Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services removed Woods, then seven years old from his parents’ home in 1991 and placed him in a residential treatment facility. There had been many reports of sexual abuse among residents of the facility and Woods, claiming to have been abused by another resident, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely because Woods failed to bring his claim within two years of its accrual, rejecting Woods’s contention that the 20-year limitations period applicable in Illinois to personal injury claims based on childhood sexual abuse applied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The limitations period applicable to all Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years, as provided in 735 ILCS 5/13-202, and this includes claims involving allegations of failure to protect from childhood sexual abuse. View "Woods v. IL Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were riding in the family’s 1978 station wagon in 2007, in heavy rain with limited visibility. Williams, a recently hired substitute letter carrier for the Postal Service, was in a postal truck, parallel parked on the side of the road with the front of the truck sticking out. Williams had visited a friend and, in violation of USPS rules, was away from his designated route. The vehicles collided, damaging the station wagon. Plaintiffs claim that Williams refused to call police and left the scene, afraid of losing his job. Williams first denied involvement, then resigned. After exhausting administrative remedies, plaintiffs sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, seeking $45 million. They did not offer any expert testimony on the cause of the collision. Williams did not appear at trial, but in a deposition stated that his vehicle was stationary at the time of the collision. Asked to reconcile this a with the fact that the back end of the car came into contact with the postal truck, Williams responded that he had no explanation and that it was “mystical.” The district court declined to find that Williams breached his duty of ordinary care. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Furry v. United States" on Justia Law

Wisconsin police recruits must complete probation. Statewide requirements are set by the Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB), Wis. Stat. 165.85. Milwaukee has interpreted Wis. Stat. 62.50(3)(b) as authority to adopt additional requirements; no new recruit becomes a full officer before 16 months of “actual active service.” Ramskugler’s probation in Milwaukee began in October 2007. Days later, Ramskugler injured her knee during training. The Department assigned Ramskugler to clerical duties. In November, she was given 2.5 months of leave for knee surgery. Ramskugler returned to duty in a clerical capacity for several months. She obtained medical clearance for unrestricted duty, but had to wait for the next recruit class to begin. Before graduating in November 2008, Ramskugler re-injured her knee. She had completed the course. After more leave and a second surgery, Ramskugler returned to clerical duties in January 2009. Although Ramskugler was a “law enforcement officer,” as defined by the LESB, she was on probation in Milwaukee, which did not consider clerical duties “actual active service.” The district court rejected a suit and, while appeal was pending, Ramskugler accepted a settlement. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that the union lacked standing to bring suit on its own behalf. View "Milwaukee Police Assoc. v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Mann operated a home day care center. While she was gone, her husband, a licensed day care provider, and Thompson, a newly-hired assistant, remained at the center. The children were left alone in the basement for about 10 minutes. One child hit another with a tray. A complaint was made to DCFS, which determined that Thompson was working without a background search or a medical evaluation. DCFS determined that Mann had failed to provide proper supervision, shut down the center, and prohibited Mann and her husband from providing child care pending full investigation. DCFS entered Mann’s name into the Illinois database concerning child abuse and neglect. DCFS concluded that the violation was “substantiated,” and after supervisory review, recommended license revocation. After another level of review, a corrective plan was recommend rather than revocation. Mann entered into a plan and had the report expunged and her name removed from the database. Mann sued DCFS employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Mann was not unconstitutionally deprived of a protected liberty interest relating to imposition of the protective plan or deprived of due process when she was prohibited from running her facility during the investigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Mann v. Vogel" on Justia Law

In 2010 the U.S. and Wisconsin sued, alleging that defendants polluted the Lower Fox River and Green Bay with PCBs, and had liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, for response costs and destruction of natural resources, estimated at $1.5 billion. The Justice Department submitted a proposed consent decree, negotiated among the state, defendants (Brown County and the City of Green Bay), and Indian tribes. The U.S. offered $4.5 million because federal agencies might have contributed to the pollution. Menasha opposed the decree and counterclaimed against the U.S. for costs that Menasha would incur if found liable. Ordinarily a non-party to a consent decree is not bound by it, but approval of the consent decree would otherwise extinguish Menasha’s claims. Menasha sought information under the Freedom of Information Act, claiming that U.S. attorneys, being from defense and prosecution teams, actually have adverse interests, and that their communication concerning the case resulted in forfeiture of attorney work product privilege. The district court held that Menasha was entitled to the documents. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Menasha’s claim actually amounted to assertion that the federal attorneys “ganged up” to reduce federal liability and that the documents are privileged. View "Menasha Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

