Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, two non-profit organizations, sought injunctive and declaratory relief to remedy the delays in the provision of mental health care and adjudication of service-connected death and disability compensation claims by the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA"). At issue was whether these delays violated veterans' due process rights to receive the care and benefits they were guaranteed by statute for harms and injuries sustained while serving our country. While the court affirmed the district court's ruling, with respect to various claims for specific forms of relief under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 500 et. seq., that the APA prevented the court from granting veterans the statutory relief they sought, the court reversed the district court's ruling on plaintiffs' constitutional claims and held that the VA's failure to provide adequate procedures for veterans facing prejudicial delays in the delivery of mental health care violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court further held that the district court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review plaintiffs' due process challenge to delays and procedural deficiencies in the compensation claims adjudication system and that it erroneously denied plaintiffs' the relief to which they were entitled under the Due Process Clause.

Plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in their official capacities under 28 U.S.C. 2201, alleging that the so-called "parsonage exemption" violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also sued the Executive Office of the California Franchise Tax Board in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that California's parsonage exemption violated the Establishment Clause of both the United States and California Constitutions. Six days after plaintiffs filed their complaint, a minister of the gospel in the Sacramento area, who regularly claimed both the federal and state parsonage exemptions, moved to intervene as a defendant. At issue was whether an individual who claimed certain federal and state tax exemptions could intervene in an unrelated action challenging the constitutionality of those exemptions. The court held that the minister was not entitled to intervene as of right where the federal defendants adequately represented the minister's interest. The court also clarified that the independent jurisdictional grounds requirement did not apply to proposed intervenors in federal-question cases when the proposed intervenor was not raising new claims. Therefore, the court also held that the minister was not required to make any further showing that his intervention was supported by independent jurisdictional grounds where the district court's denial of permissive intervention was not an appropriate exercise in discretion because the district court did not apply the correct legal rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded that portion of the district court's order so that the district court could reassess the request for permissive intervention.

Plaintiffs, manufactures of a bear-resistant container called the Ursack S29 model and three individual users of the Ursack, sued the Sierra Interagency Black Bear Group ("SIBBG"), as well as national and forest park services (collectively, "defendants"), where defendants withdrew conditional approval of the S29 model and refused to permit backpackers to use the S29 in the container-only areas of defendants' national parks and forests. At issue was whether SIBBG's decision to revoke conditional approval of the S29 model was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that SIBBG's decision to revoke conditional approval of the S29 model was not arbitrary or capricious where the court could not conclude that the SIBBG, although it did not mention overflow food problems in the course of its debate, ignored this aspect of the problem; where the distinctions the SIBBG made between the BearVault and the Ursack were rational; and where SIBBG's tree-damage rationale, prohibiting users from tying the S29 model to trees, was not arbitrary or capricious.

Appellant appealed an order of summary judgment in favor of the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") in his eight Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. 552, requests for 19 C.F.R. 133.21(c) Notices of Seizures of Infringing Merchandise ("Notices") from certain United States ports. Appellant raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the district court's findings that the Notices contained plainly commercial information, which disclosed intimate aspects of an importers business such as supply chains and fluctuations of demand for merchandise, was well supported. The court also held that the district court was not clearly erroneous in its finding that the information at issue was confidential and privileged where the trade secret exemption of FOIA ("Exemption 4") was applicable. The court further held that when an agency freely disclosed to a third party confidential information covered by a FOIA exemption without limiting the third-party's ability to further disseminate the information then the agency waived the ability to claim an exemption to a FOIA request for the disclosed information. Therefore, the district court's ruling was affirmed in regards to FOIA Exemption 4 but the district court's conclusion as to the fees charged to appellant was reversed where CBP must follow the FOIA fee provisions under 19 C.F.R. 103.

