Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order affirming the Commissioner's denial of his application for supplemental security income benefits. Specifically, he objected to the ALJ's finding, without considering the testimony of a vocational expert, that plaintiff was able to engage in gainful activity. The court concluded that the ALJ erred by relying solely on the guidelines to determine plaintiff was "not disabled." Because the ALJ determined that plaintiff suffered from severe mental impairments, the ALJ should have consulted a vocational expert in determining whether plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform other jobs that existed in significant number in the national economy. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant appealed the district court's affirmance of the Social Security Commissioner's decision to deny him disability benefits and supplemental security income (SSI) under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 423, 1382. On appeal, defendant claimed that the district court should have found that he submitted a medical report from Dr. Mary Ellen Ziolko to the Appeals Council that was not considered and this case should therefore have been remanded to the Appeals Council for consideration of the new and material evidence. The court agreed that the district court should have determined whether appellant submitted the new evidence under 20 C.F.R. 404.970(b), and thus the court remanded to the district court to make that determination.

A client complained to the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyard Administration about the broker purchasing his own stock for customers. Following a remand, the USDA imposed a 16-month suspension on his registration under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. 181-229. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The judicial officer adequately considered the nature of the violations in relation to the remedial purposes of the PSA. The suspension was not too harsh, given the circumstances of the violation.

This civil action arose out of events that occurred on the first day of the 2008 Republican National Convention in St. Paul, Minnesota. 32 people filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against six police officers and the City of St. Paul, alleging violations of their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the dismissal of their claims against five officers and the City. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for the seizures; the record did not show that any defendant directly used force against any plaintiff; and Sergeant Axel Henry was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that the district court correctly granted summary judgment for the officers on plaintiffs' claims that the officers arrested them in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights. The court further held that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the City where a Senior Commander's actions were not sufficient to impose liability on the City.

In an appeal from the district court's dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action on grounds of standing and Younger v. Harris abstention, plaintiff argued that it had standing to assert various constitutional claims and that the district court also erred in abstaining in deference to the pending state-court actions regarding whether the minor children of the members of the church were neglected or abused. Defendants contended that the district court relied on abstention only with respect to the individual plaintiffs and that the church did not have standing to assert claims alleging a deprivation of its own federal rights much less those of its individual members. The court agreed that the district court applied abstention with respect to individual plaintiffs, and that it dismissed the church solely for lack of standing. Without reaching the question of standing at the pleading stage, however, the court affirmed because the court's analysis of Younger abstention with respect to the two individual plaintiffs was equally applicable to the church.

The State challenged the Secretary's decision to accept four parcels of land within the geographic boundaries of the State into trust for the benefit of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation, a federally recognized Indian tribe. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary and the State appealed. The court held that, because the State lacked standing to bring a constitutional due process claim and did not raise any additional arguments on appeal, the State was not entitled to relief. The court dismissed and did not reach the merits.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the county and the sheriff. At issue was whether plaintiff's due process rights were violated when the sheriff induced plaintiff to plead guilty to a pending felony charge of terroristic threatening in December 1989. The court concluded that the alleged coercion did not render plaintiff's plea involuntary; there was no imposition of section 1983 liability on a state actor for coercing or inducing a guilty plea that was later determined not to be knowing and involuntary; an official holding a criminal defendant in pretrial custody could reasonably assume that the trial court would properly determine whether the defendant was competent to stand trial or plead guilty; and plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the sheriff's statements were the proximate cause of the violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. The court held that because plaintiff failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights by the sheriff, the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's official capacity claims against the sheriff and the county.

Appellants, the Libertarian party and three candidates, challenged the constitutionality of North Dakota Century Code 16.1-11-36, contending that the statute as applied to them violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause because it prevented appellants' names from appearing on the 2010 general election ballot despite their winning the party's primary. The court held that the burden imposed by the statute was not undue or excessive and the state had a compelling interest in having a minimum vote requirement before a candidate could appear on the general election ballot. Therefore, the court held that N.D.C.C. 16.1-11-36 was not unconstitutional on First or Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Furthermore, because the law applied equally to all candidates and did not result in unequal treatment, the court held that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court.

Appellant filed suit against four Minneapolis police officers and the City of Minneapolis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the officers used excessive, unreasonable force against her, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the excessive force claim and held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the officers used excessive force against appellant. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the section 1983 claims against Officer Carroll because appellant admitted that he did not use excessive force against her. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that because appellant did not allege any damages, she failed to state a claim under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act. Minn. Stat. 13.01, subdiv. 1. The court held, however, that the district court failed to consider whether appellant could recover her costs and disbursements in her December 19, 2008 action to compel compliance under Minn. Stat. 13.01, subdiv. 4. Therefore, the court remanded for a ruling on whether appellant was entitled to costs or disbursements under that section of the statute. The court finally held that the district court properly dismissed appellant's common law battery claims against officers as untimely because the two-year statute of limitations period had expired. The court held, however, that appellant presented sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on the basis of official immunity on the alleged state tort claims.

Appellant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sun Life in an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., benefits case. At issue was whether Sun Life was entitled to offset from appellant's employer-provided long-term disability benefits the amount that appellant received in Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) benefits each month. The court held that VA benefits, for a wartime service-related disability, as a matter of statutory construction, did not derive from an act that was "similar to" the SSA or RRA, which were both federal insurance programs based upon employment and the amount of an award under their terms depended upon how much had been paid in. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the district court with directions to enter judgment in favor of appellant.