Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners challenge the Commission's 2015 Open Internet Order, which reclassified broadband service as a telecommunications service, subject to common carrier regulation under Title II of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 201. The Commission determined that broadband service satisfies the statutory definition of a telecommunications service: “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public.” In accordance with Brand X, the Commission's conclusions about consumer perception find extensive support in the record and together justify the Commission’s decision to reclassify broadband as a telecommunications service. See National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services. The court rejected petitioners' numerous challenges to the Commission's decision to reclassify broadband, finding that none have merit. The court concluded that the Commission adequately explained why it reclassified broadband from an information service to a telecommunications service and its decision was not arbitrary and capricious. US Telecom never questions the Commission’s application of the statute’s test for common carriage, and US Telecom cites no case, nor is the court aware of one, holding that when the Commission invokes the statutory test for common carriage, it must also apply the NARUC test. See National Ass’n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC. Where the Commission concluded that it could regulate interconnection arrangements under Title II as a component of broadband service, the court rejected US Telecom's two challenges to the Commission's decision. The court rejected mobile petitioners’ arguments and find that the Commission’s reclassification of mobile broadband as a commercial mobile service is reasonable and supported by the record. In the Order, the Commission decided to forbear from numerous provisions of the Communications Act. The court rejected Full Service Network's procedural and substantive challenges to the Commission’s forbearance decision. The Commission promulgated five rules in the Order: rules banning (i) blocking, (ii) throttling, and (iii) paid prioritization; (iv) a General Conduct Rule; and (v) an enhanced transparency rule. The court rejected Alamo's challenge to the anti-paid-prioritization rule as beyond the Commission’s authority and rejected US Telecom's challenge to the General Conduct Rule as unconstitutionally vague. Having upheld the FCC’s reclassification of broadband service as common carriage, the court concluded that the First Amendment poses no bar to the rules and the court rejected Alamo and Berninger's challenges. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "United States Telecom Assoc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

The SEC created a new class of securities offerings freed from federal-registration requirements so long as the issuers of these securities comply with certain investor safeguards (Regulation A-Plus). Petitioners, the chief securities regulators for Massachusetts and Montana, seek review of Regulation A-Plus. The court concluded that, because Regulation A-Plus does not conflict with Congress’s unambiguous intent, it does not falter at Chevron Step 1. Furthermore, because the Commission’s qualified-purchaser definition is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,” it does not fail Chevron Step 2. By providing a reasoned analysis of how its qualified-purchaser definition strikes the “appropriate balance between mitigating cost and time demands on issuers and providing investor protections,” the court concluded that the Commission has complied with its statutory obligation under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702. Accordingly, the court denied the consolidated petitions for review. View "Lindeen v. SEC" on Justia Law

Appellant, while pursuing her Ph.D. in Politics, submitted requests to the DOD under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. By statute, educational institutions are eligible for reduced fees when they make FOIA requests. The Government has long determined that teachers who make FOIA requests are eligible for those reduced fees because teachers are part of an educational institution. But at the same time, the Government has determined that students who make FOIA requests are not eligible for those reduced fees because they are supposedly not part of an educational institution. The court disagreed, concluding that if teachers can qualify for reduced fees, so can students. Students who make FOIA requests to further their coursework or other school-sponsored activities are eligible for reduced fees under FOIA because students, like teachers, are part of an educational institution. Therefore, appellant is eligible for reduced fees for her FOIA request in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sack v. DOD" on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., seeking to obtain a copy of a report authored by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Before the Committee conducted a comprehensive review of the program of detention and interrogation formerly run by the CIA, arrangements and rules were memorialized in a June 2, 2009, letter sent by the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Committee to the CIA Director. In 2014, after completing its review and receiving comments and proposed edits, the Committee produced an end product that included a 6,000-plus page investigative report (Full Report) and a 500-plus page Executive Summary. The court concluded that the June 2009 Letter manifests a clear intent by the Senate Committee to maintain continuous control over its work product, which includes the Full Report. Therefore, the Full Report always has been a congressional document subject to the control of the Senate Committee. The mere transmission of the Full Report to agency officials for their consideration and use within the Executive Branch did not vitiate the command of the June 2009 Letter or constitute congressional relinquishment of control over the document. Accordingly, the Full Report is a congressionally generated and controlled document that is not subject to disclosure under FOIA. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit based on lack of jurisdiction. View "ACLU v. CIA" on Justia Law

