Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two Mauritian mining companies, Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. and Amari Nickel Holdings Zimbabwe Ltd., filed a lawsuit against the Republic of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), and Zimbabwe’s Chief Mining Commissioner. The plaintiffs sought to recognize and enforce a judgment from the High Court of Zambia, which confirmed an arbitral award issued in Zambia. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants waived their immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) through the arbitration exception and the implied waiver exception.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on the scope of the FSIA exceptions. The court determined that the arbitration exception did not apply because it covers actions to confirm arbitral awards, not actions to recognize and enforce foreign court judgments. However, the district court held that the implied waiver exception applied, reasoning that by signing the New York Convention and agreeing to arbitrate in Zambia, the defendants waived their immunity from the action to recognize a foreign court judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court that the arbitration exception did not apply, as the exception covers only actions to confirm arbitral awards, not actions to recognize foreign court judgments. The court also concluded that the implied waiver exception did not apply, as signing the New York Convention and agreeing to arbitrate in a signatory state did not demonstrate an intent to waive immunity from judgment recognition actions. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction, vacated the remaining orders, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v. Zimbabwe Mining Development Corp." on Justia Law

Tobias Jones, a self-described citizen journalist, was filming a Secret Service building in Washington, D.C. when two officers ordered him to stop. When he refused, they detained, handcuffed, and searched him. A third officer later informed Jones that he had the right to film, and he was released. Jones sued the officers for damages, claiming violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, and sought prospective relief against the Secret Service.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Jones' case. The court held that Jones did not have a valid cause of action for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Jones' Fourth Amendment claims presented a new context under Bivens, as the Secret Service officers were performing protective duties, which differ from the law enforcement activities in Bivens. The court found that extending Bivens to this new context was inappropriate due to the potential for judicial intrusion into executive functions and the availability of alternative remedies through the Department of Homeland Security. The court also declined to extend Bivens to Jones' First Amendment claim, noting that the Supreme Court has never done so and has foreclosed Bivens remedies for First Amendment retaliation claims.Regarding prospective relief, the court held that Jones lacked standing because he did not plausibly allege a substantial risk of future harm. The court noted that Jones' allegations of potential future encounters with Secret Service officers were speculative and insufficient to establish standing.The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Jones' case. View "Jones v. Secret Service" on Justia Law

Gary Sebastian Brown, III filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the FBI for witness accounts related to the 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California. Brown argued that the FBI's search was inadequate and that it improperly withheld information. The FBI initially provided 19 pages of previously released documents and, after Brown's dissatisfaction, conducted a new search, locating 411 pages. The FBI withheld some records under FOIA Exemption 7(A) due to a pending investigation. After the investigation concluded, the FBI released 406 pages, redacting some information under various FOIA exemptions.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the FBI, finding that the FBI's search was adequate and that its redactions were consistent with FOIA. Brown appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the FBI's search was reasonable and that it properly construed Brown's request for "witness accounts, narratives, or statements" as seeking formal witness interviews. The court also found that the FBI's invocation of FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(D) to withhold personal information and information provided by confidential sources was justified. The court noted that the FBI adequately explained the foreseeable harms from disclosure and that the redactions were not overbroad.The court also upheld the district court's decision to deny in camera review of the redactions, finding no evidence of bad faith or contradictions in the FBI's declaration. Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the FBI's actions complied with FOIA requirements. View "Brown v. FBI" on Justia Law

The Department of Labor (DoL) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in 2019 to amend its 2010 regulations regarding the H-2A visa program. In January 2021, during the final days of the Trump Administration, the DoL announced a final rule and submitted it to the Office of the Federal Register (OFR) for publication. However, the rule was withdrawn by the DoL under the Biden Administration before it was made available for public inspection. In 2022, the DoL issued a new rule based on the 2019 NPRM.The National Council of Agricultural Employers (NCAE) challenged the withdrawal of the 2021 rule and the promulgation of the 2022 rule, arguing that the 2021 rule was unlawfully repealed. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the NCAE lacked standing to challenge the withdrawal of the 2021 rule but had standing to challenge the 2022 rule. The court denied the NCAE's request for a preliminary injunction and later granted the DoL's cross-motion for summary judgment, determining that the 2021 rule had not become final because it was never made available for public inspection by the OFR.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the rulemaking process culminated in the 2022 rule. The court determined that a substantive rule is not final until the OFR makes it available for public inspection. Since the 2021 rule was withdrawn before it became final, the DoL did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing the 2022 rule without a new round of notice and comment. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "National Council of Agricultural Employers v. DOL" on Justia Law

Energy Harbor, LLC, the owner and operator of the W.H. Sammis power plant, was assessed $12 million in penalties by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. for failing to comply with PJM’s Tariff during a major winter storm in December 2022. Energy Harbor contested these penalties, arguing that the penalties were inconsistent with the terms of the Tariff, particularly the exception for maintenance outages. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) denied Energy Harbor’s complaint, leading Energy Harbor to petition for judicial review.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed Energy Harbor’s complaint and found that PJM had correctly interpreted the Tariff and calculated the penalties. FERC concluded that the maintenance outage at the Sammis Plant was not the sole cause of the performance shortfall, as the plant had sufficient capacity to meet its commitments but failed due to forced outages. Energy Harbor’s request for rehearing was denied by operation of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC’s decision. The court agreed with FERC’s interpretation of the Tariff, stating that PJM correctly evaluated whether the maintenance outage was the sole cause of the performance shortfall. The court found that the Sammis Plant had enough installed capacity to meet its expected performance during the emergency, and the forced outages were also causes of the shortfall. The court also rejected Energy Harbor’s argument that the penalty exception should be assessed for each generating unit, affirming that the entire Sammis Plant was the resource at issue. Consequently, the court denied Energy Harbor’s petition for review. View "Energy Harbor, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

