Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a class action suit in state court against the Levee District and Flood Protection Agency. Plaintiffs then initiated a second state court suit against the Levee District and the Agency. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amended petition, joining the Corps as a defendant, seeking declaratory judgment that defendants did not possess a servitude over their property. The Corps then removed the case to federal district court, the district court granted in part and denied in part the Corps' motion to dismiss, and the United States petitioned for permission to appeal. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiffs' action against the Corps fell within the scope of the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. 2409a, so as to waive the United States' immunity to suit and authorize federal subject matter jurisdiction. Because the title dispute here concerned ownership of the purported servitude - a title dispute between plaintiffs and a third party - and because it was plausible to read the QTA as only authorizing suit when the underlying title dispute was between plaintiff and the United States, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lonatro, et al v. United States" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between the City and RBIII where the City demolished a dilapidated building on property that RBIII owned. The City did not provide notice to RBIII before razing the structure and RBIII filed suit against the City. The district court granted summary judgment for the City on all claims except a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim. Those claims were tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of RBIII. The City then appealed. The court agreed with the City's argument on appeal that the district court's jury instructions did not accurately reflect the applicable law and that, under the correct legal standards, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. Because the court vacated the trial court's judgment against the City, the court need not consider the other issues raised in the City's appeal. View "RBIII, L.P. v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law

This matter arose from the multidistrict litigation (MDL) related to allegations that the Emergency Housing Units (EHUs) provided by FEMA in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita contained materials which emitted dangerous levels of formaldehyde. This appeal involved only the Louisiana plaintiffs. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that plaintiffs' negligence claims regarding the use of EHUs were barred by the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims that FEMA negligently responded to formaldehyde complaints under the Louisiana Good Samaritan provision of the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 29:733:1. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' gross negligence claim under the misrepresentation exception to the FTCA. View "In Re: FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liability Lit." on Justia Law

This case involved three consolidated lawsuits filed by plaintiffs who challenged the lawfulness of various ordinances enacted by the City of New Orleans regulating that city's taxicab industry. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of prevailing on their claim that sections 162-59 and 162-321 of the Municipal Code effected a regulatory taking. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order insofar as it granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of these sections. The court affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in connection with all aspects of plaintiffs' impairment of contract claim. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they would be irreparably injured by the denial of an injunction. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order insofar as it denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the Upgrade Ordinances. View "Melancon, et al v. City of New Orleans, et al" on Justia Law

This case arose from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico where an explosion killed 11 workers, caused the drilling platform to sink, and resulted in a major uncontrolled release of oil. At Presidential direction, those events prompted the Department of the Interior to prohibit all new and existing oil and gas drilling operations on the Outer Continental Shelf for six months. The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the moratorium. At issue on appeal was whether the Interior's subsequent actions violated a specific provision of the court's injunction, justifying a finding of civil contempt. The court held that even though the Interior immediately took steps to avoid the effect of the injunction, the court concluded that none of those actions violated the court's order. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Hornbeck Offshore Services, et al v. Salazar, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, local government officials, sought a declaration that a provision of the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA), Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 551.001 et seq., violated the First Amendment. Specifically, they contend that Texas Government Code 551.144 was a content-based restriction on political speech, was unconstitutionally vague, and was overbroad. Section 551.144 prohibited members of covered governing bodies from knowingly participating in a closed meeting, to organize a closed meeting, or to close a meeting to the public. The court held that TOMA was content-neutral and was not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. TOMA was also a disclosure statute, though that did not change the level of scrutiny, because the statute was content-neutral. Accordingly, the district court properly applied intermediate scrutiny and the court affirmed the judgment. View "City of Alpine, TX, et al v. Abbott, et al" on Justia Law

An FCC investigation concluded that Jerry and Deborah Stevens operated an unlicensed FM radio station from their Austin, Texas residence in violation of section 301 of the Communications Act of 1934. The FCC issued a forfeiture order in the amount of $10,000. Thereafter, the government brought an action to enforce the forfeiture in district court pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 504(a). The Stevenses moved to dismiss the enforcement action, arguing that the FCC lacked jurisdiction to regulate intrastate broadcasts and that section 301 did not apply to radio broadcasts. The district court denied the motion, determining it did not have jurisdiction to consider legal challenges to the validity of an FCC forfeiture order in a section 504(a) enforcement action. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Stevenses' legal defenses in the government's action to enforce the forfeiture order, as the Stevens failed to raise legal challenges to the validity of the order in a timely petition for review in the appropriate court of appeals. View "United States v. Stevens" on Justia Law

A trade group and a physician-owned hospital sued the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. They sought injunctive relief to remedy multiple alleged constitutional infirmities with Section 6001 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Section 6001 limits Medicare reimbursement for services furnished to a patient referred by a physician owner. Although it denied the Secretary's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary, concluding that Congress had a rational basis for enacting Section 6001, the new law did not constitute a real or regulatory taking, and the law's requirements were not unconstitutionally vague. The plaintiffs appealed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's decision and dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case. View "Physician Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Sixteen years tardy, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disapproved a revision to Texas's plan for implementing the requirements of the Clean Air Act (CAA). The untimely disapproval unraveled approximately 140 permits issued by Texas under the revision's terms and required regulated entities to qualify for pre-revision permits or risk federal sanctions. Petitioner - the State of Texas, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and representatives of nationwide manufacturing, chemical and petroleum industries - petitioned for review of the EPA's action under the APA. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the EPA's disapproval of Texas's plan, holding that the EPA's disapproval failed APA review, as the EPA based its disapproval on demands for language and program features of the EPA's choosing without basis in the CAA or its implementing regulations. View "State v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered in the United States in 1999. She had authorization to remain for a temporary period, not to exceed six months, but she remained beyond that period without authorization. In 2007 Petitioner was convicted of unlawful possession of fraudulent identifying information. The Department of Homeland Security then charged Petitioner with removability as an alien who remained in the United States for a time longer than permitted. Petitioner filed an application for cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents, which an immigration judge denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) Petitioner's ineligibility for cancellation of removal depended solely on whether her prior state-court conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) Petitioner's offense was one of moral turpitude, and therefore, Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Nino v. Holder" on Justia Law