Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order denying her motion for preliminary injunction of San Francisco Police Code sections 4512 and 613.10(g) on the ground that both infringed upon her Second Amendment rights. The court concluded that section 4512, which requires handguns to be stored in a locked container when not carried on the person, burdens the rights protected by the Second Amendment because storage regulations such as section 4512 are not part of a long historical "tradition of proscription;" section 4512 is not a substantial burden on the Second Amendment; and, applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that section 4512 is substantially related to the important government interest of reducing firearm-related deaths and injuries. The court also concluded that section 613.10(g), which prohibits the sale of hollow-point ammunition within San Francisco, regulates conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment because restrictions on ammunition may burden the core Second Amendment right to self-defense and the record contained no persuasive historical evidence suggesting otherwise. Determining that plaintiff had standing to challenge section 613.10(g), the court concluded that section 613.10(g) is a reasonable fit to achieve its goal of reducing the legality of ammunition, and section 613.10(g) thus satisfies intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff would not succeed on the merits of her claims and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. View "Jackson v. City & Ctny. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an American citizen born in Iran, petitioned for review of a determination letter issued by DHS, seeking disclosure of his watchlist status, a meaningful opportunity to contest inclusion on any watchlist, and removal from all government watchlists. The watchlist at issue is the Consolidated Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). In Latif v. Holder, the court held that 49 U.S.C. 46110 did not grant circuit courts jurisdiction over broad constitutional claims - such as petitioner's - that seek removal from the TSDB. The court reaffirmed its holding in Latif and clarified that it is applicable even where a traveler's claims are brought as a challenge to a DHS Travel Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) determination letter. Accordingly, the court transferred to the district court where the jurisdictional defects that prevented the court from hearing petitioner's claims would not exist. View "Arjmand v. DHS" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employed by the City as dispatchers or aeromedical technicians, filed suit alleging that the City violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 207(k), by compensating them as "fire protection" employees under section 207(k). The court affirmed the district court's finding that section 207(k)'s exemption did not apply to dispatchers and aeromedical technicians because plaintiffs did not qualify as "employees engaged in fire protection" as defined by section 203(y); affirmed the district court's findings that a three-year statue of limitations applied and liquidated damages were proper because the City acted in willful violation of the law; and affirmed the district court's decision that previously-paid overtime should be offset using a week-by-week calculation because the statutory language of section 207(h), as well as persuasive authorities, supported this method of calculation. View "Haro v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The district court invalidated a biological opinion (BiOp) by the FWS concluding that the Central Valley and State Water Projects jeopardized the continued existence of the delta smelt, a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the district court overstepped its bounds by not limiting itself to court-appointed experts. The court concluded that the 2008 BiOp's reliance on raw salvage figures to set the upper and lower OMR (Old and Middle Rivers) flow limits was not arbitrary and capricious; the 2008 BiOp's determination of X2 (the point in the Bay-Delta at which the salinity is less than two parts per thousand) was not arbitrary and capricious; the BiOp's incidental take statements was now flawed; the record supported the BiOp's conclusions regarding the indirect effects of project operations; and the FWS was not required to support the "non-jeopardy" elements of the reasonable and prudent alternatives. The court agreed with the district court's analysis that Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife did not require the FWS to segregate discretionary from non-discretionary actions when it considered the environmental baseline; reclamation did not violate the ESA by accepting the 2008 BiOp; under these circumstances, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., did not require the FWS to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) in conjunction with the issuance of the BiOp; and Reclamation's provisional adoption and implementation of the BiOp triggered its obligation to comply with NEPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "San Luis v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against police officers and the city after the officers entered her home without a warrant and shot her five or six times when she reacted violently to the officers' presence, grabbing a knife and threatening to kill the officers. Plaintiff, a woman in her mid-50s suffering from a mental illness, told the officers that she did not want to be taken to a mental health facility. The court affirmed in part, holding that the officers were justified in entering plaintiff's home initially under the emergency aid exception because they had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that she was in need of emergency medical assistance and they conducted the search or seizure in a reasonable manner up to that point. The court held