Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, a group of municipal and federal government entities, which sold electricity in the affected markets at issue but who were outside of FERC's refund jurisdiction, appealed FERC's order of refunds for electricity rates that were above what FERC determined to be the just and reasonable rate. The court did not agree with FERC's assertion that it had broad authority under section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824e, to retroactively reset rates that were charged in the California electricity markets during the time in question. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the specific FERC Orders that were challenged in the current petitions for review did not exceed the limits on FERC's authority. Consequently, the court denied the petitions. View "Modesto Irrigation District, et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

CTTA filed this action seeking to invalidate two ordinances where the City and County of San Francisco required tow truck drivers to obtain permits to operate in San Francisco and towing firms to obtain permits to conduct business within San Francisco. CTTA primarily argued that the entire "permit scheme" (as it called both ordinances) was preempted by federal law. The district court upheld the permit scheme for "non-consensual" towing, but enjoined enforcement against those doing exclusively "consensual" towing and against tow truck drivers simply "passing through" San Francisco. Both parties cross-appealed. The CTTA's challenge to the entire permit scheme necessarily encompassed all of the permit scheme's components - each of which could be preempted. The district court analyzed the permit scheme in a way the parties presented the scheme, as a whole, but without specifically addressing its individual provisions. In doing so, however, the district court ran afoul of American Trucking Associations v. City of Los Angeles, which required "examining the specific provisions" of the permit scheme. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "California Tow Truck Assoc. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

This case involved the Service's regulations under Section 101(a)(5)(A) of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. 1371(a), that authorized incidental take of polar bears and Pacific walruses resulting from oil and gas exploration activities in the Chukchi Sea and on the adjacent coast of Alaska. Plaintiffs brought suit challenging the regulations and accompanying environmental review documents under various environmental acts. The court held that the Service permissibly determined that only "relatively small numbers" of polar bears and Pacific walruses would be taken in relation to the size of their larger populations, because the agency separately determined that the anticipated take would have only a "negligible impact" on the mammals' annual rates of recruitment or survival. The "small numbers" determination was consistent with the statute and was not arbitrary and capricious. The court also held that the Service's accompanying Biological Opinion and Environmental Assessment (EA) complied with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. View "Center for Biological Diversity, et al. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

The IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency (NOD) to Alex and Liset Meruelo a few days before the three-year statute of limitations expired. Alex was a partner in a partnership. The Meruelos petitioned the tax court challenging the deficiency contained in the NOD and subsequently moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the IRS issued the NOD prematurely, making it invalid. The tax court held that the NOD was valid and not premature and that the items were affected items. The parties later reached an agreement as to all issues, except the validity of the NOD. The tax court then entered a final decision holding that the Meruelos were liable for $1,387,006 in additional income tax and $277,401 in penalties. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that (1) a NOD issued when no partnership-level proceeding or final partnership administrative adjustment have been issued is valid; (2) a NOD issued when the normal three-year statute of limitations has not expired is valid; and (3) therefore, the tax court had jurisdiction. View "Meruelo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Grand Canyon Trust appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) rejecting the Trust's claims alleging that Reclamation and FWS violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Administrative Procedure Act in the operation of the Glen Canyon Dam. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed as moot in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) several of the Trust's claims were moot; (2) Reclamation did not violate the ESA by not consulting with FWS before issuing each annual operating plan (AOP) for the Dam; and (3) Reclamation did not violate NEPA by not preparing an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement for each AOP.

Appellant appealed a district court judgment affirming the Social Security Administration's (SSA) decision finding him disabled from September 26, 1997 through December 3, 1998, and concluding that the disability ended on December 4, 1998 due to medical improvement. Appellant contended that the ALJ's medical improvement finding was not supported by substantial evidence because she erred in relying on a single proposed rating decision from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (the 2001 decision). Appellant also claimed that the ALJ erred by failing to mention the opinion of his treating physician. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ erred in relying solely on the 2001 decision, as (1) the 2001 only proposed changes while ignoring two other decisions that rejected the proposed changes recommended in the 2001 decision; and (2) the ALJ's misunderstanding led her to inaccurately conclude that her finding that Appellant's disability terminated on December 4, 1998 was consistent with the VA's ratings.

Petitioners, the Native Village of Kilalina IRA Council and other Alaskan groups, appealed the EPA Environmental Appeals Board's (EAB) order denying review of their challenges to a permit authorizing Intervenor Teck Alaska, Inc. to discharge wastewater caused by the operation of Red Dog Mine. The EAB concluded that Kivalina had not satisfied the procedural requirements to obtain review under 40 C.F.R. 124.19(a) because it did not demonstrate why the EPA's responses to comments were clearly erroneous or otherwise warranted review. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioners' petition for review, holding that Petitioners did not meet the requirements of section 124.19.

The United States petitioned the district court for an order enforcing a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) subpoena served on Golden Valley Electric Association (Golden Valley) for power consumption records concerning three customer residences. The court granted the petition and ordered compliance. Golden Valley complied with the subpoena but appealed the order. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Golden Valley's compliance with the district court's enforcement order did not moot the appeal; (2) the DEA's subpoena sought information relevant to a drug investigation, was procedurally proper, and was not overly broad; and (3) the subpoena complied with the Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiff filed for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration denied Hill's application. An ALJ also denied Plaintiff's application, and the appeals council denied Plaintiff's request for review. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security and affirmed the ALJ's decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the ALJ failed to consider evidence favorable to Plaintiff and posed an improper hypothetical question to the vocational expert; and (2) therefore, substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) granted Petitioner's asylum application in 1996. In 2003, the INS ceased to exist, and its functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. One of the Department's agencies is the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). In 2004, the USCIS sent Petitioner a termination notice informing him that his asylum status had been terminated by the USCIS and that he was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner moved to terminate the removal proceedings on the ground that his asylum status had not properly been terminated. The immigration judge (IJ) concluded she lacked jurisdiction to review an asylum officer's termination of asylum status and ordered Petitioner removed to India. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's petition for review of the BIA's orders of removal, holding (1) asylum status can only terminate through the Attorney General; and (2) the regulations pursuant to which the Department of Homeland Security terminates asylum status are ultra vires because the governing statute confers that authority exclusively on the the Attorney General. Remanded.