Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Russia invaded and subsequently asserted control over Crimea, an area internationally recognized as part of Ukraine. Ukrainian businesses operating in Crimea—including an electricity distributor and a group of petrol station owners—had their assets seized and operations transferred to Russian-controlled entities without compensation. These businesses, having made investments under Ukrainian law and while the 1998 Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments (“Investment Treaty”) was in effect, pursued arbitration against Russia for expropriation and treaty violations.The Ukrainian companies initiated separate arbitrations under the Investment Treaty’s arbitration clause. The arbitral tribunals found Russia liable for breaches and awarded significant damages to the companies. Russia challenged the arbitral jurisdiction and the awards in foreign courts, but those efforts were unsuccessful. The companies then filed petitions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the awards under the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act. Russia moved to dismiss, arguing the courts lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The District Court rejected Russia’s arguments, finding jurisdiction appropriate under the FSIA’s arbitration exception and personal jurisdiction proper upon valid service.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court correctly exercised jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied because the companies established the existence of an arbitration agreement, a qualifying arbitral award, and a treaty potentially governing enforcement. The court further held that foreign states are not entitled to the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections against personal jurisdiction. The judgments of the District Court were affirmed. View "Stabil LLC v. Russian Federation" on Justia Law

A Jordanian business entity entered into an agreement with the Republic of Iraq in 1995 to settle Iraq’s unpaid debt for delivered goods by providing specified quantities of sulfur and urea, valued at $53 million. The agreement contemplated delivery at the Iraq-Jordan border, and although the supplier anticipated reselling these materials in the United States, this downstream transaction was not included in the written agreement. Iraq did not fulfill its obligations under the agreement, leading the supplier to pursue payment through interactions with Iraqi officials, who orally acknowledged the debt and suggested legal action might facilitate payment.After Iraq failed to deliver the goods, the supplier obtained a judgment in its favor from a Jordanian court in 2015 for the full amount. The Jordanian Court of Cassation affirmed the judgment. However, when the supplier sought to enforce the judgment in Jordan, the Jordanian Court of Appeal held that Iraq had not waived its sovereign immunity in the enforcement proceeding, preventing collection. Iraq has not satisfied any part of the judgment.The supplier then initiated an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking recognition of the Jordanian judgment. Iraq moved to dismiss, invoking sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court found that no FSIA exception applied and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that Iraq had not made an explicit waiver of immunity and that Iraq’s conduct did not cause a direct effect in the United States as required by the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. Thus, the supplier’s claim is barred by Iraq’s sovereign immunity. View "Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

A provider of energy efficient resources (EERs), which are projects that reduce electrical consumption, challenged a decision by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approving a change to PJM Interconnection LLC’s tariff. PJM manages the electrical grid in parts of thirteen states and the District of Columbia, and it operates capacity auctions to ensure reliable electricity supply. Historically, EERs were allowed to bid in these auctions for up to four consecutive years to compensate for a lag in PJM’s statistical model (load forecast), which previously did not account for new EERs’ impact on energy consumption. In 2016, PJM updated its model to capture these effects in real time, removing the need for EERs to participate in the auctions.In 2024, PJM proposed a tariff amendment to exclude EERs from future capacity auctions, citing the improved accuracy of its load forecast and the unnecessary costs imposed on consumers by double-counting EERs’ effects. FERC approved this amendment, finding it would lower costs for consumers without compromising grid reliability. Affirmed Energy LLC, an EER aggregator, protested, arguing that the amendment was unlawfully retroactive and arbitrary and capricious, as it would disrupt settled expectations and reliance interests, particularly for projects that had already cleared prior auctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that FERC’s orders were not retroactive because they only applied to future auctions and did not strip EER providers of entitlements to past payments or auction results. The court also found that FERC had reasonably evaluated PJM’s updated forecast, weighed the reliance interests at stake, and explained why the amendment was justified. The petition for review was denied. View "Affirmed Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Empower Oversight Whistleblowers & Research, a nonprofit organization, filed a motion to intervene in a closed grand jury proceeding and sought to unseal Department of Justice applications for non-disclosure orders related to a 2017 grand jury subpoena for Google account records. At the time of the subpoena, Jason Foster, Empower’s founder, was the Chief Investigative Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee, investigating alleged misconduct at the Department. Google notified Foster in 2023 that a subpoena and non-disclosure order had been issued and extended multiple times. Empower argued that the applications should be unsealed, claiming they were judicial records subject to public access under common law and the First Amendment, and that grand jury secrecy had been waived due to public disclosures.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia permitted Empower to intervene but granted only partial unsealing. It held that the applications were ancillary grand jury records protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6), limiting unsealing to jurisdictional and legal standard sections. The court found no waiver of secrecy, as disclosures were not sufficiently public to meet the threshold established by precedent. Most of the documents remained sealed, and Empower appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the applications were covered by Rule 6(e)(6), which displaces any common law or First Amendment right of access, and that grand jury secrecy had not been waived by the disclosures identified by Empower. The court also declined to review new evidence (the December 2024 OIG report) not presented to the district court but remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether to allow Empower to amend its motion and supplement the record with the OIG report. View "In re: Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2705(b)" on Justia Law