that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the second entry violated the Fourth Amendment where a jury could find that the officers acted unreasonably by forcing the second entry and provoking a near-fatal confrontation. The court further held that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the officers used excessive force by resorting to deadly force and shooting plaintiff. Finally, the court held that the district court properly rejected claims of municipal liability; the court joined the majority of circuits that have addressed the issue and held that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, applied to arrests; on the facts presented here, there was a triable issue as to whether the officers failed to reasonably accommodate plaintiff's disability; and the court vacated summary judgment on plaintiff's state law claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged BOEM's Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) analyzing the environmental effects of proposed oil and gas development in the Chukchi Sea off the coast of Alaska. The court concluded that BOEM has reasonably concluded that the missing information from the FEIS and Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) was not "essential" to informed decisionmaking at the lease sale stage. The court concluded, however, that BOEM acted arbitrarily and capriciously by estimating that one billion barrels of oil would be economically recoverable where BOEM did not provide an adequate explanation of its selection. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Native Village of Point Hope v. Jewell" on Justia Law

The State entered into an agreement allowing Big Lagoon to operate a casino on a certain parcel of land. On appeal, the State challenged the district court's order requiring the State to negotiate with Big Lagoon under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721. Under Carcieri v. Salazar, the BIA lacked authority to acquire land in trust for tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The court concluded that the only reasonable construction of section 2710(d)(3)(A) is that a tribe's right to request negotiations depends on its having jurisdiction over Indian lands on which it proposes to conduct class III gaming; the State did not waive the "Indian lands" requirement; the land at issue was not "Indian lands" because there was no family or other group on what is now the Big Lagoon in 1934; and, therefore, pursuant to Carcieri, Big Lagoon was not such a tribe. Accordingly, Big Lagoon cannot demand negotiations to conduct gaming on the land and cannot sue to compel negotiations if the State fails to negotiate in good faith. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Big Lagoon Rancheria v. State of California" on Justia Law

This litigation arose from the City's recent efforts to complete its power system expansion plan first conceived in 1972 and re-affirmed in 2007. The City owns and operates Idaho Falls Power. Alliance sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the City lacked the power to condemn property outside its boundaries for the purpose of building electric transmission lines. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Alliance, finding that Idaho law did not grant the City (or, by extension, IFP) the power to condemn property outside its corporate limits for the purpose of constructing the transmission lines. Because the power to exercise eminent domain extraterritorially for the purpose of constructing electric transmission lines (1) has not been expressly granted to the City by the state, (2) cannot be fairly implied from the powers that the City has been given by the state, and (3) is not essential to accomplishing the City's objects and purposes, the City does not have that power. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Alliance v. City of Idaho Falls" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute regarding plaintiffs' membership in an Indian tribe. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin preliminarily the enforcement of a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) order upholding the Band's decision to disenroll descendants of plaintiffs from the San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians and whether such injunctive relief could issue in the Band's absence. The court held that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper, and that the Band was not a required party for the adjudication of the claims underlying the preliminary injunction because they concerned solely the propriety of final agency action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Band's motions to dismiss the claims on which the injunction rests and its consequent refusal to dissolve the preliminary injunction; remanded to allow the district court to formally clarify its order in compliance with the court's understanding of it; and concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to review on interlocutory appeal the Band's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' other claims, on which the district court expressly deferred ruling. View "Alto, et al. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Eugene, the Police Department (EPD), and others, alleging that they violated his First Amendment rights when they removed him from his position on the EPD K-9 team in retaliation for repeatedly airing concerns about work-related safety issues to his supervisors. The court concluded that the evidence presented to the jury did not reasonably permit the conclusion that plaintiff established a retaliation claim where, as here, a public employee reports departmental-safety concerns to his or her supervisors pursuant to a duty to do so, that employee did not speak as a private citizen and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and held that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hagen v. City of Eugene, et al." on Justia Law