Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Per Hovem (Per), a former student of Klein Independent School District (KISD), along with his parents, filed a claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for reimbursement of private school expenses incurred because KISD allegedly failed to provide Per with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) while Per was a KISD student. The special hearing officer and the district court found in favor of the Hovems. The Fifth Circuit Court reversed, holding (1) the provision of FAPE to a student qualified for special education must be judged by the overall educational benefits received, and not solely by the remediation of the student's disability; and (2) because this student's individualized education program enabled him to excel, with accommodations for his disability, in a mainstream high school curriculum, KISD complied procedurally and substantively with IDEA.

Relators filed two qui tam suits against Shell, alleging that Shell had defrauded the U.S. Department of the Interior. At the time their suits were filed, Relators were federal employees who discovered wrongdoing in the scope of their official duties. The district court granted summary judgment to Shell on the ground that two False Claims Act (Act) provisions prohibited the suit: 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(1), describing who may bring suit; and 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(A),(B), which contained a public disclosure bar. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding (1) a federal employee, even one whose job it is to investigate fraud, a "person" under the Act such that he may maintain a qui tam action; and (2) the district court used an overly broad conception of the Act's public disclosure bar.

The City of New Orleans filed suit against BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC, claiming that the company owed it additional compensation for the use of its public rights-of-way. The district court rejected the City's claims for additional compensation pursuant to the various contracts between the parties. The court, however, awarded the City $1.5 million in unjust enrichment damages to compensate the City for benefits the company had received from its use of the City's rights-of-way. Both parties appealed. The City then enacted an ordinance to force BellSouth to continue compensating the City in future years for the unjust enrichment identified by the district court. BellSouth moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the City from enforcing the ordinance, which the district court denied. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, in part, to the extent the court rejected the City's claims for damages; and (2) reversed and vacated the district court's judgment awarding unjust enrichment damages to the City, holding that BellSouth had justification in contract for any enrichment it was enjoying from its use of the City's rights-of-way. Remanded with instructions to permanently enjoin enforcement of the City's ordinance.

Two sets of petitioners sought review of the EPA's final rule partially approving and partially disapproving the most recent revision to Texas's State Implementation Plan (SIP) submitted by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality pursuant to the Clean Air Act. The portion of the SIP at issue created an affirmative defense against civil penalties for excess emissions during both planned and unplanned startup, shutdown, and maintenance/malfunction (SSM) events. The EPA approved the portion of the SIP revision providing an affirmative defense against civil penalties for unplanned SSM events and disapproved the portion of the SIP revision providing an affirmative defense against civil penalties for planned SSM events. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied both petitions for review, holding that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, or contrary to law, or in excess of its statutory authority, in its partial approval and partial disapproval of Texas's SIP revision.

Claimant was employed by New Orleans Depot Services, Inc. (NODSI) as a mechanic from 1996 until 2002. Prior to his employment with NODSI, Claimant was employed by New Orleans Marine Contractors (NOMC) for five months. During his employment with both NODSI and NOMC, Claimant was exposed to loud noises on a continuous basis and did not use hearing protection. Claimant sought permanent partial disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act for a hearing impairment. The ALJ determined that NODSI was liable for Claimants benefits as his last maritime employer. The Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirmed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the factual findings of the ALJ.

Appellee, the City of New Orleans, enacted an automated traffic enforcement system ordinance (the Ordinance), which permitted the City to use automated cameras to detect speeding violations and cars entering an intersection against a red light. The district court dismissed Appellants' constitutional challenge to the Ordinance, concluding that the Ordinance (1) was civil in nature, (2) afforded constitutionally adequate due process, and (3) did not violate the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the district court correctly found that the Ordinance (1) imposed a civil penalty rather than criminal penalties; (2) supplied constitutionally adequate process; and (3) did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

This appeal involved a challenge to the 2011 Medicare payment rate set by the Secretary of Health and Human Services for partial hospitalization services. Paladin claimed that the Secretary's use of both hospital-based and community mental health center cost data in establishing and adjusting the 2011 relative payment weights and ultimate payment rate was in excess of her statutory authority. Paladin filed suit in district court without first presenting an administrative claim, alleging jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. 1331. The court found that Congress expressly precluded judicial review of the Secretary's determinations and that her actions were not a facial violation of a clear statutory mandate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Petitioner, the former employer of a retired longshoreman, challenged a Benefits Review Board (BRB) decision that overruled an ALJ twice and held petitioner liable for the longshoreman's hearing loss. The court held that the BRB erred in rejecting expert evidence in part and in then rejecting the ALJ's first conclusion based on his evaluation of the evidence. Further, the court need not reach the aggravation rule issue raised by petitioner. Because the BRB initially applied the wrong legal test and standard of review to the ALJ's decision, the court reversed.

Petitioners, non-profit environmental protection organizations, filed petitions for judicial review challenging sixteen Department of the Interior (DOI) plan approvals, issued between March 29 and May 20, 2010, under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356a. The court concluded that: (1) petitioners' OCSLA-based challenges were justiciable, except for four, which have become moot; (2) the DOI's approval of the exploratory and development plans were subject to judicial review by the court under OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. 1349(c)(2); (3) petitioners' failure to participate in the administrative proceedings related to the DOI's approval of the plans as required by section 1349(c)(3) did not oust the court's jurisdiction because that participation requirement was a non-jurisdictional administrative exhaustion rule; but, (4) petitioners have not shown sufficient justification for excusing them from that exhaustion requirement in this case. Accordingly, except for four of petitioners' petitions for judicial review that were dismissed as moot, petitioners' petitions for judicial review were dismissed because of their failure to participate in the administrative proceedings.

Plaintiff brought suit against the Board, arguing that the fee charged at the conclusion of his public intoxication and public inhabitation case violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment because it discouraged public defenders from exonerating their clients. Louisiana's funding mechanism for indigent defense required indigent defendants who were found guilty, or plead nolo contendere, to pay a $35 fee at the conclusion of their cases, but it did not require defendants who were exonerated to pay the fee. The district court ruled that abstention was required under the Younger doctrine and, alternatively, that plaintiff did not state a claim for relief under the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment. Because the court held that the district court did not err in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's lawsuit, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.