Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Three conservation groups (Applicants) appealed from the denial of their motion to intervene on the side of defendants in an action where plaintiff challenged an interim order issued by the Forest Service in response to an adverse decision in prior litigation brought by Applicants. The interim order restricted motorized and mechanized vehicle use in a section of the Gallatin National Forest. The court held that Applicants showed, in a timely-filed motion, that they had a significantly protectable interest in the action; that the disposition could impair their ability to protect that interest; and that the Forest Service could not adequately represent their interest. Therefore, Applicants were entitled to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with further instructions to the district court.

Plaintiffs, raisin producers, appealed an administrative decision by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), which imposed civil penalties and assessments for their failure to comply with the reserve pool requirements for raisins, among other regulatory infractions. At issue was the interpretation and constitutionality of a food product reserve program authorized by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), 7 U.S.C. 601 et seq., and implemented by the Marketing Order Regulating the Handling of Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California (Marketing Order), 7 C.F.R. Part 989, first adopted in 1949, which contained the reserve pool requirements. The court held that applying the Marketing Order to plaintiffs in their capacity as handlers was not contrary to the AMAA. The court also held that plaintiffs have suffered no compensable physical taking of any portion of their crops and therefore, the Fifth Amendment posed no obstacle to the enforcement of the Marketing Order under the Takings Clause. The court further held that the district court did not err in finding that the penalties were consistent with the Eighth Amendment and were not excessive fines. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

This case involved the seizure and administrative forfeiture of two leopard trophies by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service from two hunters (plaintiffs) who attempted to import the leopards from African countries without proper export permits. Plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in dismissing their Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) claim for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the district court properly held that plaintiffs' CAFRA claim was barred from judicial review where plaintiffs received proper notice of the proposed forfeitures; plaintiffs chose to pursue an administrative path and filed petitions for remission and petitions for supplemental remission; and plaintiffs' choice to pursue such administrative remedies waived the opportunity for judicial forfeiture proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the action.

This case stemmed from the NRDC's complaint against the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) alleging that SCAQMD violated the Clean Air Act (CAA), section 173(c), by distributing invalid credits from its offset accounts under Rules 1304 and 1309.1 of the Regulation XIII rules; that SCAQMD violated Regulation XIII as well as section 173(c) by maintaining invalid credits in its offset accounts; and that SCAQMD violated the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule approving Regulation XIII and section 173(c) by failing to track emission reductions to show it maintained positive account balances in its offset accounts. The NRDC appealed the district court's grant of SCAQMD's motion to dismiss the NRDC's claims against (SCAQMD). The court held that the district court did not err in determining it lacked jurisdiction under section 304 of the CAA over the alleged violations of section 173(c). The court also held that the district court did not err in concluding that the NRDC otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted where Regulation XIII did not contain validity requirements for SCQMD's internal offsets and the EPA rules did not require SCAQMD to use a tracking system. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgments.

Appellants formerly maintained railroad tracks on a parcel of land in Stockton, California, that was contaminated by petroleum. The petroleum was spilled at a nearby industrial site and migrated onto the property via an underground french drain that appellants had installed in order to remove water from the roadbed. At issue was whether appellants were liable for the contamination of the property under the law of nuisance or under California's Polanco Redevelopment Act (Act), Cal. Health & Safety Code 33459 et seq. The court held that there was no evidence that appellants actively or knowingly caused or permitted the contamination as required for nuisance liability and liability under the Act's Water Code provision, Cal. Health & Safety Code 33459(h). The court also held that appellants were not "owners" of the property under the Act's Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a), provision when the contamination occurred. The court further held that, because the record established no genuine issue of material fact as to appellants' liability, appellants were entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, the court need not reach any of the damages issues on appeal or cross-appeal.