A family that inherited a renowned art collection in Hungary prior to World War II sought to recover dozens of valuable artworks seized by the Hungarian government and its Nazi collaborators during the Holocaust. The heirs, who became citizens of the United States and other countries, alleged that the majority of the collection was confiscated during the Nazi occupation and dispersed across Europe and later deposited at Hungarian institutions. Some pieces were returned to the family after the war, only to be retaken by the government under various circumstances, including criminal forfeiture and postwar policies.The heirs initially pursued their claims in Hungarian courts without success. In 2010, they sued the Republic of Hungary and several Hungarian museums in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation and commercial activity exceptions. The district court partly dismissed the claims on international comity grounds but retained jurisdiction over most artworks. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the comity dismissal and affirmed jurisdiction on different grounds. Subsequent rulings narrowed the scope of claims, particularly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, which clarified the FSIA’s expropriation exception and incorporated the domestic-takings rule, limiting jurisdiction over property taken from a sovereign’s own nationals.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over the family’s claims. The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish that the seizure of their artwork violated the international law of expropriation, as required by the FSIA. It found no international authority supporting jurisdiction for wartime or stateless-person takings, and that treaties and the domestic-takings rule further barred the claims. The court affirmed the district court’s complete dismissal of the litigation. View "De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary" on Justia Law

The case centers on the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), which transports crude oil from Alaska’s North Slope, with oil from different shippers being commingled in the pipeline. To address variations in oil quality, a “Quality Bank” compensates shippers who inject higher-quality oil and charges those with lower-quality oil. The valuation of one particular oil component, Resid—the heaviest and least valuable cut—has been disputed for decades. Petro Star, a shipper whose refineries lack specialized units to further process Resid, argued that Resid was undervalued, while ConocoPhillips contended it was overvalued. The TAPS owners, who administer the Quality Bank, also challenged a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) finding that the Bank’s administrator violated tariff provisions.Following a 2013 FERC investigation into the Resid valuation formula, both Petro Star and ConocoPhillips intervened, seeking changes. After initial FERC findings were remanded for further explanation by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, FERC held additional hearings. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded the formula was just and reasonable, and FERC largely affirmed this result, also finding a tariff violation by the Quality Bank administrator for failing to update formula yields based on monthly Resid testing.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s formula for valuing Resid remains just and reasonable, as neither Petro Star nor ConocoPhillips demonstrated the formula to be unjust or unreasonable. The court also upheld FERC’s finding that the Quality Bank administrator violated the tariff by not updating formula yields with each test, but found FERC’s prospective remedy—requiring monthly testing and annual yield updates—was appropriate. The court denied all three petitions. View "Petro Star Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

This case concerns the Transportation Security Administration’s issuance of an emergency amendment that required certain airport operators to incorporate specific cybersecurity measures and controls into their airport security programs. The amendment, issued in March 2023, responded to increasing cyber threats to the aviation sector, including ransomware and foreign cyberattacks. Under the amendment, airports were required to identify critical systems, submit a cybersecurity implementation plan, and assess their effectiveness annually. The Spokane Airport Board, which operates Spokane International Airport, objected to the amendment on both procedural and substantive grounds.After the amendment was issued, the Spokane Airport Board petitioned the TSA for reconsideration, raising various objections. The TSA denied these petitions, upholding the emergency amendment. Spokane then filed a timely petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as provided by statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA’s order under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically considering whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review arguments not properly raised before the TSA, as required by statute. The court found that the objections Spokane did properly exhaust were meritless. It concluded that the TSA possesses broad statutory authority to regulate aviation security—including cybersecurity—in response to threats. The court also found that the emergency amendment was consistent with TSA regulations and was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied Spokane’s petition for review, leaving the TSA’s emergency cybersecurity amendment in effect. View "Spokane Airport Board v. TSA" on Justia Law