Intervenor State of Alaska appealed the district court's judgment in favor of Southeast Alaska Conservatory Council and five other groups (collectively, "SEACC") in their suit against the Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") and other defendants arising from the initiation of the Juneau Access Improvements Project ("Project") to improve surface access between Juneau and the communities of Haines and Skagway in the Lynn Canal corridor of Southeast Alaska. At issue was whether the district court properly ordered the State to consider improving existing ferry service between Juneau and the communities of Haines and Skagway before proceeding with expensive construction of a new ferry terminal and highway through a national forest. The court held that the district court properly concluded that it was arbitrary for the FHWA to refuse to consider reassigning vessels as a project alternative on the basis that it would increase costs and reduce services elswhere when the chosen project alternative could have been rejected for the same reason. By failing to examine a viable and reasonable alternative to the proposed project, and by not providing an adequate justification for its omission, the Environmental Impact Statement issued by the FHWA violated the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(a).

Defendants, in consolidated appeals, appealed their convictions for violations of 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1) for attempting to travel by boat from Saipan in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands ("CNMI") to the Territory of Guam by boat. At issue was whether defendants violated section 1325(a)(1) for being aliens who knowingly and willingly attempted to enter the United States at a time and place other than as designated by immigration officers on or about January 5, 2010, a date within Title VII of the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008's ("CNRA"), 48 U.S.C. 1806-1808, transition period. The court held that defendants did not violate section 1325(a)(1) by attempting to travel by boat from the CNMI to Guam where the CNMI and Guam were parts of the United States and an alien did not enter or attempt to enter the United States for purposes of section 1325(a)(1) when traveling from one part of the United States to another, even if when doing so they passed through international waters.

Plaintiffs, operators of a business that promoted gun shows throughout California, sued the County of Alameda and county officials alleging that a county ordinance, which made it a misdemeanor to bring onto or to possess a firearm or ammunition on county property, violated their Constitutional rights. At issue was whether the Second Amendment prohibited a local government from banning gun shows. Also at issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' First Amendment and Equal Protection claims. The court initially held that only regulations which substantially burden the right to keep and to bear arms triggered heightened scrutiny under the Second Amendment. Therefore, the court held that to the extent the district court's leave to amend was with prejudice, it must be vacated where plaintiffs could still be able to allege sufficient facts to state that the ordinance substantially burdened their right to keep and to bear arms under the Second Amendment. The court also held that summary judgment was properly granted on plaintiffs' First Amendment claim where the ordinance passed the United States v. O'Brien test. The court further held that summary judgment was properly granted on plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim where plaintiffs' claim would fail so long as the ordinance's distinction between military reenactments and gun shows were rational.

United Medical Caregivers Clinic ("UMCC") prevailed in a civil forfeiture proceeding initiated by the United States. UMCC moved for an award of attorneys fees under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act ("CAFRA"), 28 U.S.C. 2465(b)(1)(A), and requested that the fee award be paid directly to counsel. At issue was whether the amount requested for attorneys fees was appropriate and whether CAFRA permitted that the fee award be paid directly to UMCC's counsel. The court referred the matter to the Appellate Commissioner and held that the lodestar method would be used to calculate the amount of an appropriate fee award and held that the actual fee agreement between UMCC and its attorney may be taken into account but was not by itself determinative in calculating the appropriate amount of the fee award. The court also held that attorney fee awards under CAFRA were payable to the claimant, UMCC, but not to the claimant's attorney.

Plaintiff filed for social security disability benefits as a result of left-knee chronic neuropathic pain, hypertension, and depression. At issue was whether the district court's decision to direct an award of benefits, rather than to remand for further agency proceedings, exceeded its statutory authority. The court held that the district court erred in awarding benefits based upon the ALJ's failure to follow its remand order rather than consider whether plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the statute or whether the evidence the ALJ improperly excluded or discounted was true.

Plaintiff sued defendant, the Executive Officer of the California Air Resources Board ("CARB"), alleging that California's Vessel Fuel Rules ("VFR")violated federal statutory and constitutional grounds. At issue was whether the VFR was preempted by the Submerged Lands Act and whether the VFR was preempted by the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause. The court held that summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was properly denied where plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the VFR was "otherwise 'unlawful and impermissibly regulate navigation and foreign and domestic commerce as delegated to the United States Congress'" under the Submerged Lands Act. The court also held that summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was properly denied where the Commerce Clause or general maritime law should be used to bar a state from exercising its own police powers when such powers were used to combat severe environmental problems.