Plaintiffs, married couples who worked as house parents to children who were "severely emotionally disturbed" in defendants' homes, sued defendants for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. 203(r)(2)(A). The children attended local public schools and participated in other activities away from the homes. Although, the children participated in group therapy conducted by clinicians in the homes, they received most of their medical and psychological treatment outside the homes. Plaintiffs were not licensed medical or social service professionals. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's conclusion that defendants' homes were covered by the FLSA and were subject to its overtime provisions. The court held that defendants' homes were not covered by the FLSA because they were not an "institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, mentally ill or defective who resided on the premises of such institution." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Former Arizona Congressman Richard G. Renzi sought to invoke the Speech or Debate Clause ("Clause") of the Constitution to preclude his prosecution for allegedly using his public office to benefit himself rather than his constituents. Renzi denied the charges against him but argued on interlocutory appeal that he was protected by the Clause from even the burden of defending himself. Specifically, Renzi claimed that the public corruption charges against him amounted to prosecution on account of his privileged "legislative acts"; that "legislative act" evidence was improperly presented to the grand jury; that the United States must show that its investigation did not benefit from its review of "legislative act" evidence; and that the district court erred by declining to wholly suppress all of the evidence against him relating to his illicit "negotiations." The court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to consider Renzi's suppression claim and therefore, dismissed that part of his appeal. The court also held that the Clause was a privilege that "had enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy others with impunity," but the Supreme Court had made equally clear that the Clause did not "make Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal responsibility." Accordingly, the court held that Renzi's actions fell beyond the Clause's protections and denied him the relief that he sought.

This action stemmed from the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") "ISP Remand Order", which imposed a new compensation regime for ISP-bound traffic, i.e., internet service provider-bound traffic. Plaintiff, which was a competitive local exchange carrier ("CLEC"), maintained that the ISP Remand Order applied when the carrier originating the call and the carrier terminating the call were both CLECs. Defendant and the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") contended that the ISP Remand Order's compensation regime applied only to traffic between a CLEC and an incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC"). CPUC agreed with defendant's limited reading of the reach of the compensation regime, finding it inapplicable to the ISP-bound traffic originating with plaintiff and terminated by defendant, and so it assessed against plaintiff charges consistent with defendant's state-filed tariff. Plaintiff then sued defendant and the CPUC in federal district court, alleging that the ISP Remand Order preempted their attempts to assess plaintiff charges for ISP-bound traffic based on state-filed tariffs. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant and CPUC, agreeing with their argument that the ISP Remand Order did not apply to CLEC-CLEC traffic. The court agreed with plaintiff and with the analysis contained in an amicus brief filed upon its request by the FCC, that the ISP Remand Order's compensation regime applied to ISP-bound traffic exchanged between two CLECs. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment.

San Diego County Sheriff's Deputies ("deputies") shot and killed Shane Hayes inside his home after the deputies arrived at Hayes' residence in response to a domestic disturbance call from a neighbor. Plaintiff, Hayes' daughter, asserted a claim for negligence based in part on the deputies' preshooting conduct, specifically their alleged failure to properly assess the situation before entering the house. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the deputies and found that the deputies owed Hayes no duty of care in their preshooting conduct. The district court did not address whether the deputies' preshooting conduct could be considered a breach of any standard of care, if such a duty were owed. The court certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: "Whether under California negligence law, sheriff's deputies owe a duty of care to a suicidal person when preparing, approaching, and performing a welfare check on him." In light of the court's decision to certify the issue presented, the opinion filed in this case on March 22, 2011 was withdrawn.

This case arose from the controversial late-night arrests and subsequent release of two Phoenix newspaper executives. The newspaper executives and the Phoenix New Times, LLC (collectively, "plaintiffs") subsequently sued various officials connected with the Maricopa County Attorney's Office and the Sheriff's Office, including the county attorney, the sheriff, and a special prosecutor, alleging that the special prosecutor and possibly others ordered the arrest of the newspaper executives at their homes in the middle of the night after The Phoenix New Times newspaper published various articles critical of the officials. At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' federal claims and in remanding their remaining claims to state court. The court held that, while many of the actions alleged were protected by either absolute or qualified immunity, the actions of the special prosecutor in arranging the newspaper executives' arrest raised colorable claims of First and Fourth Amendment violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.