Two U.S. citizens petitioned for immigrant visas on behalf of their relatives. After each relative interviewed with a consular officer, their visa applications were placed in administrative processing, requiring additional information. Both applicants submitted the required information but experienced lengthy delays. Eventually, after sixteen months, one applicant and his spouse filed a complaint alleging unreasonable delay; the other applicant and his son did the same after seven months. Both sought to compel the Department of State to adjudicate the applications.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed both complaints for failure to state a claim. The court applied factors from Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC to determine whether there had been an unreasonable delay and ruled that neither complaint met the standard. The applicants appealed the dismissals.While the appeals were pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Department of State finished processing the applications: one applicant received his visa and entered the United States, while the other was refused a visa due to inadmissibility for terrorist activities, with no waiver available. The Court of Appeals held that these events rendered both appeals moot, as no effectual relief could be provided. The court found that neither of the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine—voluntary cessation or “capable of repetition yet evading review”—applied. The court vacated the judgments of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the cases as moot. The court also declined the appellants’ request to create a new exception to mootness for unreasonable delay claims. View "Mehneh v. Rubio" on Justia Law

PJM Interconnection, LLC, which manages electricity transmission across several Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states, conducted its 2024/2025 capacity auction based on certain published parameters intended to ensure sufficient capacity for future electricity needs. After bidding closed, PJM discovered an error in the Locational Delivery Area Reliability Requirement for the Delmarva Power & Light Company South Zone, which would result in inflated auction prices and excess capacity charges for consumers. PJM sought to amend its tariff to correct this issue before finalizing the auction results, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved PJM's request.Capacity suppliers challenged FERC’s approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which vacated the decision, finding that the amendment was retroactive and violated the filed-rate doctrine. FERC, complying with the Third Circuit’s mandate, directed PJM to proceed with the unamended tariff, resulting in higher costs for consumers. Following this, agencies, customers, and entities representing customers’ interests filed a complaint under section 206 of the Federal Power Act, seeking modification of the auction outcome. FERC denied the complaint, stating that the Third Circuit’s ruling foreclosed any relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders. The court held that FERC’s denial of the complaint was legally erroneous because the Third Circuit’s decision did not address whether FERC could use its section 206 authority to modify the auction result. The D.C. Circuit clarified that section 206(b) of the Federal Power Act provides a statutory exception to the general prohibition on retroactive rate changes. The court granted the petition for review, vacated FERC’s orders denying the complaint, and remanded the case to FERC for further proceedings. View "Maryland Office of People's Counsel v. FERC" on Justia Law

PJM Interconnection LLC manages an extensive electrical grid across thirteen states and the District of Columbia. To ensure competitive market conditions and compliance with regulatory standards, PJM employs Market Monitoring Analytics LLP as its independent market monitor (IMM). For several years, IMM attended meetings between PJM’s Board of Managers and the Liaison Committee, a nonvoting body designed to facilitate communication between PJM Members and the Board. However, PJM began enforcing the Liaison Committee’s charter provision, restricting attendance to end-use customers and regulated utilities, thereby excluding IMM from future meetings.After this exclusion, IMM filed a complaint with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), arguing that PJM’s action violated Section IV.G of its tariff, which IMM interpreted as granting it the right to participate in such stakeholder processes. FERC reviewed the complaint and dismissed it. The Commission determined that Section IV.G only applied to decision-making bodies within PJM that handle proposed revisions to tariffs or market rules, not to the Liaison Committee, which functions solely as a communication forum and does not engage in decision-making or voting.IMM subsequently petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of FERC’s decision. The Court, before addressing the merits, examined whether IMM had standing to challenge its exclusion. The Court held that IMM failed to demonstrate a concrete or particularized injury resulting from its inability to attend the Liaison Committee meetings, as IMM retained access to all market data required for its monitoring functions and had alternative avenues for communication with the Board. The Court further found that IMM had not shown any expenditure of resources to counteract the alleged harm. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to IMM’s lack of standing. View "Independent Market Monitor for PJM v. FERC" on Justia Law