Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in 2020, which authorized the transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by rail in newly designed tank cars without requiring a permit. LNG is a hazardous material that poses significant risks if released, including explosions, fires, and the formation of ultra-cold gas clouds. The rule did not limit the number of LNG tank cars per train or set a mandatory speed limit, raising safety concerns among various stakeholders.The rule was challenged by a coalition of environmental nonprofits, several states, and the Puyallup Tribe of Indians. They argued that PHMSA did not adequately consider the safety risks and that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) required the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The petitioners contended that the decision not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that PHMSA's decision not to prepare an EIS was indeed arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that transporting LNG by rail poses a low-probability but high-consequence risk of derailment, which could result in catastrophic environmental impacts. The court emphasized that PHMSA failed to adequately consider the probability and potential consequences of such accidents and did not impose sufficient safety measures, such as a mandatory speed limit or a cap on the number of LNG tank cars per train.The court held that PHMSA's failure to prepare an EIS violated NEPA and vacated the LNG Rule, remanding the case to PHMSA for further proceedings. The court's decision underscores the importance of thoroughly assessing environmental risks and adhering to NEPA's requirements in rulemaking processes. View "Sierra Club v. DOT" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) grant of an abandonment incentive to ITC Midwest, LLC (ITC). This incentive allows ITC to recover 100% of its prudently incurred costs if a planned transmission project is abandoned for reasons beyond its control. Petitioners, a group of organizations whose members purchase electricity, argued that ITC's ownership of the project was uncertain due to ongoing litigation challenging the Iowa Right of First Refusal statute.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved ITC's request for the abandonment incentive, finding that the project met the necessary criteria, including enhancing reliability and reducing congestion. Petitioners filed a protest, which FERC rejected, stating that regulatory or litigation uncertainty does not preclude granting an abandonment incentive. Petitioners then sought rehearing, which FERC also denied, reiterating that the approval was consistent with its precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that petitioners lacked Article III standing because they failed to show imminent injury from FERC's orders. The court noted that petitioners' claims of potential future higher rates were speculative and not concrete or imminent. The court also found that petitioners' interest in the proper application of the law and potential collateral estoppel effects did not constitute a cognizable injury. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Industrial Energy Consumers of America v. FERC" on Justia Law

Aclara Meters LLC owned the license for the Somersworth Hydroelectric Project on the Salmon Falls River between New Hampshire and Maine from 2016 to 2023. In 2019, Aclara sought to surrender its license to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). After conducting an environmental assessment, FERC authorized the surrender in 2023. American Whitewater, a conservation organization, requested a rehearing, arguing that two dams from the Project should be removed as a condition of surrender. FERC denied the request, leading Whitewater to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for relief, claiming that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).The Commission's environmental assessment concluded that approving the surrender as proposed would not significantly affect the environment, thus an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was unnecessary. FERC found that removing the dams was unfeasible due to the local municipalities' reliance on the reservoir for water supply and other needs. The Commission also determined that the benefits of keeping the dams outweighed the environmental and recreational benefits of their removal. FERC's decision was based on the public interest, considering the water supply, firefighting needs, and potential impacts on local infrastructure.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and denied Whitewater's petition for review. The court held that FERC's analysis was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Commission reasonably determined that dam removal was unfeasible and appropriately assessed the public interest. The court found that FERC's decision to approve the license surrender without dam removal was supported by substantial evidence and consistent with its policies and precedents. View "American Whitewater v. FERC" on Justia Law

Environmental groups requested records from the EPA that the agency had previously obtained from power plants under Section 308 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1318(a), (b). The records requested are exempt from disclosure under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4), but seemingly must be disclosed under Section 308. At issue was what statute prevailed. The DC Circuit held that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 559, directly addressed the issue. Section 559 provides that FOIA exemptions apply unless a later statute expressly supersedes or modifies those exemptions. In this case, section 308 is the later statute. Because section 308 does not expressly supersede Exemption 4, EPA impermissibly invoked Exemption 4 to deny the FOIA requests. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA" on Justia Law