EPIC seeks review of the FAA's decision not to promulgate the FAA’s dismissal of its petition for rulemaking and the FAA’s omission of privacy provisions in the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). EPIC's petition relates to the Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, 49 U.S.C. 40101, which was enacted to regulate, inter alia, unmanned aircraft - i.e. drones. The court rejected EPIC's contention that "reasonable grounds" justify its untimely petition 60 days after the FAA's explicit dismissal. The court also rejected EPIC's argument that the FAA's February 23, 2015 NPRM constituted, in effect, the dismissal of its petition, triggering the 60-day clock. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Electronic Privacy Information Center v. FAA" on Justia Law

Via Christi seeks an upward adjustment of the capital-asset depreciation reimbursement paid to its predecessor hospitals under a since curtailed Medicare regulation. Via Christi argues that it received St. Francis’s and St. Joseph’s assets at a lower value, i.e., more depreciated, than was reflected in the Secretary’s earlier depreciation reimbursements. As the hospitals’ successor-in-interest, Via Christi thus seeks additional reimbursements to cover the proportional Medicare share of the depreciation. The court concluded that the Secretary reasonably interpreted the bona fide sale requirement as limited to arm’s length transactions between economically self-interested parties. The Secretary concluded that St. Francis’s transfer of its assets to Via Christi was not an arm’s-length transaction in which each party sought to maximize its economic benefit. The court concluded that the Secretary's determination was supported by substantial evidence, and was not arbitrary, capricious or otherwise unlawful. In this case, Via Christi is not entitled to additional depreciation reimbursement in the absence of a qualifying transaction. View "Via Christi Hosp. Wichita v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as a holder of U.S. public debt, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the Debt Limit Statute, 31 U.S.C. 3101. Plaintiff alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Public Debt Clause and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for lack of standing because he failed to allege plausible factual allegations to establish the constitutional minimum requirements for Article III standing, either in the first amended complaint (FAC) filed with the district court or in his proposed amended complaint filed with this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1653. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend his FAC and denied plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint on appeal. View "Williams v. Lew" on Justia Law

MSHA issued seven citations to Cactus Canyon for violations of the safety and health standards under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq. Cactus Canyon then sought to contest the citations before the Commission. After the case was assigned to an ALJ, but before any hearings were held, the Secretary decided to vacate the citations. Over the objection of Cactus Canyon, the ALJ dismissed the case without indicating whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. Cactus Canyon then filed an application for the award of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). Following this court’s precedent in Turner v. National Transportation Safety Board, the court held that Cactus Canyon is not eligible for fees because it is not a prevailing party. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. v. MSHR" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a foreign alien from Venezuela, seeks review of the TSA's determination that petitioner was a risk to aviation and national security, and denial of his application for FAA-certified flight school training. The Vara Declaration confirms that the internal agency materials express TSA’s reasoned, contemporaneous explanation for its decision. The internal agency materials, as illuminated by the Vara Declaration, offer a clear and reasonable statement of the grounds upon which TSA relied in denying petitioner’s application for flight training. Furthermore, the Declaration and the internal agency materials to which it refers are not impermissible post hoc rationalizations. Because petitioner and the court have a written statement explaining the grounds and rationale for TSA's action, and because the court found the agency action against petitioner was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court concluded that there is no need to remand the case for further review. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Olivares v. TSA" on Justia Law

Under a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), the government formally initiates prosecution but agrees to dismiss all charges if the defendant abides by negotiated conditions over a prescribed period of time. This case arises from the interplay between the operation of a DPA and the running of time limitations under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161-3174. In this case, after Fokker voluntarily disclosed its potential violation of federal sanctions and export control laws, the company and the government entered into an 18-month DPA, during which Fokker would continue cooperation with federal authorities and implementation of a substantial compliance program. In accordance with the DPA, the government filed criminal charges against the company, together with a joint motion to suspend the running of time under the Act pending assessment of the company’s adherence to the agreement’s conditions. The court held that the Act confers no authority in a court to withhold exclusion of time pursuant to a DPA based on concerns that the government should bring different charges or should charge different defendants. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of the joint motion to exclude time under the Act. The court granted the government’s petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V." on Justia Law