Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

These cases arose out of the energy crisis of 2000-2002. Plaintiffs, retail buyers of natural gas, alleged that defendants, natural gas traders, manipulated the price of natural gas by reporting false information to price indices published by trade publications and engaging in wash sales. The court held that the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717 et seq., did not preempt plaintiffs' state antitrust claims, and reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. The 2003 enactment of FERC's Code of Conduct did not affect the court's conclusion that the NGA did not grant FERC jurisdiction over claims arising out of false price reporting and other anticompetitive behavior associated with nonjurisdictional sales. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Heartland Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend to add a treble damages state law claim and therefore affirmed the district court's order denying that motion. The court reversed the district court's order dismissing the AEP Defendants from the Wisconsin Arandell case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the plain text of Wisconsin Statutes 133.14 allowed recovery only by plaintiffs who were direct purchasers under the voided contract, the court affirmed the district court's order granting partial summary judgment to DETM. View "In re: Western States Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

In 2001, petitioner fell from a barge to a dry dock while working as a ship laborer. He then filed a workers' compensation claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-950, for the injuries from his fall. In 2003, petitioner shot himself in the head, causing severe injuries. Petitioner also sought compensation for these injuries under the Act, alleging that his suicide attempt resulted from his 2001 fall and the litigation over that claim. The Benefits Review Board subsequently affirmed the ALJ's denial of benefits. The court held, however, that evidence that a claimant planned his suicide did not necessarily preclude compensation under the Act because the proper inquiry was whether the claimant's work-related injury caused him to attempt suicide. In this case, the ALJ erroneously applied the irresistible impulse test instead of the chain of causation test. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the question was whether there was a direct and unbroken chain of causation between petitioner's work-related injury and his suicide attempt. View "Kealoha v. Office of Workers Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

ANI, a risk retention group, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Commissioner and the Division of Insurance under 42 U.S.C. 1983. ANI claimed that an order of the Commissioner violated the Liability Risk Retention Act (LRRA), 15 U.S.C. 3902(a)(1). The court held that the Commissioner's Order, which barred ANI from writing first dollar liability insurance policies in Nevada, was preempted by the LRRA. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's entry of declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of ANI. However, the LRRA did not confer a right to be free from state law that could be enforced under 42 U.S.C. 1983, making fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 unavailable. Thus, the court vacated the fee award. Finally, the court remanded so that the district court could enter a new summary judgment order consistent with this opinion. View "Alliance of Nonprofits for Ins. v. Kipper, et al" on Justia Law

Firebaugh claimed that a lack of adequate drainage in part of the Central Valley Project (CVP) caused poor quality water flow into its service area. Firebaugh argued that Interior should be ordered to provide the necessary drainage or, alternatively, to pay money damages. The court held that Interior's broad discretion in matters of drainage precluded both claims. Firebaugh's proposals did not involve discrete actions that Interior was legally required to take; rather, they involved matters of discretion and, as such were beyond the scope of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(1). Providing irrigation water without concomitantly providing adequate drainage for it was a discretionary function and, therefore, not actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2674. View "Firebaugh Canal Water District, et al v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the City of Lancaster under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Article I, Section 4 of the California Constitution, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief from the City's policy of permitting prayers that mention Jesus. Plaintiffs argued that both the invocation at issue and the City's prayer policy amounted to an establishment of religion. The invocation did not proselytize, advance, or disparage any faith. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the City, through its prayer practice, placed its official seal of approval on Christianity where the City has taken every feasible precaution to ensure its own evenhandedness. Therefore, the court held that the district court correctly determined that neither the invocation at issue nor the City's prayer policy constituted an unconstitutional establishment of religion. For the same reasons that plaintiffs' First Amendment claim failed, their state claim failed as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rubin, et al v. City of Lancaster" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and others sought and received LASIK eye surgery with a Nidek EC-5000 Excimer Laser System ("Laser") to correct farsightedness. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals, claimed that, had they known that the FDA had not approved the Laser for this use, they would not have consented to the surgeries. The court held that the complaint did not state a claim under the California Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation Act, Cal. Health & Saf. Code 24171 et seq., because the surgeries were not "medical experiments" subject to the protection of the Act. Plaintiff did not have standing to sue for injunctive relief under the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code 1750 et seq., and his other substantive claim was preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq. Plaintiff's common-law fraud by omission claim was expressly preempted by the preemption provision in the Medical Device Amendments. Even if it were not, it was impliedly preempted because it amounted to an attempt to privately enforce the FDCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "Perez, et al v. Nidek Co., Ltd., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against the Chief of Police and the City under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim. Plaintiff, a police officer for the City, led a no-confidence vote of the police officers' union against the Chief. The Chief subsequently delayed signing an application for a certification that would have entitled plaintiff to a five percent salary increase. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that plaintiff failed to meet his burden under Garcetti v. Ceballos, to show that he undertook his act as a private citizen and not pursuant to his official duties. The court disagreed and held that plaintiff had established a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation. Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Chief and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City because plaintiff did not adduce sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on his Monnell claim. View "Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, et al" on Justia Law

The government sought to forfeit two bundles of currency in the amounts of $11,500 and $2,971. Only one contrary claim was filed regarding both sets of currency. The district court concluded that the claimant failed to comply with Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule G(5)(a)(iii), which required that a claim filed by a person asserting an interest as a bailee must identify the bailor. The court agreed with the district court that the requirement applied to the claimant, even though he initially asserted a different interest. The court concluded, however, that striking his claim based on that transgression was not mandatory but was instead subject to the sound exercise of discretion by the court. In this case, the dismissal of the claim to the $11,500 for that failure was an abuse of discretion, primarily because the omission did not prejudice the government or extend the forfeiture proceedings. The court further concluded that, even though the government had not given timely notice in regards to both sets of currency, the government was not required in these circumstances to return the property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the government regarding the portion of currency amounting to $2,971. The court vacated the judgment in favor of the government as to the $11,500 portion and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Guerrero, et al" on Justia Law

FHFA, the regulator and conservator of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (the Enterprises), issued a "directive" preventing the Enterprises from buying mortgages on properties encumbered by liens made under so-called property-assessed clean energy (PACE) programs. Plaintiffs contended that FHFA was acting as a regulator, and not a conservator. As a regulator, plaintiffs contended that FHFA must issue a regulation to effectuate its order. The court concluded that FHFA's decision to cease purchasing mortgages on PACE-encumbered properties was a lawful exercise of its statutory authority as conservator of the Enterprises. Because the courts have no jurisdiction to review such actions, the court vacated the district court's order and dismissed the case. View "County of Sonoma, et al v. FHFA, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants enforced two local ordinances in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. The court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for retrospective relief because those claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief because those claims have not been mooted by defendants' voluntary conduct; the court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment challenges; and the court held that jurisdiction existed as to plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims and remanded for a consideration of the merits in the first instance. View "Bell, et al v. City of Boise, et al" on Justia Law