Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case required the court to review the EPA's disapproval, more than three years after the time within which it was statutorily required to act, of three regulations promulgated by the State of Texas. 30 Tex. Admin. Code 116.610(a), 116,610(b), and 116.617. Pursuant to Texas's duty under the Clear Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., to adopt and administer a statewide plan for implementing federal air quality standards, those regulations provided a standardized permit for certain projects that reduce or maintain current emissions rates. Because the EPA had no legal basis on which to disapprove those regulations, the court vacated the agency's disapproval of Texas's regulations and remanded with instructions.

Plaintiffs, nine children in the custody of PMC, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against three Texas officials, in their official capacities, seeking to represent a class of all children who were now, and all those who will be, in the State's long-term foster care. The gravaman of plaintiffs' complaint is that various system-wide problems in Texas's administration of its PMC subjected all of the children in PMC to a variety of harms. Applying the standards announced in the Supreme Court's recent opinion, Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the court held that the district court failed to conduct the "rigorous" analysis required by Rule 23 in deciding to certify the proposed class. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by certifying a class that lacked cohesiveness under Rule 23(b)(2). Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's class certification order and remanded for further proceedings.

The City appealed the district court's summary judgment enjoining it from implementing a purported housing ordinance that required all adults living in rental housing within the City to obtain an occupancy license conditioned upon the occupant's citizenship or lawful immigration status. The court concluded that the ordinance's sole purpose was not to regulate housing but to exclude undocumented aliens, specifically Latinos, from the City and that it was an impermissible regulation of immigration. The court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional and presented an obstacle to federal authority on immigration and the conduct of foreign affairs. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The Board appealed the district court's decision granting summary judgment to appellees on the Board's claim that the EPA improperly exercised its power to veto a plan to reduce flooding in Mississippi (the Project). The Board claimed that the EPA was barred from vetoing the Project under section 404(r) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344(r). As an initial matter, the court denied the Board's motion to supplement the record on appeal or, in the alternative, for judicial notice. In addition, the court concluded that the EPA waived its argument that the Board did not have prudential standing under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's decision upholding the EPA's veto, as the record did not contain sufficient evidence to overturn the EPA's findings.

This case involved the Corps' dredging of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), a shipping channel between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico, as well as levees alongside the channel and around the city. The Corps' negligence in maintaining the channel, grounded on a failure to appreciate certain hydrological risks, caused levees to fail and aggravated the effects of 2005's Hurricane Katrina on the city and its environs. Claimants filed hundreds of lawsuits and this opinion concerned three groups of bellwether plaintiffs, all suing the United States for flood damages. The district court found that neither the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA), 33 U.S.C. 702, nor the discretionary-function exception (DFE) to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(a), protected the government from suit; the district court found that three plaintiffs had proven the government's full liability and four had not. Another group of plaintiffs (Anderson plaintiffs) had their cases dismissed on the government's motion, the district court finding both immunities applicable. A different group (Armstrong plaintiffs) were preparing for trial of their own case against the government. The government appealed its losses in Robinson; the losing Robinson plaintiffs cross-appealed. The Anderson plaintiffs also appealed. On the theory that a favorable ruling might moot the pending Armstrong trial, the government petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to order the district court to stay trial until the court issued an opinion in Robinson and Anderson. The three cases have been consolidated on appeal. The court held that the district court's careful attention to the law and even more cautious scrutiny of complex facts allowed the court to uphold its ruling in full, excepting the court's minor restatement of FCA immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments in Robinson and Anderson, denying the government's petition for writ of mandamus to stay the Armstrong trial.

Christopher M. Loften died from a rare disease called Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (TEN) after taking Motrin. Lofton's wife and children brought suit against defendants asserting that Motrin caused the disease and defendants had failed to warn consumers about the risk of these severe autoimmune allergic reactions. At issue on appeal was whether the district court correctly found that federal law preempted Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 82.007(b)(1), which required plaintiffs to assert, in failure to warn cases, that a drug manufacturer withheld or misrepresented material information to the FDA. The court held that section 82.007(b)(1) required a Texas plaintiff to prove fraud-on-the-FDA to recover for failure to warn and this requirement invoked federal law supremacy. Therefore, because the court concluded that section 82.007(b)(1) was a fraud-on-the-FDA provision analogous to the claim considered in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., the court held that it was preempted by the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq., unless the FDA itself found fraud. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Plaintiff appealed its First Amendment challenge to a newsrack ordinance enacted by the City in 2007. The ordinance required newsracks on the City's rights-of-way to meet certain material size, and placement standards and required publishers using newsracks to pay a permit fee. The court held that plaintiff's appeal was without merit where the City's ordinance's requirement were narrowly tailored to the City's substantial interests in public safety and aesthetics and left open the ample alternative means of distribution; the fees under the newsrack ordinance were consistent with the First Amendment because they defrayed the City's administrative costs; and as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction that did not leave enforcing officials with unbridled discretion, the newsrack ordinance need not contain an explicit provision for judicial review. Accordingly, the court rejected plaintiff's First Amendment challenges to the City's newsrack ordinance.

Plaintiff, a terminal and switching railroad operating in the City, brought a declaratory judgment against the City alleging that a federal statute preempted all City ordinances that affected its transloading operations. The railroad wanted to expand its operations and the City opposed the expansion, claiming it violated several municipal ordinances. The court reversed the district court's holding of no preemption as to the standard construction details and road grading ordinance, resting its decision on express preemption under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. The court's express preemption holding only pertained to the road and paving areas used in connection with the TCB-MAALT-Halliburton transloading operation. This preemption rendered the City's appeal from the denial of its request for civil penalties for ordinance violations moot. The court reversed what the court concluded was likely a holding by the district court that there was express preemption as to the older, 20-acre transloading center and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's remaining rulings.

Plaintiffs-Appellants James and Sandra Lindquist sued the City of Pasadena alleging the City violated their state and federal constitutional rights by exercising "unbridled discretion" in connection with the denial of a zoning waiver. Plaintiffs operated a used-car dealership in Pasadena. In 2003, the Pasadena City Council enacted an ordinance adopting licensing standards for used-car dealers criminalizing the sale of used cars without a license and imposing a number of requirements that dealers must meet as a condition of receiving a license. Two of those requirements were the subject of this appeal: (1) new license locations are required to be a minimum of one-thousand feet from any existing license; and (2) no new licenses could be issued within 150 feet of a residential area. After the ordinance was passed, Plaintiffs considered purchasing two lots to expand their existing dealership. City officials told them that neither lot qualified for a license, but Plaintiffs purchased the lots anyway. Plaintiffs later learned that their competitors purchased a nearby lot, had applied for a license, and were denied for different reasons than those given to Plaintiffs. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling that Plaintiffs' equal protection claim failed to state a claim for relief. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the City after determining Plaintiffs failed to create a genuine issue of fact with respect to their equal protection claim. Upon review, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs could not show that the City Council acted irrationally when it denied their license appeal. Furthermore, the Court found that Plaintiffs failed to preserve their unbridled discretion claim for further review. As such, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.

This was an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to intervene as of right brought by citizens of Houston in regard to litigation between the City and the contractor hired to run a red light camera system that generated millions of dollars annually to the City and the contractor. The court held, that under the totality of the circumstances, including the haste of the litigation, the City's pecuniary motives, the extended opposition to the charter amendment, the agreed order to leave the cameras in place, and the attempt to reinstate them before the suit had concluded, it was sufficient to conclude that the intervenors' interests "may be" inadequately represented. Accordingly, the district court's orders denying intervention and a new trial were reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.