Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The government commenced removal proceedings against Defendant, who was born in Guatemala. Defendant submitted an application for asylum or withholding of removal, basing his asylum application on his membership in a particular social group, which he defined as "Guatemalans returning from the United States who are perceived as wealthy." The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that Defendant did not meet his burden of showing past persecution or a reasonable probability of future persecution, that he did not show the government of Guatemala was unable or unwilling to control alleged persecutors, and that there was little evidence that his social group would be perceived as a group by society or subject to a higher incident of crime than the population. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Defendant's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err in finding that the group "Guatemalans returning from the United States who are perceived as wealthy" was not a particular social group within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) imposed a civil money penalty on Greenbrier Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, a skilled nursing facility in Arkansas, for noncompliance with Medicare participation requirements. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Greenbrier's petition for review, holding (1) substantial evidence supported HHS's finding that Greenbrier was not in substantial compliance with 42 C.F.R. 483.25; (2) the finding that Greenbrier's noncompliance with section 483.25 rose to the level of immediate jeopardy was not erroneous; and (3) judicial review of two of Greenbrier's objections to the monetary penalty was barred, and Greenbrier received adequate notice of its noncompliance.

The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission entered an order requiring Qwest Corporation, a successor Bell operating company, to submit for review and approval a price list and supporting rationale for certain telecommunication network facilities Qwest was required to provide to its Minnesota competitors under 47 U.S.C. 271. Qwest sought judicial review and declaratory relief in the district court, arguing the Commission's order was preempted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The district court concluded federal law and regulations did not preempt the Commission's order. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Commission's order impermissibly intruded on federal authority to regulate rates for elements required under section 271 and interfered with the purpose and objectives of Congress and the FCC; and (2) therefore, the order was preempted by the Act and the FCC's implementing regulations and rulings.

This appeal arose from an insurance coverage dispute where the City sought coverage from Genesis for 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims in the nature of malicious prosecution. Genesis filed suit against the City, seeking a declaratory judgment that its policies provided no coverage for the underlying actions. The district court granted summary judgment to Genesis and the City appealed, arguing that the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the policies did not provide the City insurance coverage for the claims. Because Genesis did not have an insurance contract with the City in 1977, when the underlying charges were filed, it did not have a duty to defendant and indemnify the city in the suits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

This case stemmed from FNS's permanent denial of an application from J&K to participate in the government's food stamp program, SNAP. The court held that the imposition of permanent ineligibility to participate in SNAP, as oppose to assessing a monetary penalty, was not arbitrary and capricious where J&K's ineligibility to participate in SNAP was based on its owner's involvement in a prior food stamp trafficking violation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants on various claims arising from plaintiff's unsuccessful application for appointment as director of the City's Department of Human Rights and Equal Economic Opportunity, as well as denial of his motion to compel various depositions. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's due process claims because he had no protected property interest in the position; because plaintiff had not presented evidence that he was treated differently from similarly situated candidates or that he was the victim of intentional or purposeful discrimination, plaintiff's equal protection claim failed as a matter of law; the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's conspiracy claim because plaintiff's assertion did not demonstrate a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus; and the court affirmed the district court's remaining rulings.

HUD debarred plaintiff from obtaining federal government contracts in 1990 after he failed to make required payments to the agency. Twenty years after HUD had sent him notice of debarment, plaintiff brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against its enforcement. The court held that the district court properly concluded that plaintiff's claim accrued in 1990; that his claim was time-barred; and that equitable tolling of the limitations period was unavailable to such a "garden variety claim of excusable neglect."

This case addressed the effect of a pooled special-needs trust created by an over-65-year-old beneficiary on his medicaid benefits. The Center for Special Needs Trust Administration appealed a summary judgment in favor of the North Dakota Department of Human Services. Invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, the Center alleged that North Dakota's demand for reimbursement and its state regulations violated a paragraph of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4)(C). The court held that the district court properly determined that section 1396p(d)(4)(C) afforded the Center a right of action under section 1983; that North Dakota did not waive its claim to recover for reimbursements and should not be estopped from making that claim; that the Center's claim was without merit; and that preemption did not apply.

The United States sued defendants, alleging they engaged in a pattern or practice of sex discrimination in the rental of housing. After a jury found for defendants, the district court granted in part defendants' motion for costs and attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, and the government subsequently appealed. In this case, the government brought a single pattern or practice claim. The court held that the district court should have made a single determination about whether the government's suit, as a whole, was substantially justified. The district court improperly considered the case as consisting of ten individual victims' claims for separate assessment, rather than a single pattern or practice claim. Consequently, this error required reversal.

This case arose when plaintiff and his two business entities commenced action against defendant, alleging statutory and constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In this interlocutory appeal, defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The court remanded the case to the district court for a more complete articulation of its analysis of defendant's motion. The court found it difficult to discern from the order whether the district court applied either step of the qualified immunity inquiry to the claims alleged by plaintiff.