Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives revoked a Wisconsin pawn and gun shop's license to sell firearms after it rejected an appeal from a finding that the shop willfully violated record keeping requirements of the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. 923. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appropriate standard for willfulness for revoking a firearms dealerâs license is purposeful disregard of, or plain indifference to, a known legal obligation; the dealer had notice of those obligations and disregarded them. The infrequency of errors, compared to the number of transactions, does not disprove willfulness.

The Equal Access to Justice Act entitles a prevailing party to fees only if the position of the United States was not substantially justified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of fees for a remand to an administrative law judge for an explanation of the determination of a precise date on which the social security applicant became disabled. The ALJ did not ignore, mischaracterize, selectively cite, or otherwise bungle a significant body of relevant evidence, but committed the sort of articulation error that ordinarily does not taint the commissionerâs position. A reasonable person could conclude that both the ALJâs opinion and the commissionerâs defense of the opinion had a rational basis in fact and law.

The wife of a deceased coal miner argued that her claim for black lung benefits should be remanded to the administrative law judge (ALJ) because sect. 1556 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010) revived a presumption under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901, that was not available when the ALJ denied benefits. The presumption states that if a miner was employed for 15 years or more in underground coal mines and other evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, there is a rebuttable presumption that such miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, that his death was due to pneumoconiosis, or that at the time of his death he was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. The presumption did not apply to the miner's claim, filed in 2001. The Seventh Circuit remanded, rejecting the coal company's arguments concerning due, process, retroactive application and unconstitutional taking.

In 1995 the city gave an examination for positions in its fire department and rated applicants on a scale between highly qualified and not qualified, based on scores. "Qualified" applicants were told that they were unlikely to be hired. From 1996 through 2001, the city hired random batches from the well-qualified pool. In 1997 a person in the qualified pool filed a charge of discrimination, claiming disparate impact on African-American applicants (42 U.S.C. 2000(e)). After receiving right-to-sue letters from the EEOC, applicants filed a class action in 1998. After a trial, the court rejected a business necessity defense and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On remand, after the Supreme Court held that most of the claims were timely, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The city conceded that the cut-off score in the ranking system had a disparate impact, so each "batch" hiring had a similar impact. While hiring according to a list, perhaps hiring highest scorers first, might have served a business necessity, the random selection of batches amounted to repeated "use" of a tool that created disparate impact.

The United States has a $60 million judgment against the defendant, who fled the country, for Medicare and Medicaid fraud. The government served a writ of garnishment (28 U.S.C. 3205) against his interest in a Georgia company, which paid secured creditors, liquidated its assets, and placed slightly more than $4 million in escrow for the claim. Creditors of the Georgia company claimed $175,000. The district court ruled in favor of the government because the creditors had not obtained a writ. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that the creditors' claim was against the Georgia company, not against the defendant, and that the defendant's equity interest in the company (which was reachable by the government) may have been subordinate to the interests of creditors. The court noted many unanswered questions about the creditors' interest in the company.

The city requires that potential mayoral candidates obtain 12,500 signatures from registered voters within 90 days in order to be placed on the ballot. The district court denied an injunction to prevent enforcement of the rule. The Seventh Circuit, noting that the election has passed, held that the issue is moot and does not fall within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception.

Former captains from the Illinois Department of Corrections sued state and union officials, alleging that the defendants unlawfully punished them for seeking to organize with a rival union. The district court entered summary for the defendants, including a decision that the governor was protected by immunity. The governor's line-item veto of funding for captains' positions was legislative in nature and, therefore, protected by immunity and the plaintiffs failed to tie the governor to any allegedly-retaliatory actions before or after the veto. The decision to eliminate the middle management position at issue was a policy decision, unlike hiring or firing a particular individual, regardless of the subsequent creation of a new, similar position. The captains did not show how deposing the governor or more extensive deposition of the deputy chief of staff would lead to relevant evidence on the immunity issue. That two unions were competing to represent the captains did not establish a conspiracy between one of the unions and the administration with respect to determining the seniority of captains who took positions as corrections officers after their positions were eliminated.

Every president, except Jefferson, has issued proclamations including an invitation to pray. The president is directed by 36 U.S.C. 119 to proclaim a national day of prayer. The district court found the statute to be a violation of the Establishment Clause and enjoined the President from issuing such a proclamation. The Seventh Circuit vacated for lack of a justiciable issue. The statute imposes duties on the President alone and does not harm the plaintiffs. No person is required to pray; any "slight" perceived by plaintiffs is insufficient to establish standing. The courts do not censor the President.

A 1994 regulation concerning fall protection in the residential construction industry was subject to a 1999 directive instructing OSHA to not commence enforcement actions against employers using certain systems. The directive included notice of rule-making, soliciting comments on how the regulation should be amended. In 2010 the rule-making closed without amendment to the 1994 regulation. The 1999 directive was rescinded and a new directive issued, authorizing proceedings that may require employers to show, on a case-by-case basis, why they employed fall protection other than described in the 1994 regulation. Employers argued that the 2010 directive constituted an occupational health and safety standard, subject to rule-making procedures. The Seventh Circuit dismissed a petition for review. Although employers using certain systems have not been required to make case-by-case showings since 1999, the 1999 directive did not change the 1994 regulation and was only an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, as was the 2010 directive.

An African-American coroner was elected in 2004. After a contract with Indiana University for pathology services expired, two Caucasian university pathologists formed a company (FP) and contracted to provide services. The new coroner replaced the deputy coroner with an African-American, resulting in a successful claim of reverse discrimination. The new deputy expressed concerns about costs under the FP contract and whether FP used county supplies for outside work allowed by the contract. The county terminated the contract under a six-month notice provision and hired an African-American pathologist without conducting a search or checking references. The change did not save money. FP and the pathologists filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that a reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled to believe that the contract was terminated because of cost. The contract allowed the county to require FP to stop performing outside work, but the defendants chose not to do so despite their statements that they were very satisfied with FP's services. The coroner had made remarks about wanting to replace white workers with African-Americans; although he contracted with FP, it is possible to infer that FP was intended to serve as a "placeholder" for a seamless transition until African-American replacements could be found.