Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose between the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding a rule requiring broadcasters to disclose if any programming was paid for by a foreign governmental entity. The FCC's 2021 Rule mandated such disclosures and included specific diligence steps for broadcasters to follow. NAB challenged the rule, leading to a court decision that vacated part of the rule requiring broadcasters to search federal databases.The FCC then issued a revised rule in 2024, which retained the core disclosure requirements but modified the diligence steps. The new rule exempted commercial ads and political candidate ads from the disclosure requirement but included paid public service announcements (PSAs) and issue advertisements. NAB challenged the 2024 Rule, arguing it violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the First Amendment, and exceeded the FCC's statutory authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2024 Rule complied with the APA's notice-and-comment requirements and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court also held that the rule did not violate the First Amendment, as it was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest in preventing foreign influence in U.S. broadcasting. The court further determined that the FCC did not exceed its statutory authority with the reasonable diligence requirements, as the rule did not directly regulate lessees but required broadcasters to seek information from them.Ultimately, the court denied NAB's petition for review, upholding the FCC's 2024 Rule. View "National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC" on Justia Law

The Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, a federally recognized tribe, operates several substance-abuse health programs funded by the federal government. To support these programs, the Tribe built the Obaashiing Chemical Health Treatment Center, costing $5.8 million, financed through a $4.95 million loan from the Department of Agriculture and $850,000 of the Tribe's own funds. The Tribe sought compensation from the Indian Health Service (IHS) for both the facility's depreciation and the loan payments under a § 105(l) lease.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. The Government had compensated the Tribe for depreciation in 2020 and 2021 and for loan payments in 2022 but refused to compensate for both costs each year, citing 25 C.F.R. § 900.70, which prohibits duplicative compensation. The district court upheld the Government's decision, agreeing that compensating for both depreciation and loan payments would be duplicative.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Government correctly declined to compensate the Tribe for both depreciation and loan payments, as doing so would result in duplicative compensation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment regarding the 2022 decision but reversed the judgment for 2020 and 2021. The court instructed the district court to vacate the Government's decision for those years and remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings, allowing the Government to apply its anti-duplication rationale consistently across all years. View "Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. HHS" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved a 1,000-foot natural-gas pipeline crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. The Sierra Club and Public Citizen challenged this approval, arguing that FERC should have exercised jurisdiction over a longer 157-mile pipeline extending into Texas, considered the environmental impact of the entire pipeline, and evaluated alternatives to the border-crossing segment. They also claimed that FERC's approval of the border-crossing pipeline was arbitrary and capricious.The lower court, FERC, concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the 157-mile Connector Pipeline because it did not cross state lines or carry interstate gas upon entering service. FERC conducted an Environmental Assessment for the 1,000-foot Border Facility, found minimal environmental impact, and deemed it in the public interest. After FERC reaffirmed its conclusions on rehearing, the petitioners sought judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC reasonably declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Connector Pipeline under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, respecting state regulatory authority. The court also found substantial evidence supporting FERC's conclusion that the Connector Pipeline would not transport interstate gas initially, thus not subjecting it to Section 7 jurisdiction. The court rejected the petitioners' claims that FERC's approval of the Border Facility was arbitrary and capricious, noting the presumption favoring authorization under the Natural Gas Act.Regarding the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the court found that FERC reasonably defined the project's purpose and need, appropriately limited its environmental review to the Border Facility, and did not need to consider the upstream Connector Pipeline's impacts. The court denied the petition, affirming FERC's decisions. View "Sierra Club v. FERC" on Justia Law

