Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, as trustee for the next of kin of her deceased son, filed suit against five police officers and the city, alleging violations of the son's (1) Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable seizure, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and (2) the Minnesota wrongful death statute, Minn. Stat. 573.02. The court concluded that Officer Devick was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions during his initial encounter with the son where a reasonable officer faced with the same circumstances would not have known that the decision to kick and hit the son in an attempt to detain him clearly violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions during the second encounter with the son where plaintiff failed to establish that the punches, kicks, knee strikes, and tasers they used on the son were unconstitutional. Even if the conduct was unconstitutional, it was not clearly established at the time. The court agreed with the district court's finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence showing that the officers intentionally apprehended the son in a way that they believed was prohibited by law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of official immunity and dismissal of the wrongful death claim against the individual officers. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the vicarious liability claim against the city. View "Smith v. City of Minneapolis, et al." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was arrested for violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.095, which prohibits flag desecration, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Cape Girardeau, the arresting police officer, and the prosecuting attorney. Both the arresting officer and attorney stated that they were unaware of the Supreme Court's decisions in Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichman, which struck down statutes criminalizing flag desecration as unconstitutional. Plaintiff's charges were dismissed against him and he was released from jail. On appeal, the officer challenged the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and award of attorney's fees. The State, which intervened, appealed the district court's order declaring its flag desecration statute facially unconstitutional and the award of attorney's fees. The court concluded that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity where a reasonably competent officer in his position would have known that plaintiff's expressive conduct was constitutionally protected and would have concluded no arrest warrant should issue for the expressive conduct engaged in by plaintiff. The court concluded that Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.095 was overbroad and criminalizes a substantial amount of expressive activity. Further, the statute was not susceptible to an appropriate narrowing construction and, therefore, the district court did not err in holding the statute to be facially unconstitutional. The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding the officer and the state jointly and severally liable for attorney's fees and costs; the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees based on the rate for the St. Louis legal market, instead of Cape Girardeau; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Cape Girardeau. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Snider, III v. Peters" on Justia Law

The Secretary petitioned for review of OSHA's order approving without comment an underlying ALJ's decision that addressed competing interpretations of a Department of Labor safety regulation, 29 U.S.C. 1910.212(a)(1). The Secretary determined that the regulation requires lathes such as those used by Loren Cook to have guards to protect workers from ejected workpieces. The court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation of the regulation in this matter was reasonable and well supported by the plain meaning of the regulation's text. Pursuant to Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, the court deferred to the Secretary's interpretation rather than the Commission. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, reversed the order of the Commission, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Perez v. Loren Cook Co." on Justia Law

An ALJ denied plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits, concluding that she was not disabled because there were jobs she could have performed during the relevant period. The Appeals Council then denied review and plaintiff appealed the Commissioner's final decision to the district court. In this appeal, the government challenged the district court's reversal of the Commissioner's decision. The court reversed and affirmed the Commissioner's final decision, concluding that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence on the record. View "Turpin v. Colvin" on Justia Law

The Government filed civil forfeiture actions against five properties alleging that they were used to manufacture illegal drugs or were purchased with proceeds from illegal drug sales. Claimants filed claims to the defendant properties. The district court necessarily had to construe both Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions G(4)(b)(i)-(ii) (the direct notice requirements) and Supplemental Rule G4(b)(v) (the actual notice exception) in order to determine what proper notice was required in this case. Therefore, the court reviewed de novo the district court's decision to strike the claims where that decision rested on an interpretation of the civil forfeiture notice provisions. The court concluded that claimants' verified claim was not untimely where the government did not comply with the notice regime laid out in Supplemental Rule G. The court also concluded that to impute actual notice on the basis of a communication to the government by an attorney (an email) who at the time did not represent them would work a serious injustice and raise troubling constitutional concerns. Accordingly, the court vacated the forfeiture judgments, reversed the district court's order striking two of claimants' claims as untimely, and remanded for a merits determination on the claims to the properties. View "United States v. Buczkowski, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City, several officers, the State of Iowa, the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections (Baldwin), the Curt Forbes Residential Center, and manager of the Residential Center (McPherson), alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and several state-law negligence claims. Plaintiff was shot three times by Angenaldo Bailey. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could not conclude that Officer Mueller acted recklessly or in a conscience-shocking manner by declining to arrest Bailey before the investigation proceeded the next day; plaintiff's claim against Officers Owens, Ropp, and Crippen failed because nothing the officers did - or did not do - established either a state-created danger or special relationship that imposed on them an affirmative duty to protect plaintiff from third-party harm; the evidence did not support a finding that Officers Owens, Ropp, or Crippen were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's injuries; and because plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation by any of the individual City Defendants, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the City. Plaintiff's due process claims against the State Defendants rested on distinct factual allegations about whether those parties exposed her to harm by failing to take steps in response to Bailey's repeated violations of a protective order. Even if the factual record had been fully developed on those claims, plaintiff had no opportunity to make legal arguments in support of her position. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the City Defendants, reversed the grant of summary judgment for the State Defendants, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Montgomery v. City of Ames, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the cities, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., federal civil rights laws, and state laws stemming from the cities' demolition of his properties after declaring them nuisances. On remand, the district court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a claim under federal law and that the statute of limitations barred his FHA claims. The court concluded that the district court did not err by ordering the parties to brief the issue of whether plaintiff's complaints stated a claim under federal law; the district court properly considered the relevant evidence and did not err by excluding evidence plaintiff submitted; the district court did not err in concluding that the two-year statute of limitations barred plaintiff's FHA claims; the district court did not err in concluding that plaintiff's complaint, alleging 42 U.S.C. 1981-83 claims, failed to state a claim under federal law; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions to alter or amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, et al." on Justia Law

GoJet petitioned for review of the FAA Acting Administrator's ruling that GoJet violated FAA regulations when it failed to make a logbook entry and to remove a gear pin. GoJet argued that it did not violate 14 C.F.R. 91.13(a) and 121.153(a)(2) by carelessly or recklessly operating an unairworthy airplane, and procedural error. The court concluded that the Administrator did not err in determining that GoJet violated section 121.153(a)(2) where the type-certificate nonconformity in this case - inoperable landing gear - was so clearly related to safe operation of the airplane that a finding that the airplane was not airworthy was clearly warranted based solely on this nonconformity. The court also concluded that the Administrator did not err in crediting an FAA Inspector's testimony regarding potential danger and finding that GoJet violated section 91.13(a). The Administrator's decision that GoJet failed to establish extraordinary circumstances was not arbitrary or capricious. A violation of section 91.13(a) did not require proof of actual danger to lives or property; the potential for danger was enough. Finally, the agency did not abuse its discretion in terminating the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program self-disclosure proceeding and commencing a civil penalty action. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "GoJet Airlines v. FAA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the city building inspector under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant and the city, dismissing plaintiff's suit with prejudice. The court affirmed, concluding that, while the inspector was acting inappropriately, he did not violate plaintiff's First Amendment rights where the potential chilling effect of the inspector's instruction to a city employee to call the police when plaintiff wanted to file a grievance against the inspector was mitigated by the fact that the other city employees present did not echo the inspector's attitude. View "Scheffler v. Molin, et al." on Justia Law

The County filed a putative class action on behalf of similarly situated Minnesota counties seeking a declaratory judgment that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHFA violated state laws by failing to pay a tax on transfers of deeds to real property. The district court granted the federal agencies' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Since Congress exempted the federal agencies from all state taxation except on real property, and Minnesota's deed transfer fell within the broad exemption, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hennepin County v. Federal National Mortgage, et al." on Justia Law