Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court seeking damages for the 31 months during which they were barred from improving their shoreline property by the moratorium imposed by local officials on new projects. Plaintiffs asserted that the moratorium violated their substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and sought damages against the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that the moratorium ordinances were validly enacted, nonarbitrary, and manifestly related to the city's legitimate municipal interests. Accordingly, the court held that the city did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

The Lands Commission appealed the district court's final judgment in this eminent domain case, wherein the United States took a fee simple interest in the property at issue on behalf of the Navy, which has continuously leased this parcel since 1949. In condemning the property, the United States sought to extinguish California's public trust rights. The court concluded that, having paid just compensation, the United States was entitled to the interest it sought in its complaint in condemnation; full fee simple, free of California's public trust. The court concluded that neither the equal-footing doctrine nor the public trust doctrine prevented the federal government from taking that interest in the land unencumbered.

Plaintiff appealed an order of the district court affirming the Commissioner's final decision denying her disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (SSA), 42 U.S.C. 401-434. At issue, among other things, was whether the district court should have considered evidence plaintiff did not submit to the ALJ but submitted for the first time to the Appeals Council, which accepted and considered the new evidence but declined to review the ALJ's decision. The court held that when a claimant submitted evidence for the first time to the Appeals Council, which considering that evidence in denying review of the ALJ's decision, the new evidence was part of the administrative record, which the district court must consider in determining whether the Commissioner's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Considering the record as a whole, the court concluded that the Commissioner's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for an immediate award of benefits.

Plaintiffs brought a First Amendment and other constitutional challenges to regulations and associated guidelines that required permits for "commercial weddings" on public beaches in Hawaii. The court held that Hawaii's regulation of commercial weddings on unencumbered state beaches did not violate the First Amendment, except for a provision giving an official absolute discretion to revoke a permit at anytime and to modify it as the official deemed necessary or appropriate.

This case stemmed from the denial of plaintiff's claim of social security disability benefits. At issue was whether the ALJ's handling of an ex parte contact was error, and if so, whether it was harmless. Because the ALJ erred by considering the ex parte evidence without allowing a supplementary hearing, the court was required to evaluate whether there was prejudice. The court concluded that there was no prejudice from the error where, considering the record as a whole, and the ALJ's explanation of his decision, the court was convinced that plaintiff had not demonstrated that the decision would have been any different without the ex parte communication. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

In expedited petitions for review, the court considered the allegations of petitioners that the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) failed to discharge obligations under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) in approving Shell's plan for exploratory oil drilling in the Beaufort Sea. The court concluded that BOEM's decision that Shell's exploration plan complied with OCSLA's requirements was entitled to deference and was supported by the record as a whole. Accordingly, the court denied the expedited petitions.

Defendant, a city police officer, appealed from the denial of qualified immunity in plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging First Amendment retaliation. The district court held that it was clearly established in December 2008 that a supervisor could not retaliate against a public employee for his or her subpoenaed deposition testimony offered as a citizen in the context of a civil rights lawsuit. The court agreed and affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

After the September 11, 2011 attacks, the government detained plaintiff, an American citizen, as an enemy combatant. Plaintiff alleged that he was held incommunicado in military detention, subjected to coercive interrogation techniques and detained under harsh conditions of confinement, all in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiff and his mother sued John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) from 2001 to 2003, alleging that they suffered from plaintiff's unlawful detention. The court held that, under recent Supreme Court law, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the court was compelled to conclude that, regardless of the legality of plaintiff's detention and the wisdom of Yoo's judgments, at the time he acted the law was not "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he [wa]s doing violated[d]" plaintiff's rights. Therefore, the court held that Yoo must be granted qualified immunity and accordingly reversed the decision of the district court.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Commissioner in its review of the Commissioner's denial of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Social Security Income (SSI) benefits. Based on the rarity of the surveillance system monitor jobs, and considering plaintiff's physical and mental limitations, the court was compelled to find that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

This case arose when defendants contended that they were engaged in bona fide mining activities on National Forest System lands, which justified full-time residency on their respective claim sites. The court held that the Forest Service could regulate residential occupancy of bona fide mining claims within the national forests, and that 36 C.F.R. 261.10(b) was consistent with the mining laws and not unconstitutionally vague. The court further held that in a criminal proceeding predicated on the Forest Service's administrative determination, a defendant could obtain judicial review of the agency action under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., so long as defendant complied with the procedural requirements for direct review and the APA's statute of limitations has not expired. Thus, defendant Everist was not entitled to judicial review of the Forest Service's determination that his residency was not reasonably incident to mining, because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the APA. Defendant Backlund, on the other had, did administratively exhaust his claim that the Forest Service's denial of his proposed plan of operations was not in accordance with law. Therefore, Backlund was entitled to judicial review of the agency decision in the context of his criminal prosecution.