The American Burying Beetle, the largest carrion beetle in North America, was listed as an endangered species by the Fish and Wildlife Service in 1989. In 2015, the Service began reevaluating the Beetle's status, prompted by a petition from private entities. The Service's Species Status Assessment Report revealed that the Beetle's current range is larger than initially thought, with several large, resilient populations across the United States. The Service concluded that the Beetle faces a relatively low near-term risk of extinction but is likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future due to future land-use changes and climate change. Consequently, in 2020, the Service downlisted the Beetle from "endangered" to "threatened" and established a Section 4(d) Rule for its conservation.The Center for Biological Diversity challenged the downlisting and the sufficiency of the protections for the Beetle as a threatened species. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the Service, concluding that the Downlisting Rule did not violate the Endangered Species Act, was supported by the administrative record, and was reasonably explained. The court also found that the Center failed to establish standing for its challenges to the Section 4(d) Rule.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the Service's conclusion that the Beetle was not endangered at the time of the decision in 2020 was reasonable and consistent with the record evidence. The court also found that the Center lacked standing to challenge the Section 4(d) Rule on appeal. The Service's decision to downlist the Beetle to threatened status was based on the best available scientific and commercial data, and the Service's predictions about the Beetle's future viability were adequately explained and supported by the record. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. FWS" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) implementing a cap-and-trade program to reduce hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) as mandated by the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act of 2020. The AIM Act requires an 85% reduction in HFC production and consumption by 2036. The EPA issued a rule in 2021 to allocate allowances for 2022 and 2023 based on historical market share data from 2011 to 2019. In 2023, the EPA issued a new rule for 2024-2028, again using the same historical data.The petitioners, RMS of Georgia, LLC (Choice) and IGas Holdings, Inc. (IGas), challenged the 2024 Rule. Choice argued that the AIM Act violated the nondelegation doctrine by giving the EPA too much discretion in allocating allowances. IGas contended that the EPA's exclusion of 2020 data from its market-share calculations was arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed Choice's argument, holding that the AIM Act did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power because it provided sufficient guidance to the EPA, modeled on previous cap-and-trade programs under the Clean Air Act. The court found that Congress intended for the EPA to allocate allowances based on historical market share, providing an intelligible principle to guide the agency's discretion.Regarding IGas's challenge, the court found that the EPA's decision to exclude 2020 data was reasonable. The EPA determined that 2020 data was unrepresentative due to the COVID-19 pandemic and supply chain disruptions and that including it could disrupt the market. The court held that the EPA's methodology was not arbitrary and capricious, as the agency provided a rational explanation for its decision.The court denied both petitions for review, upholding the EPA's 2024 Rule. View "IGas Holdings, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Seth Hettena, an investigative journalist, submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for a report on the death of an Iraqi national, Manadel al-Jamadi, who died in CIA custody at Abu Ghraib prison in 2003. The CIA disclosed parts of the report but redacted most of it, including the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) conclusions and recommendations. Hettena sued the CIA, arguing that the redactions did not comply with FOIA.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the CIA, concluding that the redactions were justified under FOIA exemptions. The court found that the redacted information pertained to the CIA's intelligence activities, sources, and methods, which are protected under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court agreed that most of the redactions were justified, as they contained information about CIA covert personnel, intelligence methods, and locations of Agency facilities. However, the court found that the CIA had not adequately justified the redactions related to the OIG's findings on potential obstruction by CIA officers. The court noted that the CIA's declaration and Vaughn index did not address these findings, and it was unclear why disclosing them would reveal protected information.The appellate court also found that factual questions remained regarding whether the redactions contained information that the CIA had already officially acknowledged, such as references to a "hood" or "head cover." The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the CIA another opportunity to explain its redactions and potentially develop the record further. View "Hettena v. CIA" on Justia Law

The Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs (WLC) frequently submits Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) for records to aid in representing incarcerated individuals. Frustrated by the Bureau’s delays in responding to these requests, WLC filed a lawsuit claiming the Bureau has a policy or practice of violating FOIA by not responding promptly. WLC sought an injunction to reform the Bureau’s FOIA processes to expedite record production.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that WLC had a viable policy or practice claim but granted summary judgment to the Bureau. The court credited an affidavit from the Bureau describing efforts to improve FOIA response times and found no evidence of a policy or practice of violating FOIA. WLC appealed, arguing that the Bureau’s requirement to submit individual FOIA requests for prisoners’ disciplinary and educational records, rather than using an expedited process like the one for medical records under the Privacy Act, unnecessarily increased delays.