OFAC is authorized to impose civil penalties against any person who exports goods to a third party who it has reason to know intends to send them to Iran. At issue was whether OFAC must also show that the goods actually ended up in Iran. The DC Circuit held that the government need not make that showing and affirmed the district court on that ground. However, the court held that OFAC did not adequately explain parts of its determination that the exporter in this case had reason to know that its shipments would be sent on to Iran. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order granting the government defendants' motion for summary judgment as to OFAC's determination that Epsilon's 34 shipments to Asra International between August 2008 and March 2011 violated section 560.204 of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. The court reversed as to OFAC's determination that Epsilon's five shipments to Asra International in 2012 violated the same regulation. The court remanded with instructions. View "Epsilon Electronics v. US Department of Treasury" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the Army unlawfully relieved him of command in retaliation for whistleblowing, in violation of the Military Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988, 10 U.S.C. 1034. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the decision of the Chief of Staff for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The DC Circuit ordered this action to be transferred to district court, holding that nothing in section 1034 or any other provision of the Act provides for direct review in the courts of appeal. View "Rodriguez v. Penrod" on Justia Law

Neustar petitioned for review of the FCC's orders naming another company, Telcordia, to replace it as the Local Number Portability Administrator (LNPA). The DC Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to hear Neustar's petition; the Order did not qualify as a rule, and there was no requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking when selecting the LNPA; neither the FCC's neutrality determination nor its cost analysis was arbitrary and capricious; and the FCC's Best and Final Offers (BAFO) determination was not arbitrary and capricious. Because the court found no error in the FCC's decision, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Neustar, Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

Riverkeeper petitioned for review of FERC's Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity conditionally approving the Leidy Project. The DC Circuit denied the petition and held that it had jurisdiction to consider Riverkeeper's challenge to the Certificate Order on the ground that FERC violated the sequencing requirement of the Clean Water Act (CWA) by issuing its Certificate Order before Pennsylvania issued its section 401 certification; the sequencing requirement of section 401 was not triggered because the Commission's conditional approval of the Leidy Project construction did not authorize any activity which might result in a discharge in navigable waters; the court need not decide whether the letter orders impermissibly approved activity that might have resulted in a discharge before Pennsylvania issued its section 401 certification; FERC did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by misclassifying wetlands; even if FERC technically erred in some of its classifications, Riverkeeper has not shown any prejudice; and FERC's NEPA review of the Leidy Project's proposed gas flow velocities appeared to be fully informed and well-considered. View "Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. FERC" on Justia Law

Section 309 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 825h, vests the Commission with broad remedial authority, including the authority to grant recoupment when it is justified; Section 201(f) does not limit the authority of the Commission to grant relief under Section 309 with respect to matters that are beyond the strictures of Sections 201(f) and 205; and an order of recoupment, as distinguished from an order to refund under Section 205, is beyond the strictures of Sections 201(f) and 205. In this case, Chehalis sought relief from the Commission by filing a Motion for an Order Requiring Recoupment of Payments, but the Commission concluded that it could not order recoupment because the Commission's refund authority does not extend to exempt public utilities such as the Intervenor Bonneville. The DC Circuit held that the Commission erred when it held that it lacked the authority to grant the Order Requiring Recoupment where the Commission clearly had jurisdiction over the subject of this dispute and the Commission retained the authority to order Bonneville to return the funds when the agency acknowledged that its initial order was mistaken. The court granted in part and denied in part Chehalis's petitions for review, and remanded for further proceedings. View "TNA Merchant Projects v. FERC" on Justia Law

The FAA's Registration Rule requires the owners of small unmanned aircraft operated for recreational purposes (model aircraft) to register with the FAA. Advisory Circular 91-57A announced that model aircraft would be subject to certain flight restrictions in the Washington, D.C., area. The DC Circuit granted the petition for review in this case, vacating the Registration Rule to the extent it applies to model aircraft because Section 336(a) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, 49 U.S.C. 40101 note, states that the FAA "may not promulgate any rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft." The DC Circuit held that petitioner's challenge to the Advisory Circular was untimely and petitioner did not have reasonable grounds for the late filing. View "Taylor v. Huerta" on Justia Law