Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima (Lima) and Rutas de Lima S.A.C. (Rutas) entered into a Concession Contract for the construction and operation of urban roads in Lima, Peru. Rutas agreed to finance and manage the project in exchange for toll revenue, while Lima was responsible for preliminary infrastructure activities. Subsequent agreements transferred these preliminary responsibilities to Rutas in exchange for toll rate increases. Social protests erupted in response to these increases, leading Lima to close a toll unit and refuse further rate hikes. Rutas initiated two international arbitrations, claiming Lima breached the contract. Lima argued the contract was void due to bribery by Rutas’s parent company, Odebrecht S.A.The District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after two arbitration tribunals ruled in favor of Rutas, finding insufficient evidence of corruption linked to the Concession Contract. Lima sought to vacate the arbitration awards, citing violations of U.S. public policy against corruption, fraud by Rutas in discovery, and misconduct by the second tribunal in excluding evidence. The District Court denied Lima’s petitions and confirmed the awards, concluding that Lima failed to prove the contract was obtained through bribery and that any alleged discovery misconduct did not prejudice Lima’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The court held that the arbitration tribunals’ findings were supported by the record and that there was no sufficient evidence linking Odebrecht’s bribes to the Concession Contract. The court also found no merit in Lima’s claims of discovery fraud and tribunal misconduct, noting that Lima suffered no prejudice from the exclusion of evidence. The court concluded that enforcing the arbitration awards did not violate U.S. public policy. View "Metropolitan Municipality of Lima v. Rutas De Lima S.A.C." on Justia Law

The case involves the Center for Biological Diversity and other petitioners challenging the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) Program for the years 2023, 2024, and 2025. The petitioners include environmental organizations, refiners, a renewable fuel producer, and a biofuel trade association. They argue that the EPA's rule, known as the Set Rule, fails to adequately address the environmental impacts, particularly greenhouse gas emissions and effects on endangered species.The lower court, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reviewed the EPA's RFS Program standards for 2020-2022 in a previous case, Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co. LLC v. EPA. In that case, the court upheld the EPA's standards. In the current case, the petitioners argue that the EPA did not adequately explain its reliance on outdated data for greenhouse gas emissions and failed to properly consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) regarding the impact on endangered species.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the EPA's use of outdated data for greenhouse gas emissions was arbitrary and capricious. The court also found that the FWS's concurrence with the EPA's determination that the Set Rule would have "no effect" on endangered species was not adequately explained. The court remanded the Set Rule to the EPA and FWS for further consideration and explanation without vacating the rule. The court denied the petitions of Neste and the Refiner Petitioners and dismissed SABR's petition for untimeliness and lack of standing. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Mady Marieluise Schubarth pursued compensation for land allegedly seized from her family in Soviet-occupied Germany after World War II. She sued BVVG Bodenverwertungs-und-Verwaltungs GmbH (BVVG), an agent of Germany, under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). BVVG argued that U.S. courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the taking was a domestic matter, not subject to the expropriation exception. The district court disagreed and denied BVVG’s motion to dismiss.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed Schubarth’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Germany but reversed and remanded as to BVVG, allowing the case to proceed. On remand, the district court directed jurisdictional discovery, and BVVG again moved to dismiss, claiming the expropriation was a domestic taking. The district court denied this motion, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of BVVG’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the 1945 expropriation of the Estate was not a domestic taking because it implicated both Germany and the Soviet Union, thus interfering with relations among states. The court concluded that the expropriation could not be considered a domestic taking and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the expropriation constituted a taking in violation of international law. View "Schubarth v. BVVG Bodenverwertungs- Und -Verwaltungs GMBH" on Justia Law

Kimball Wind, LLC operates a wind facility in Nebraska, generating electricity transmitted on a network owned by the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Before operations began, WAPA determined that a substation expansion was necessary to safely transmit the facility's electricity. WAPA offered to cover part of the expansion costs, requiring Kimball Wind to pay the rest. Kimball Wind agreed under protest, believing WAPA wrongfully made it responsible for most of the costs. Kimball Wind petitioned the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for an order directing WAPA to reimburse its contribution to the substation expansion.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission determined that section 211A of the Federal Power Act does not provide for the relief sought by Kimball Wind. The Commission found that Kimball Wind did not seek an order for transmission services, which is the sole form of relief provided by section 211A. Kimball Wind then filed a request for rehearing, arguing that the order was internally inconsistent and unsupported by substantial evidence. The Commission denied the request for rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the Commission that section 211A does not authorize the Commission to issue an order directing WAPA to reimburse Kimball Wind for its contribution to the substation expansion. The court found that Kimball Wind did not seek an order for transmission services, the only type of order the Commission may issue under section 211A. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review. View "Kimball Wind, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