After a 2008 Indiana flood, the President authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide disaster relief under the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121–5207. Columbus Regional Hospital was awarded approximately $70 million, but suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 1349, claiming that it was entitled to about $20 million more. The district judge granted FEMA summary judgment. In response to the Seventh Circuit’s questioning of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Hospital argued that the Court of Federal Claims was the right forum and requested transfer. FEMA argued that the district court had jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit agreed with FEMA, holding that the suit was not for “money damages.” The Hospital wants money, but not as compensation for FEMA’s failure to perform some other obligation, but as “the very thing to which [it] was entitled” under the disaster-relief program. The court noted that only the district court can serve as a forum for all of the Hospital’s legal theories, then rejected all of those theories. View "Columbus Reg'l Hosp. v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency" on Justia Law

Borrowers obtained secured loans from InBank. Their promissory notes established that InBank would calculate annual interest rates by adding a predetermined amount, usually one percent, to a variable index rate set by InBank at “its sole discretion,” which could change up to once per day. InBank stated that it would set the rate “at or around the U.S. prime rate.” Borrowers compared loan statements and found that the rate was neither consistent across customers nor close to the prime rate. After borrowers filed suit, the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation took control of InBank and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver. MB Financial purchased InBank accounts. The borrowers filed an amended class action against MB, claiming violations of the Interest Act, 815 ILCS 205/1, and the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1. The court granted a motion to substitute the FDIC as defendant, then dismissed. The Seventh Circuit held that dismissal was proper for failure to exhaust remedies under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(3)-(d)(13). The claims relate to InBank’s alleged acts and omissions, not MB’s, and there is no support for an assumption of liability argument.View "Farnik v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs controlled Mutual Bank. In an effort to save the bank from insolvency, at the request of FDIC-Corporate, they raised about $30 million mostly in the form of note purchases. In 2008, FDIC-Corporate requested another $70 million, which they were unable to raise. In 2009, regulators issued warnings about the bank. The bank’s board voted to redeem the notes and create deposit accounts for plaintiffs, essentially returning their money. Before FDIC-Corporate responded to a request for required approval, 12 U.S.C. 1821(i), the bank was declared insolvent and FDIC was appointed as receiver. Mutual Bank’s branches opened as branches of United Central Bank the next day. The plaintiffs filed proofs of claim, seeking to redeem the notes and obtain depositor-level priority in post-insolvency distribution scheme. FDIC Receiver rejected the claims and the plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that they had been misled into investing in the bank and prevented from getting their money back. The district court dismissed as moot. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the claim as an unauthorized request for “money damages,” 5 U.S.C. 702. The plaintiffs did not first seek administrative review of what was essentially a challenge to the FDIC’s regulatory decision not to act on the redemption approval request. View "Veluchamy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Roddy, born in 1964, suffers from several serious medical problems, including severe lower back pain attributable to degenerative disc disease. When her pain became unbearable, she stopped working and applied for disability insurance benefits. She was unsuccessful before the Social Security Administration. An administrative law judge found that there were jobs in the national economy within her capabilities, although she no longer could perform her old job as a shift manager at a Taco Bell restaurant. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of a physician and improperly considered Roddy’s testimony about her ability to do housework. View "Roddy v. Astrue" on Justia Law

The pharmaceutical consulting group failed to pay taxes. By 2005, it accumulated over $1 million in unpaid liabilities. Revenue Officer Johnson pursued collection efforts, levied the group’s accounts, and sought to recover taxes withheld from employees (trust fund taxes) from Gessert personally. Gessert was the group’s creator, sole shareholder, and CEO, and presumably behind the refusal to pay. The group and Gessert sued, seeking refunds and abatements, and pursued damages under I.R.C. 7433 for improper collection efforts. They claimed that the group directed Johnson to apply a few voluntary payments toward its trust fund liability, but that Johnson applied the payments to the non-trust fund portion, increasing Gessert’s personal liability; that Johnson violated Internal Revenue Code and Treasury provisions; and that she improperly levied the accounts. The district court rejected the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gessert lacked standing under I.R.C. 7433 because Johnson sought collection from the group. The group failed to allege economic harm, prerequisite to standing under I.R.C. 7433. Concerning the refund claim, the district court properly concluded the group filed its administrative claim too late. Gessert’s refund-and-abatement claim failed because the group did not provide specific written direction to the IRS effectuating a directed payment. View "Gessert v. United States" on Justia Law