Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a long-running conflict which has devolved to the present remaining dispute as to the classification of approximately 9,000 acre feet (AF) of water released between June 17 through 24 of 2004 from the Nimbus and New Melones reservoirs within California's Central Valley Project (CVP) by defendant, the U.S. Department of the Interior, acting through the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (collectively, federal defendants). Plaintiffs, water agencies, contended that the Department of the Interior abused its discretion in failing to apply the latter June 2004 releases against the 800,000 AF of CVP yield especially designated for fish, wildlife, and habitat restoration under section 3406(b)(2) of the CVP Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600. Because the court found that the water agencies have standing and the accounting which the Department of Interior conducted for the latter June 2004 releases did not constitute an abuse of discretion, the court affirmed the district court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants and against the water agencies.

Plaintiff, the Chief of Police Services for the City of San Clemente, sued defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after plaintiff was placed on administrative leave after he ran for, and lost, the election of Orange County Sheriff-Coroner. Plaintiff claimed that his placement on administrative leave and subsequent demotion were in unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. The district court concluded that plaintiff's campaign speech was not protected by the First Amendment because he fell into the narrow "policymaker" exception to the general rule against politically-motivated dismissals. Although the court determined that the district court erred in this conclusion, the court agreed that the district court's alternative holding that Michael Carona, the incumbent Orange County Sheriff who won the election at issue, was entitled to qualified immunity because a government official in his position "reasonably but mistakenly" could have believed that political loyalty was required by someone with plaintiff's job responsibilities at the time he ran against Carona. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Just when Defendants-Appellees United States Forest Service and Joseph P. Stringer (USFS), and Intervenor-Defendant Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership (ASRLP) had successfully defended an agency decision to allow snowmaking at a ski resort on federal land all the way to the United States Supreme Court, "new" plaintiffs appeared. Represented by the same attorney as the losing parties in the first lawsuit, the "new" plaintiffs—who had closely monitored the first litigation—brought certain environmental claims that were virtually identical to some that the attorney had improperly attempted to raise in the earlier lawsuit, for no apparent reason other than to ensure further delay and forestall development. "Although it is apparent to [the Ninth Circuit] that the 'new' plaintiffs and their counsel have grossly abused the judicial process by strategically holding back claims that could have, and should have, been asserted in the first lawsuit… [the Court was] compelled to hold that laches [did] not apply here" because the USFS and ASRLP could not demonstrate that they suffered prejudice, as defined by the applicable case law. The Court held that the Save the Peaks Plaintiffs' claims failed under NEPA and the APA. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the USFS and ASRLP.

The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (REA) prohibits the U.S. Forest Service from charging fees solely for parking, undesignated parking, or picnicking along roads or trailsides, for hiking without using facilities and services, and for camping at undeveloped sites. Despite these prohibitions, the Forest Service collected fees from all drivers who parked their vehicles in a piece of the Coronado National Forest running along the Catalina Highway, the only paved road to the summit of Mount Lemmon, a heavily used recreational area. Four recreational visitors used, seeking a declaration that the Forest Service was exceeding the scope of its authority under the REA by charging fees to those who drove to Mount Lemmon, parked their cars, then picnicked, hiked, or camped in nearby undeveloped areas. Plaintiffs also sought to enjoin the Forest Service from collecting such fees. The district court granted Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Forest Service's fee structure contravened the plain language of the REA. Remanded to allow Plaintiffs to pursue that claim.

This case arose out of plaintiffs' second challenge to the sufficiency of the DOE's Environmental Assessment (EA) of a prospective "biosafety level-3" (BSL-3) facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). On appeal, plaintiffs petitioned the court to require the DOE to prepare an Environment Impact Statement (EIS), or in the alternative, to revise its EA, in light of the allegations set forth in its original complaint, to determine whether an EIS was required. The court held that the DOE took the requisite "hard look" at the environmental impact of an intentional terrorist attack in the manner required by the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq., and San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This appeal arose when the People of California adopted Proposition 8, which amended the state constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry. At issue was whether this amendment violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court declined to address the more general questions presented to it concerning the rights of same-sex couples to marry. The court concluded that, through the proponents of ballot measures, the People of California must be allowed to defend in federal courts, including on appeal, the validity of their use of the initiative power. Accordingly, the proponents possessed Article III standing to prosecute this appeal from the district court's judgment invalidating Proposition 8. However, the court concluded that the People could not employ the initiative power to single out a disfavored group for unequal treatment and strip them, without a legitimate justification, of a right as important as the right to marry. By using their initiative power to target a minority group and withdraw a right that it possessed, without legitimate reasons for doing so, the People violated the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, the court held that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional on this ground and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion by the official sponsors of Proposition 8 to vacate the judgment entered by former Chief Judge Walker, on the basis of his purported interest in being allowed to marry his same-sex partner.

This case involved the Randolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act, 20 U.S.C. 107, which established a cooperative program between the federal government and the states to assist blind persons who wish to operate vending facilities on federal property. The California Department of Rehabilitation (DOR) and the U.S. Department of Education appealed from the district court's decision enforcing a 2008 arbitration award issued pursuant section 107d-1(a) of the Act. At issue was whether the 2008 arbitration panel exceeded its authority under the Act when it ruled that DOR had a statutory obligation to sue the General Services Administration (GSA) for its failure to comply with the 2000 Arbitration Award, and therefore was liable for damages in favor of a blind vendor when it failed to do so. Based on the plain language of the Act and other guides to statutory construction, the court concluded that the Act did not impose a statutory obligation on a state licensing agency to sue a federal agency for its failure to comply with a Randolph-Sheppard arbitration award. The 2008 arbitration panel therefore committed a legal error when it interpreted the Act as requiring DOR to bring an action against GSA, and that DOR's failure to do so made it liable for compensatory damages. Because DOR had no statutory obligation to sue GSA to enforce the 2000 Arbitration Award, the 2008 arbitration panel's ruling that DOR became liable for the damages against GSA by failing to bring such an enforcement action was "not in accordance with law" and must be set aside.

Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court challenging the 2004 Framework, the Forest Services' recommendations to the Sierra Nevada Forest Plan, as inconsistent with the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., claiming that the 2004 EIS did not sufficiently analyze the environmental consequences of the 2004 Framework for fish and amphibians. The court held that the Forest Service failed to take a hard look at environmental consequences on fish in the 2004 EIS, in violation of NEPA. There was a lack of analysis of the likely impact on individual species of fish in the 2004 EIS and the lack of any explanation in the 2004 EIS as to why it was not "reasonably possible" to perform some level of analysis of such impact. The court held, however, that the Forest Service did take a hard look at environmental consequences on amphibians in the 2004 EIS, in compliance with NEPA. Therefore, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Petitioners petitioned for review of the EPA's approval of the 2004 State Implementation Plan (2004 SIP) for the San Joaquin Valley's nonattainment area for the one-hour ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard. The court held that the EPA's 2010 approval of the 2004 SIP, which was based on data current only as of 2004, was arbitrary and capricious. The court did not reach petitioners' remaining arguments and granted the petition for review, remanding the matter to the EPA for further proceedings.

Defendant filed a due process hearing complaint with California's Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), alleging that he was being denied the free appropriate public education (FAPE) that he was entitled to under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: Does California Education Code 56041 - which provided generally that for qualifying children ages eighteen to twenty-two, the school district where the child's parent resides is responsible for providing special education services - apply to children who are incarcerated in county jails? The case was withdrawn from submission and further proceedings were stayed pending final action by the Supreme Court of California.