A regional transmission organization, Southwest Power Pool, sought to integrate the City of Nixa's transmission assets into its Zone 10 infrastructure. This integration would spread the costs of the Nixa Assets across all Zone 10 customers. Several nearby cities and utilities objected, arguing that they would bear unjustified costs without receiving corresponding benefits. They took their objections to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).FERC initially found insufficient evidence to determine whether the cost shift was justified and remanded the case for further proceedings. After a second hearing, an administrative law judge concluded that the integration was just and reasonable, providing incremental benefits such as improved reliability and power support for all Zone 10 customers. FERC affirmed this decision, finding that the integration's benefits justified the cost shift and denied the non-Nixa parties' request for rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC's decision to analyze costs and benefits at the zonal level, rather than on a customer-by-customer basis, was reasonable. The court noted that requiring a hyper-granular approach would undermine the zonal system. The court also upheld FERC's consideration of unquantifiable systemwide benefits, such as improved integration and reliability, as sufficient to justify the cost shift. Finally, the court found that FERC's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including testimony and records indicating that the integration would benefit all Zone 10 customers.The court denied the petition for review, affirming FERC's decision to approve the integration and the associated cost allocation. View "Paragould Light & Water Commission v. FERC" on Justia Law

Patrick Kennedy and Roy J. Meidinger, Sr. filed whistleblower claims with the IRS, alleging significant tax violations by various entities. Kennedy's claims involved three corporations, while Meidinger's claim was based on a theory that healthcare provider discounts to insurance companies constituted untaxed debt relief. Both claims were initially reviewed by the IRS Whistleblower Office (WBO) and forwarded to IRS operating divisions for further action.The IRS operating divisions did not take substantive action on Meidinger's claim or on two of Kennedy's claims. Meidinger's claim was deemed speculative, and Kennedy's first two claims were either outside the operating division's jurisdiction or involved a defunct entity. Kennedy's third claim led to an audit of the targeted taxpayer, but the IRS found no tax violations and collected no proceeds.The United States Tax Court dismissed Meidinger's case for lack of jurisdiction, as the IRS had not proceeded with any administrative or judicial action based on his information. The Tax Court also dismissed Kennedy's first two claims for the same reason but reviewed his third claim on the merits, ultimately denying it because the IRS collected no proceeds.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction over Meidinger's claim and Kennedy's first two claims, as the IRS had not taken any substantive action against the taxpayers based on their information. However, the court affirmed the Tax Court's decision on Kennedy's third claim, agreeing that no proceeds were collected, and thus, no award was warranted. The court dismissed Meidinger's appeal and Kennedy's first two claims for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of Kennedy's third claim on the merits. View "Kennedy v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS), a proxy advisory firm, challenged the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) interpretation of the term “solicit” under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC had begun regulating proxy advisory firms by treating their voting recommendations as “solicitations” of proxy votes. ISS argued that its recommendations did not constitute “solicitation” under the Act.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with ISS and granted summary judgment in its favor. The court found that the SEC’s interpretation of “solicit” was overly broad and not supported by the statutory text. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), an intervenor supporting the SEC’s position, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the ordinary meaning of “solicit” does not include providing proxy voting recommendations upon request. The court concluded that “solicit” refers to actively seeking to obtain proxy authority or votes, not merely influencing them through advice. The SEC’s definition, which included proxy advisory firms’ recommendations as solicitations, was found to be contrary to the statutory text of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. View "Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. v. SEC" on Justia Law

Dr. John Doe, a federal public servant with a security clearance, was convicted of two felonies in Ohio in the early 1990s. He received a pardon from the Ohio governor in 2009, and his felony convictions were sealed by an Ohio court. In 2022, Dr. Doe applied for a position at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), but his application was denied due to a statutory bar against hiring individuals with felony convictions. Dr. Doe then filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of this hiring prohibition and sought to proceed under a pseudonym to avoid public association with his sealed convictions.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. The court acknowledged Dr. Doe's privacy concerns and the lack of unfairness to the government but concluded that the privacy interest in felony convictions does not warrant pseudonymity. The court emphasized the importance of transparency in judicial proceedings, especially in cases involving constitutional challenges against the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling, agreeing that Dr. Doe's privacy interest in his sealed felony convictions was insufficient to overcome the presumption against pseudonymous litigation. The court highlighted the public's significant interest in open judicial proceedings, particularly when the case involves a constitutional challenge to a federal statute. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the relevant factors and denying Dr. Doe's motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. McKernan" on Justia Law

Michigan Electric Transmission Company (METC) owns a high-voltage transmission line with Michigan Public Power Agency (MPPA) and Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative. The case concerns the ownership of new transmission facilities, or "network upgrades," connecting a new solar generation park to the transmission line. METC claims exclusive ownership based on existing agreements, while MPPA and Wolverine disagree.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed the case and found that no agreement conclusively determined ownership rights. FERC declined to decide the ownership question, leading METC to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with FERC's interpretation that the relevant agreements did not grant METC exclusive ownership of the network upgrades. The court found that the Styx-Murphy line qualifies as a "system" under the Transmission Owners Agreement (TOA), and since METC is not the sole owner, it cannot claim exclusive ownership. The court also found that the Styx-Murphy Agreements did not preclude MPPA and Wolverine from owning network upgrades.The court denied METC's petitions for review, upholding FERC's decision. View "Michigan Electric Transmission Company, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law