Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerned applications to transfer water rights from agricultural land in the Newlands Reclamation Project to the Carson Lake and Pasture, a wildlife refuge located within the Lahontan Valley wetlands at the terminus of the Carson River. At issue was whether diverting water to wetlands in order to sustain wildlife habitat constituted "irrigation." Concluding that the Tribe had Article III standing, the court held that diversion of water for waterfowl habitat was not "irrigation" within the meaning of the Alpine decree. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Nevada" on Justia Law

The Tribe and CTGW brought suit against the County for imposing property taxes on the Great Wolf Lodge located on the Grand Mound Property, which was tribal land held in trust by the government. At issue was whether state and local governments have the power to tax permanent improvements built on non-reservation land owned by the United States and held in trust for an Indian tribe. The court concluded that Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones made it clear that where the United States owns land covered by 21 U.S.C. 465, and holds it in trust for the use of a tribe, section 465 exempts permanent improvements on that land from state and local taxation. Accordingly, under Mescalero, the County was barred from taxing the Great Wolf Lodge during the time in which the Grand Mound Property was owned by the United States and held in trust under section 465. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the County. View "Chehalis Tribes v. Thurston Cnty." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that police officers used excessive force which resulted in her son's death. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The court held that the district court did not correctly conclude as a matter of law that the pre- and post-handcuffing conduct of defendants did not violate the son's constitutional rights and that no negligence occurred. The standard used by the district court was not correct where the district court judge's analysis was infected by impermissible credibility assessments. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The court declined to reassign the case where, despite the district court judge's error of law, the court had no reason to believe that the judge would be unable fairly and correctly to apply the Rule 50(a) standard on remand. View "Krechman v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

After the court reversed and remanded for an award of social security disability benefits to plaintiff, plaintiff moved for an award of attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying the fees where the government's underlying action was not substantially justified in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion and remanded for an award of fees and costs. View "Meier v. Colvin" on Justia Law

This appeal involved litigation over how much water from the Truckee and Carson Rivers should be diverted to irrigation and how much should flow into Pyramid Lake for the benefit of the Tribe. At issue was the court's ruling in United States v. Bell, which concerned the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID). The court concluded that it's understanding of the scope of the gauge error claim - the margin of error with respect to the gauges that measured the flow of the diversions - in Bell was mistaken and the court should have ordered recalculation of the gauge error's impact in all the years potentially affected. Accordingly, the court withdrew its earlier mandate and clarified it by ordering the district court to recalculate the effect of gauge error, not only for the years, 1974, 1975, 1978, and 1979, but for the years 1973, 1976, 1985, and 1986 as well, to determine the amount of any excess diversions. View "United States v. Board of Directors" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a conservationist organization, filed suit under the Clean Water Act (the "Act"), 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1), alleging that defendants violated a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit that governed industrial storm water discharges at three scrap metal recycling facilities that defendants operated. Defendants claimed that two statutory bars, 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(6)(A)(i)-(iii) and 1365(b)(1)(B), prohibited plaintiff's citizen suit. The court concluded that section 1365(b)(1)(B) did not bar this action because the 2007 and 2008 proceedings aimed to enforce only laws other than the Act. The court also concluded that the statutory bar under section 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) did not apply to plaintiff's claims because California has commenced no administrative penalty proceeding that was comparable to a proceeding by the EPA under section 1319(g). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cal. Sportfishing v. Chico Scrap Metal" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concerned the 1999 Final Rules, identifying which navigable waters within Alaska constituted "public lands," promulgated by the Secretaries to implement part of the Alaska National Interstate Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. 3101-3233. The court concluded that Katie John I was a problematic solution to a complex problem, in that it sanctioned the use of a doctrine ill-fitted to determining which Alaskan waters were "public lands" to be managed for rural subsistence priority under ANILCA; but Katie John I remains the law of this circuit and the court, like the Secretaries, must apply it the best it can; in the 1999 Rules, the Secretaries have applied Katie John I and the federal reserved water rights doctrine in a principled manner; it was reasonable for the Secretaries to decide that the "public lands" subject to ANILCA's rural subsistence priority included the waters within and adjacent to federal reservations; and reserved water rights for Alaska Native Settlement allotments were best determined on a case-by-case basis. View "John v. Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund" on Justia Law

The Clinics filed suit challenging California Welfare and Institutions Code 14131.10, which eliminated certain Medi-Cal benefits that the state deemed optional, including adult dental, podiatry, optometry, and chiropractic services. The court reversed the district court's holding that the Clinics have a private right of action to challenge the Department's implementation of the state plan amendments (SPA) prior to obtaining approval; affirmed that the Clinics have a private right of action to bring a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the validity of section 14131.10; and reversed the district court's interpretation of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq., holding that section 14131.10 impermissibly eliminated mandatory services from coverage. View "California Ass'n of Rural Health Clinics v. Douglas" on Justia Law

The Canal Authority appealed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Interior, Bureau, San Luis, and Wetlands, in a suit to establish priority water rights under Central Valley Project (CVP) water service contracts. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that all claims arising before February 11, 2004 were time-barred and that Canal Authority was not entitled to priority water allocation under the CVP contracts. The court affirmed the district court's decision on the alternative basis that California Water Code 11460 did not require the Bureau to provide CVP contractors priority water rights, because contracts between the Canal Authority and Bureau contained provisions that specifically address allocation of water during shortage periods. View "Tehama-Colusa Canal Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior" on Justia Law

The Committee filed suit seeking a declaration that certain portions of a Montana statute making it a criminal offense for any political party to "endorse, contribute to, or make an expenditure to support or oppose a judicial candidate" in a nonpartisan judicial election, Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-231, were unconstitutional and requesting an injunction against its enforcement. The court concluded that, to the extent appellants challenged the permanent injunction against enforcement of section 13-35-231's ban on endorsements and expenditures, the court was bound to follow its published decision finding those provisions unconstitutional. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's entry of a permanent injunction as it pertains to those portions of the statute. However, the district court mistakenly entered a permanent injunction against the enforcement of section 13-35-231 in its entirety. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to revise the permanent injunction so that it enjoined only the statute's ban on endorsements and expenditures, and not the statute's ban on contributions. View "Sanders Cnty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Fox, et al." on Justia Law