Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, African American officers who worked in a state penitentiary, filed suit under 41 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983 against supervisors for race based harassment and retaliation. On appeal, the officers challenged the district court's dismissal of their claims against Lieutenants Stoner, Haney, and Runge and against Sergeants Miles and Furby. The court concluded that the evidence revealed acts, comments, and inaction by Sergeant Miles sufficient to make out prima facie harassment claims against him, which must be reinstated and remanded; there was insufficient evidence of harassment by the other supervisors and therefore the claims against Lieutenant Stoner, Runge, and Haney, and Sergeant Furby were affirmed; the retaliation claims by supervisors were affirmed; and Sergeant Miles has not shown that he was entitled to qualified immunity on the officers' harassment claims, nor have Lieutenants Stoner and Haney shown they were entitled to qualified immunity on the retaliation claims of Officer Ellis. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ellis, et al. v. Houston, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a police detective used excessive force when arresting him for disorderly conduct. On appeal, the detective appealed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss his official capacity claims where plaintiff was unable to introduce evidence adequate to support such claims; the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the question concerning whether the officers "could have just left the scene;" the district court did not commit plain error by allowing plaintiff to elicit testimony regarding alternative courses of action; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on the use of excessive force by using a modified version of instruction 4.40 from the Eighth Circuit Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions. View "Retz v. Seaton" on Justia Law

Argus filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., seeking information regarding how much money individual retailers received from taxpayers each year through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). On appeal, Argus challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to the USDA. The district court found that the spending information was exempt from disclosure and granted the USDA's motion. The court reversed, concluding that the statutory text plainly precluded the USDA from shielding the spending information under Exemption 3. View "Argus Leader Media v. USDA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a qui tam action against North Memorial under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., alleging that North Memorial knowingly submitted fraudulent claims to the government seeking payment for cardiac and pulmonary rehabilitation services that did not comply with Medicare regulations. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court affirmed the dismissal on the alternative ground that plaintiff's complaint did not meet the requirements of Rule 9(b) because the complaint failed to identify even one example of an actual false claim submitted for reimbursement. View "United States, ex rel. Michael Dunn v. North Memorial Health Care, et al." on Justia Law

Cab Drivers filed suit against the city challenging Ordinance section 76-73, which regulates the number of taxicab permits in the city. The city's stated purpose for the ordinance was insufficient demand for taxicabs. The court concluded that the ordinance was neither wholly arbitrary nor invidious. It is rationally related to a number of legitimate government purposes and Cab Drivers have failed to demonstrate that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the city. View "KC Taxi Cab Drivers, etc., et al. v. City of Kansas City, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the Secretary of State, in his official capacity, and other state defendants. Plaintiff claimed race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied the state defendants' motion for summary judgment on the race discrimination and retaliation claims; concluded that plaintiff could pursue his Title VII claims against all defendants but that the Eleventh Amendment barred his section 1983 claims against the Secretary and his claims for monetary damages against the Secretary and Chief Hedden in their official capacities; denied Chief Hedden qualified immunity; and denied summary judgment to the state defendants as to mitigation of damages and punitive damages but granted summary judgment to the state defendants on the section 1981 claims, hostile work environment claims, and claim of deprivation of a protected property or liberty interest. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects, except the court reversed its denial of qualified immunity to Chief Hedden on plaintiff's 1983 equal-protection retaliation claim. The right to be free from retaliation was clearly established as a First Amendment right and as a statutory right under Title VII; but no clearly established right exists under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation. View "Burton v. Arkansas Secretary of State, et al." on Justia Law

CBP imposed almost $38 million in penalties against UP under the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1584(a)(2), after finding illegal drugs secreted on trains brought to the U.S. border by Ferromex or KCSM, both Mexican railroads. The district court found that CBP lacked statutory authority to penalize UP and found in UP's favor. The government appealed. The court rejected CBP's constitutionally suspect contention that the Act authorizes the heavy fines at issue in this case; the statute does not authorize penalties against UP for drugs found on railcars UP neither owned nor controlled; and the statute did not authorize CBP to require UP, as a common carrier, to do more than reasonably possible to prevent Mexican drug cartels from hiding drugs on trains UP did not control in a country in which UP had no operations. The court concluded, however, that the district court's imprecise injunction must be corrected. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacating only the injunction. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the first African-American circuit court judge elected in Phillips County, Arkansas, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the commission and officials during the disciplinary proceedings against him. The district court denied plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order and stayed proceedings in accordance with the Younger abstention doctrine. The state disciplinary proceedings ended with a decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court. The district court then granted the commission and officials' Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, finding no justifiable federal controversy. The court concluded that Defendant Stewart, Executive Director of the commission, was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity as to plaintiff's claims for damages on the first cause of action; plaintiff had no justiciable claim for damages against any defendant in the second cause of action where plaintiff's allegations amounted to nothing more than a state law defamation claim and the district court did not abuse its discretion; and plaintiff's requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Simes, II v. Arkansas Judicial D. & D. Comm, et al." on Justia Law

The State, in consolidated petitions for review, challenged the EPA's final rule approving in part and disapproving in part two state implementation plans (SIPs) submitted by the State to address its obligations under sections 110 and 169A of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q. The final rule also promulgated a federal implementation plan (FIP) to address those portions of the SIPs that were disapproved. The court concluded that, even assuming that the State's interpretation of section 7607(d)(3) was correct, the State has failed to demonstrate that the EPA's error in this regard was so serious and related to matters of such central relevance to the rule that there was a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if the error had not been made; the EPA's refusal to consider the existing pollution control technology in use at the Coal Creek Station because it had been voluntarily installed was arbitrary and capricious and its FIP promulgating selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) as the best available retrofit technology (BART) for the Coal Creek Station was therefore vacated; the State's petition for review of the EPA's disapproval of the State's SIP and promulgating of a FIP was denied because the EPA properly disapproved the State's reasonable progress determination; the Environmental Groups' motion to dismiss their petition for review was moot; and the State's petition for review of the EPA's disapproval of the interstate transport SIP was denied because the EPA properly disapproved portions of the State's regional haze SIP. Accordingly, the court granted the State's and Great River Energy's petitions for review to the extent that they challenged the EPA's BART determination for the Coal Creek Station promulgated in EPA's FIP; vacated and remanded that portion of the final rule to the EPA for further proceedings; and denied the remainder of the State's, Great River Energy's, and the Environmental Groups' petitions for review, as well as the Environmental Groups' motion for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b). View "State of North Dakota v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife appealed the denial of his application for Medicaid benefits, arguing that the Department wrongfully denied the application because it had improperly counted against the wife's eligibility an annuity owned by the wife. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiffs and the Department appealed. The court concluded that, because the wife had no right, authority, or power to liquidate the annuity, the annuity benefits were not a resource, but rather was income indicated by the federal statute defining "unearned income." Therefore, the Department applied a more restrictive methodology under state law by classifying the annuity benefits as a resource that counted against plaintiff's eligibility for Medicaid benefits. The court rejected the Department's counter-arguments and the remaining arguments, and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Geston, et al. v. Anderson" on Justia Law