Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Secretary appealed the district court's order certifying a nationwide class of Medicare beneficiaries and granting summary judgment in the beneficiaries' favor. The beneficiaries raised two claims: (1) the Secretary's practice of demand "up front" reimbursement for secondary payments from beneficiaries who have appealed a reimbursement determination or sought waiver of the reimbursement obligation was inconsistent with the secondary payer provisions of the Medicare statutory scheme; and (2) the Secretary's practice violated their due process rights. The court concluded that Patricia Haro had Article III standing on behalf of the class; John Balentine, as counsel for Haro, had Article III standing on his individual claim; and the beneficiaries' claims for injunctive relief were not moot and Article III's justiciability requirements were satisfied. The court concluded, however, that the beneficiaries' claim was not adequately presented to the agency at the administrative level and therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). On the merits of Balentine's claim, the court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation of the secondary payer provisions was reasonable. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's injunctions, reversed the district court's summary judgment order, and remanded for consideration of the beneficiaries' due process claim. View "Haro v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Dandino petitioned under 49 U.S.C. 521(b)(9) for review of an order of the FMCSA affirming a civil penalty to Dandino for transporting goods after the agency had revoked its operating authority and before that authority was reinstated. The court held that, for purposes of section 521(b)(9), when a final agency order was mailed to a party, and there was no proof of actual receipt, there was a rebuttable presumption that the order was received within three days of mailing. Applying this holding to these circumstances, the court concluded that Dandino's petition was timely. However, on the merits, the court concluded that Dandino's concession that it operated "without the required operating authority" was dispositive of its petition on the merits. The court rejected Dandino's remaining claim and dismissed the petition for review. View "Dandino, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Applicants sought a four-month exemption from the per page Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system fee. At issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to review the district court's administrative order denying the exemption. The court held that 28 U.S.C. 1291 necessarily refers to final decisions of a judicial character, not to administrative actions outside the scope of the litigative function. Because the order denying applicants a PACER fee exemption came before the court strictly in an administrative context, the court could not review under section 1291. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "In re: Application for Exemption from Electronic Public Access Fees" on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood and others filed suit challenging Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-196.05(B) as a violation of the federal Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-196.05(B) barred patients eligible for the state's Medicaid program from obtaining covered family planning services through health care providers who performed abortions in cases other than medical necessity, rape, or incest. The court concluded that the district court's entry of final judgment and a permanent injunction mooted Arizona's appeal of the district court's preliminary injunction. Therefore, the court dismissed that appeal (Case No. 12-17558), and considered only Arizona's appeal of the summary judgment order and permanent injunction (Case No. 13-15506). The court held that the Medicaid Act's free-choice-of-provider requirement conferred a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court also held that the Arizona statute contravenes the Medicaid Act's requirement that states give Medicaid recipients a free choice of qualified provider. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment and permanent injunction. View "Planned Parenthood v. Betlach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the EPA's permit allowing Shell to construct, operate, and conduct "pollutant emitting activities" associated with a drill vessel (the "Kulluk") in the Beaufort Sea off Alaska's North Slope. The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that the Environmental Appeals Board's (EAB) Decision was not entitled to Chevron deference; Section 7661c(e) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7661c(e), was ambiguous, and the EPA's interpretation was reasonable under the applicable statutes' plain language; the court owed Chevron deference to the EAB Decision not to require a preconstruction increment analysis for the "Kulluk;" and the EPA permissibly granted a 500-meter exemption to the "Kulluk" from "ambient air" standards. View "Alaska Wilderness League v. EPA" on Justia Law

This case concerned the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a government program created to help distressed homeowners with delinquent mortgages. At issue was whether Wells Fargo was contractually required to offer plaintiffs a permanent mortgage modification after they complied with the requirements of a trial period plan (TPP). Following the Seventh Circuit, the court held that Wells Fargo was required to offer the modification. The district court should not have dismissed plaintiffs' complaints when the record showed that Wells Fargo had accepted and retained the payments demanded by the TPP, but neither offered a permanent modification, nor notified plaintiffs they were not entitled to one, as required by the terms of the TPP. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A." on Justia Law

This case involves a federal rent-subsidy program for Indian Tribes and Tribally Designated Housing Entities (TDHE) that lease housing to Indians. Fort Belknap, a TDHE, petitioned for review of HUD's decision to withhold overpayments from future program payments. The court held that 25 U.S.C. 4161(d) allows an appeal only when HUD takes action pursuant to section 4161(a). In this instance, because HUD has taken no action pursuant to section 4161(a), the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fort Belknap v. Office of Pub. & Indian Hous." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed suit claiming that the USCIS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and the Due Process Clause, by denying the husband's I-130 petition without affording them the opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff's ex-husband regarding his statement that their marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that there was no statutory right of cross-examination in I-130 visa adjudications. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs' due process rights were violated where the immediate relative status for an alien spouse was a right to which citizen applicants were entitled and that protected interest was entitled to the protections of due process; plaintiffs' showed sufficient prejudice; and additional process was due in this case pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the due process claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ching v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Environmental groups challenged the BLM's Resource Management Plan (RMP) for the Upper Missouri River Breaks National Monument. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs' Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1782(a), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), claims; held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. 470f, claims; and vacated that portion of the judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the NHPA claim and to enter an appropriate order requiring BLM to conduct Class III surveys with respect to roads, ways, and airstrips that have not been subject to recent Class III surveys. View "Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Connell" on Justia Law

The FBI appealed the district court's order granting Shura Council's motion for sanctions under Rule 11(c). The FBI had already "corrected" the challenged pleadings and provided all the information it was obligated to provide to the district court before Shura Council filed its motion for sanctions. Shura Council moved for sanctions long after the district court had ruled on the adequacy of the government's eventual compliance, and a fortiori after it had ruled the FBI's original response had been inadequate and misleading. The motion for sanctions was made after "judicial rejection of the offending contention." Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the award of fees. View "Islamic Shura Council of So. Cal. v. FBI" on Justia Law