David J. Rudometkin was found guilty of several offenses by a military judge in 2018 and sentenced to seventeen years of confinement. His post-trial motion for a mistrial was denied by another military judge after the original judge was suspended for inappropriate conduct. Rudometkin then submitted FOIA requests to the Army and the Department of Defense for records related to the judges involved. The government either did not respond meaningfully or rejected the requests under FOIA exemptions.Rudometkin filed a pro se complaint in the District Court in 2020, challenging the government's withholding of records. He later amended his complaint to focus solely on records related to the appointment of the Chief Trial Judge. The District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government had adequately searched for records and appropriately withheld information under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege. The court also denied Rudometkin’s motions to amend his complaint to include his original FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government did not establish that it properly withheld records under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege and had not shown that it released all reasonably segregable information. The court reversed and remanded on the segregability issue. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Rudometkin’s motion to amend his complaint, as his FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge was now live in a separate action. View "Rudometkin v. USA" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) extending the construction deadline for the Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (MVP) Southgate Project. Initially, FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the Southgate Project in June 2020, setting a construction completion deadline of June 18, 2023. However, due to unresolved permitting issues for the Mainline, which Southgate extends from, the construction could not proceed as planned. MVP requested an extension shortly before the deadline, citing delays in Mainline permitting as the reason for not meeting the original deadline.The Commission granted MVP's extension request, finding that MVP had demonstrated good cause due to unavoidable circumstances, specifically the Mainline permitting delays. FERC also maintained that its previous assessments of market need and environmental impacts for the Southgate Project remained valid and did not require reevaluation.Eight environmental organizations petitioned for review, arguing that FERC's decision to extend the construction deadline and its refusal to revisit prior assessments were arbitrary and capricious. They contended that MVP had not made reasonable efforts to advance the Southgate Project and that the market need and environmental impact analyses were outdated.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC reasonably found that MVP had satisfied the good cause standard for the extension, given the permitting and litigation delays with the Mainline. The court also upheld FERC's decision not to revisit its prior findings on market need and environmental impacts, concluding that the information presented by the petitioners did not constitute significant changes in circumstances. Consequently, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Appalachian Voices v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

In August 2022, a bin full of phosphate rock collapsed at the Lee Creek Mine in Beaufort, North Carolina, injuring three miners. Industrial TurnAround Corporation (ITAC), the independent contractor responsible for checking the structural integrity of the bin's support columns, was cited by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) for failing to take defective equipment out of service. MSHA sent a notice of proposed penalty to ITAC's outdated address of record, and ITAC did not contest the penalty, which became final 30 days later. ITAC subsequently filed a motion to reopen the penalty, claiming it had inadvertently failed to update its address of record.The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission granted ITAC's motion to reopen the penalty, citing excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The Commission noted that ITAC had not occupied the address since 2009 and had only discovered the MSHA notice when an employee checked for missing packages. The Secretary of Labor, representing MSHA, opposed the motion, arguing that ITAC's failure to update its address could not be excused under FRCP 60(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Commission’s order to reopen the penalty was not an appealable collateral order and dismissed the Secretary’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the order did not impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix a legal relationship, and that the interest in immediate review did not meet the high threshold required under the collateral order doctrine. The court concluded that the Commission’s decision to reopen the penalty did not involve a substantial public interest or a particular value of a high order that justified immediate appeal. View "Secretary of Labor v. Industrial TurnAround Corporation" on Justia Law

Ryan Castaneira, a U.S. citizen, filed a Form I-130 petition to obtain permanent residency for his spouse, a Mexican national. USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the petition due to Castaneira's prior convictions in Georgia for crimes that appeared to qualify as "specified offenses against a minor" under the Adam Walsh Act. Castaneira argued that his convictions involved an undercover officer, not a minor, and thus should not be considered offenses against a minor. He also challenged the agency's use of the "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard to prove he posed no risk to his spouse.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Castaneira's claims. The court held that his prior convictions fell within the statutory definition of "specified offense against a minor" and that the Adam Walsh Act's grant of "sole and unreviewable discretion" to USCIS precluded judicial review of the evidentiary standard applied by the agency. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the standard of proof used by USCIS in making the no-risk determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling in part, agreeing that Castaneira's prior convictions were covered by the Adam Walsh Act. However, the appellate court vacated the District Court's jurisdictional ruling regarding the evidentiary standard. The court held that while USCIS's ultimate no-risk determinations are unreviewable, challenges to the agency's departure from its own binding precedent, such as the standard of proof, are reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether USCIS violated its own precedent by applying the "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard. View "Castaneira v. Noem" on Justia Law

Judith Jeltsje Pietersen, a Dutch citizen, and her fiancé, Daniel Gerhard Brown, an American citizen, sought to obtain a visa for Pietersen to enter the United States so they could marry. Pietersen had previously traveled to the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program but was denied entry in February 2020 by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for alleged unlawful employment. Pietersen and Brown applied for a K-1 visa, but consular officers denied the applications, citing willful misrepresentation of a material fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).The appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of State, challenging the visa denials and the guidance in the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). They argued that the consular officers failed to properly review Pietersen’s applications and that the "reason to believe" standard used to determine inadmissibility was contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the consular nonreviewability doctrine barred the claims and that the claims were otherwise meritless.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the consular nonreviewability doctrine did not bar the appellants' Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim for prospective relief. The court expressed doubts about the viability of the State Department's "reason to believe" standard and vacated the District Court’s alternative holding based on 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the INA authorizes the challenged FAM guidance. View "Pietersen v. United States Department of State" on Justia Law

Petitioners, who own New York’s electric-transmission grid, sought to finance upgrades required when new power sources connect to the grid. This would allow them to raise rates and earn a return on these investments. However, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) denied their requests to change the rules prohibiting owner upgrade funding.The transmission owners filed two petitions with FERC on April 9, 2021, under Sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act, requesting amendments to the Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) to allow them to fund interconnection upgrades. On September 3, 2021, FERC rejected the Section 205 filing, stating that the owners’ agreement with the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) limited their Section 205 rights. FERC also dismissed the Section 206 complaint, concluding that the owners failed to demonstrate that the existing funding mechanism was unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential. The owners’ requests for rehearing were deemed denied by operation of law on November 4, 2021, and FERC issued a new order on March 24, 2022, modifying its original orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC’s decisions. The court found that FERC acted reasonably in dismissing the Section 205 filing, as the owners had relinquished their rights to file for changes to the OATT without NYISO’s approval. The court also agreed with FERC’s dismissal of the Section 206 complaint, noting that the owners failed to provide sufficient evidence that the current rates were unjust or unreasonable. The court concluded that FERC’s orders were not arbitrary or capricious and denied the owners’ petitions for review. View "Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. FERC" on Justia Law