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Bureau’s practice of processing requests for individual prisoners’ records under FOIA, rather than creating a separate expedited process, does not violate FOIA. The court found that FOIA does not require the Bureau to waive its statutory entitlements under the Privacy Act for non-medical records. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, concluding that WLC’s claim failed as a matter of law. The court also upheld the denial of WLC’s discovery request, finding it unnecessary given the legal insufficiency of WLC’s claim. View "Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Michael Muir, who has a congenital birth defect presenting as a hernia in his right scrotum, challenged the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Final Rule authorizing the use of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) scanners at airport security checkpoints. Muir argued that the scanners, which use electromagnetic radiation, flag his hernia as a threat, leading to painful and potentially life-threatening pat-downs. He claimed that the Final Rule and TSA’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) are arbitrary and capricious, contrary to TSA’s statutory authority, and violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court found that Muir had not raised his statutory challenges during the rulemaking process, resulting in forfeiture of those claims. However, the court agreed with Muir’s Rehabilitation Act claim, noting that TSA’s failure to provide an accommodation for his disability could be a violation of the Act. The court determined that Muir had identified a reasonable accommodation—screening with a walk-through metal detector (WTMD)—and remanded the case to TSA to determine if this accommodation would impose an undue burden on the agency.The court denied Muir’s other challenges to the Final Rule and his motion to supplement the record. The court emphasized that TSA must conduct the appropriate administrative process to address the implementation of Muir’s reasonable accommodation and explore alternative accommodations if necessary. View "Muir v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Crowley Government Services, Inc. ("Crowley") entered into a contract with the Department of Defense United States Transportation Command ("USTRANSCOM") in 2016 to provide transportation coordination services, which involved hiring motor carriers to transport freight. The General Services Administration ("GSA"), not a party to the contract, began auditing Crowley's bills under a provision of the Transportation Act of 1940, claiming Crowley overbilled USTRANSCOM by millions of dollars. GSA sought to recover these overcharges by garnishing future payments to Crowley.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Crowley's Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") claims, holding that the claims were essentially contractual and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that Crowley's suit was not a contract claim and remanded the case. On remand, the District Court held that GSA could audit both carriers and non-carriers but agreed with Crowley that the USTRANSCOM Contracting Officer's interpretations governed any GSA audits. The court enjoined GSA from issuing Notices of Overcharge ("NOCs") contrary to the Contracting Officer's determinations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that 31 U.S.C. § 3726(b) allows GSA to audit only bills presented by carriers and freight forwarders. The court found that Crowley is not a carrier because it does not physically transport freight nor is it contractually bound to help perform the movement of goods. Consequently, the court reversed the District Court's decision on the scope of § 3726(b) and remanded for further proceedings, permanently enjoining GSA from conducting postpayment audits of Crowley's bills. View "Crowley Government Services, Inc. v. General Services Administration" on Justia Law

The Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability, Inc. filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests with six intelligence agencies seeking documents related to the upstreaming and unmasking of forty-eight named current and former members of congressional intelligence committees from January 1, 2008, to January 15, 2020. All six agencies issued Glomar responses, refusing to confirm or deny the existence of such records, citing multiple FOIA exemptions, including Exemption 1 for classified national security materials. The Project challenged these responses in court.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the agencies, concluding that the Glomar responses were proper under FOIA’s first exemption. The court found that the agencies were not required to search for responsive documents before issuing their Glomar responses and that the agencies' affidavits sufficiently supported their responses.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the agencies' Glomar responses were justified under Exemption 1, which allows withholding information that is classified under criteria established by an Executive order. The court found that the agencies' affidavits provided specific, logical, and plausible justifications for the Glomar responses, explaining that disclosing the existence or nonexistence of the requested records could harm national security by revealing intelligence sources, methods, and priorities. The court also rejected the Project's argument that the agencies were required to search for records before issuing Glomar responses, citing precedent that an agency need not search its records before invoking Glomar. View "Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability, Inc. v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law