Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit in district court against the United States, alleging negligence in record-keeping and the administration of a certain life insurance policy. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed from the district court's order granting the United States' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that plaintiffs did exhaust its administrative remedies, but its claim arose out of a misrepresentation and was barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671.

Thomas E. Clemmons, the former director of operations for Ameristar Airways, Incorporated (Ameristar), filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging he was discharged in retaliation for reporting air safety issues to the Federal Aviation Administration. The Department of Labor Administrative Review Board (Board) found a violation of the employee protection provision of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21), 49 U.S.C. 42121, ordering an award of back pay. The court held that because Clemmons had presented a prima facie case of retaliation and adduced evidence capable of rebutting Ameristar's proffered explanations, substantial evidence supported the Board's finding of liability. The court held, however, that because the question of whether Clemmons' insubordinate email, which was after-acquired evidence, "was of such severity that [he] would have been terminated on these grounds alone" was a question of fact, the court remanded to the agency to make that determination and to adjust the back pay award if necessary.

Petitioner, a skilled nursing facility that participated in the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs, petitioned for review of the final decision of the Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) finding that petitioner was in substantial noncompliance with regulations covering skilled nursing facilities, and affirming civil monetary penalties and denial of payment for new admissions. Finding that the DAB's decisions were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court dismissed the petition for review.

These three closely related appeals arose out of two district court cases, each involving a different tract of land owned by the Avoyelles Parish School Board (School Board), where neither tract was accessible by public road and both shared borders with the Lake Ophelia Wildlife Refuge (Refuge), which was owned by the United States Department of Interior (Department). The School Board filed these suits against all adjoining landowners, including the Department, to fix the School Board's legal rights of passage to the respective enclosed lands. The district court fixed rights of passage that burdened Refuge lands and concluded that the Department could not impose certain desired restrictions on the School Board's actions on Refuge lands. On appeal, the court reversed both judgments in full and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant filed suit in state court demanding compensation from the State of Louisiana for the commandeering of its real property following Hurricane Katrina. While the state court litigation was pending, the United States initiated condemnation proceedings involving part of the same property in federal district court. To avoid potentially conflicting judgments, the United States sought a stay of the state court proceedings. The district court entered a stay and defendant appealed. At issue was whether the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, precluded the issuance of the stay and even if not prohibited, the issuance of the stay was not proper on the facts of the case. The court found that, in light of Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, the uncertainty surrounding the ownership of the property at issue and the extent of the United States' interest militated in favor of enjoining the state court litigation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court noted that the district court would need to determine the best manner in which to proceed in reaching an answer to the title questions that arose because of the commandeering. The court concluded that the district court might resolve the question itself, lift the stay for the limited purpose of allowing the state court to determine title, or take other steps to avoid the potential for inconsistent rulings in the two proceedings.

The Elijah Group, Inc. ("Church") sued the City of Leon Valley ("City") alleging that the City's prohibition of the Church from performing religious services on certain properties violated Texas state law, the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(b)(1), and both the Texas and U.S. Constitutions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the Church's claims under the Equal Terms Clause of the RLUIPA. The court held that the City's imposition of its land use regulation violated the Equal Terms Clause where the ordinance treated the Church on terms that were less than equal to the terms on which it treated similarly situated nonreligious institutions. Accordingly, the district court's order granting the City's motion for summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Appellees filed suit asserting that their due process rights were violated when the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") failed to make additional attempts at service after it had knowledge that the initial attempt at notice failed where the notice informed an obligor that an alien had been detained by DHS and that the obligor could post a cash bond to secure the alien's release. At issue was whether, in order to satisfy due process, the government must take additional reasonable steps to notify a bond obligor that the bond had been breached when the government had knowledge that the initial attempt at notice failed. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of appellees and held that DHS violated the bond obligor's due process rights when it failed to take additional reasonable steps to notify the obligors of the bond demand after the initial notice was returned as undeliverable before it collected the bond.

The City of New Orleans appealed a jury verdict for Rosedale Missionary Baptist Church finding that the city violated the church's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by demolishing the church building without notice. At issue was whether the suit should be dismissed because the church's procedural and substantive due process claims were unripe. The court dismissed the suit as unripe where the church did not allege a substantive due process claim that was independent of its procedural due process claim and where the court could not address the procedural due process claim without knowing the outcome of the takings claim, which was not before the court.

This mandamus proceeding arose out of the public-corruption prosecution centering around former Dallas City Council Member Don Hill and various other members of Dallas city government who conspired to solicit and accept things of value in exchange for providing official assistance to Brian Potashnik in his pursuit of city approval and funding for various affordable-housing development projects. One of the things of value Mr. Hill and his coconspirators solicited was the award of construction subcontracts on Mr. Potashnik's developments to Ronald Slovacek. Petitioners, competitors of Mr. Potashnik who were seeking city approval of their own affordable-housing developments, sought restitution alleging that Mr. Slovacek and his coconspirators had rendered petitioners' $1.8 million investment worthless. At issue was whether the court should grant petitioners' writ of mandamus directing the district court to recognize that petitioners were crime victims within the meaning of the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), 18 U.S.C. 3771(d)(3), and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("MVRA"), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. The court denied the petition and held that the district court was not clearly and indisputably wrong to find that petitioners failed to prove that they had been directly and proximately harmed by Mr. Slovacek's criminal conduct. The court also denied each of petitioners' pending motions.