying effectuation of the termination notice. View "Oaks of Mid City Resident Council v. Sebelius, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants claimed that ATF lacked statutory authority to issue a demand letter to firearms licensees classified as a "dealer" or "pawnbroker" in certain states, and even if it possessed statutory authority, that its decision to issue the demand letter to the chosen licensees was arbitrary and capricious. The court concluded that 18 U.S.C. 923(g)(5)(A) "unambiguously authorized the demand letter," and the court's "inquiry ends at Chevron step one." The court rejected appellants' claim that section 923(g)(1)(A), 923(g)(1)(B), 923(g)(3)(A), and 923(g)(7) must be read to limit ATF's demand letter authority; the demand letter did not run afoul of section 926(a)'s prohibition; and the appropriation rider at issue did not prohibit ATF from issuing the demand letter because it fell short of consolidating or centralizing records. The court addressed the remaining claims, concluding that ATF's decision was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "10 Ring Precision, Inc., et al. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his motion for attorneys' fees in his Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, suit against the IRS. The court applied the Open Government Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II), and concluded that plaintiff was eligible to attorneys' fees where he filed his FOIA suit after enduring the IRS's continued and unexplained delays in responding to his request for almost a year; only after he filed and served his lawsuit did the IRS first begin to produce some of the responsive documents; and the remaining documents were still not produced for years following further litigation. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for the district court to assess plaintiff's entitlement. View "Batton v. Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law

IEC-Houston petitioned for review of two of the Board's orders stemming from unfair labor practice charges against IEC-Houston and others. The charges stemmed from allegations that IEC-Houston's member employment-assistance programs discriminated against the hiring of union members and "salts" in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3). Concluding that the court had jurisdiction, the court granted IEC-Houston's petition for review and denied the Board's cross-petition for enforcement where IEC-Houston was deprived of due process of law because it was charged and tried under Section 8(a)(3), while each Board panel rejected the ALJ's finding of liability under Section 8(a)(3), and instead found violations of Section 8(a)(1) under a novel theory of liability. The Board's change of liability theories on appeal was error and it was not harmless error. Accordingly, the court did not reach the merits of the Board's novel Section 8(a)(1) theory of liability. View "Correct Electrical, Inc., et al. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

ATO challenged the City's enactment of an ordinance offering taxicabs certified to run on compressed natural gas (CNG) a "head-of-the-line" privilege at a municipally-owned airport. At issue was whether the ordinance was preempted by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7543(a). The court concluded that the ordinance, enacted using traditional police powers, was not superseded by any clear and manifest purpose of Congress, above all where Congress's term "standard" had been identified as one "susceptible" to a mandate/incentive distinction. The court also concluded that the ordinance could have its intended effect and substitute CNG cabs for traditional cabs at the airport but it did not show that the City's cab drivers faced such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects as to force them to switch vehicles. Accordingly, the ordinance was not preempted by section 209(a) of the Act and the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ass'n of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

This case presented a constitutional challenge to Texas's statutory scheme, which does not allow 18- to 20-year-old adults to carry handguns in public. The court held that the state scheme withstood this challenge because the court was bound by a prior panel opinion of this court, NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives. Because plaintiffs Jennings and Harmon were now 21, the court remanded their claims to the district court with instructions to dismiss them as moot. The court also reversed the district court's ruling that the remaining plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge Texas's general criminal provision barring persons from carrying handguns in public. Finally, with respect to the general criminal provision, the court rendered, and with respect to the licensing law the court affirmed the district court, holding that the Texas scheme did not violate the Second or the Equal Protection Clause. View "Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of America Inc, et al. v. McCraw" on Justia Law

Elgin sought review of a final decision by DHHS upholding a ruling of an ALJ affirming a determination by the CMS that Elgin had violated certain safety requirements by serving "undercooked" eggs to its elderly residents. The court concluded it would not defer to DHHS's interpretation of the State Operations Manual (SOM); there was not substantial evidence to find that Elgin violated the SOM; and DHHS could not issue ambiguous interpretative documents and then interpret those in enforcement actions. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and set aside the finding of deficiency and resultant penalties. View "Elgin Nursing Center v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, waste haulers that operate throughout the City, filed suit against the City claiming that its ordinance, which imposed a permit fee for the collection or disposal of waste within city limits, violated the dormant Commerce Clause by imposing an excessive burden on interstate waste haulers. The court concluded that the City's ordinance did not facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce or place excessive burdens on plaintiffs' interstate commerce. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that their alleged injuries fell within the zone of interests protected by the dormant Commerce Clause and the court declined to address their arguments because they lacked prudential standing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Cibolo Waste, Inc., et al v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law

Southwest appealed the district court's dismissal of its claim regarding the Medicare Part D statute, 42 U.S.C. 1395w-101 et seq., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Citing Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Southwest argued that its claim provided a narrow exception to 42 U.S.C. 405(h)'s requirement that required a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a claim in federal court. The court concluded that caselaw interpreting the application of section 405(h) to Medicare claims emphasized that the Illinois Council exception was extremely narrow and appropriately applied only in cases where judicial review would be entirely unavailable through the prescribed administrative procedures. Because Southwest has not carried its heavy burden of showing that the Illinois Council exception applied, the court affirmed the district court's order dismissing the suit. View "Southwest Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a contract FBI employee, sued the government under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 et seq., alleging sex discrimination and retaliation. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and for summary judgment. The court concluded that subsection (g) created a security exemption to Title VII where access was denied to a premise where secure information was kept. Therefore, plaintiff could not be granted relief under Title VII where the government advanced numerous reasons for revocation of her access to the building where secured information was kept, all of which were related to security breaches she allegedly committed. View "Toy v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law