Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Union petitions the court for review of the PRC's denial of its complaint, alleging that the Postal Service failed to comply with First-Class Mail service standards. The court concluded that the PRC reasonably determined that whether service standards are violated must be evaluated in reference to external performance goals. Based on this interpretation, the court concluded that the PRC logically construed the Union’s amended complaint as asserting a claim for violation of service standards in the aggregate, in accordance with the relevant performance goals. The PRC’s subsequent dismissal of this amended complaint was not arbitrary or capricious because the amended complaint failed to allege new issues of material fact or law. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "American Postal Workers Union v. PRC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, diagnosed with Insulin Treated Diabetes Mellitus (ITDM), seeks the first class medical certificate necessary to serve as a commercial airline pilot. Plaintiff holds a third class medical certificate authorizing him to pilot non-commercial flights in the United States. The FAA contends it did not issue a final order regarding plaintiff's first class medical certificate application; it purportedly ruled solely on his independent request for a third class medical certificate and specifically indicated the first class certificate remained under review. The court concluded, however, that the specific facts presented here establish a constructive denial of plaintiff's application for a first class certificate. The court held that where, as here, an agency has clearly communicated it will not reach a determination on a petitioner’s submission due to petitioner’s recalcitrance but simultaneously refuses to deny the petitioner’s submission on those grounds, it has engaged in final agency action subject to the court’s review. Although plaintiff's case is subject to judicial review, the court noted that there is a complete absence of a relevant administrative record to review. Accordingly, the court remanded to the FAA to offer reasons for its denial of plaintiff's application for a first class medical certificate. View "Friedman v. FAA" on Justia Law

In Order No. 1926, the Commission—recognizing that the Great Recession of 2008 was an exigent circumstance—allowed for a rate increase but also sought to calculate the extent to which decreased mail volume was “due to” the economic downturn in order to determine how long that rate increase should remain in effect. The Commission created a “new normal” test to determine when the “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances” no longer supported a rate increase. The Postal Service petitioned the court for review of the "new normal" test and the court upheld the Commission's approach. The Postal Service now seeks reconsideration, claiming that the Commission altered its original decision. The court dismissed the Postal Service's petition for lack of jurisdiction because the Commission's denial of reconsideration is unreviewable. View "USPS v. PRC" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of two Notices issued by FERC as part of ISO New England’s eighth forward-capacity market. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that FERC did not engage in collective, institutional action when it deadlocked on FCA 8’s rates. Consequently, the Notices describing the effects of that deadlock are not reviewable orders under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824d-824e. View "Public Citizen, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

CalPortland seeks review of the Commission's decision ordering CalPortland to temporarily reinstate Jeffrey Pappas, pursuant to section 105(c)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(2), pending final order on Pappas’s underlying discrimination complaint currently pending before the Commission. The court concluded that the Commission’s order directing CalPortland to hire Pappas is immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Because the Commission’s temporary reinstatement order satisfies the requirements of the collateral order doctrine, the court has jurisdiction to hear this petition for review. The court also concluded that the text and structure of section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act preclude the Commission from directing an owner or operator to temporarily “reinstate” a complainant who has never been employed by that owner or operator. Because Pappas was an “applicant for employment” who was not eligible for temporary reinstatement pending final order on his complaint, the court granted CalPortland’s petition for review and vacated the Commission’s decision and order. View "CalPortland Co., Inc. v. MSHR" on Justia Law

In the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. 5491, Congress established a new independent agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an independent agency headed not by a multi-member commission but rather by a single Director. PHH is a mortgage lender that was the subject of a CFPB enforcement action that resulted in a $109 million order against it. PHH seeks to vacate the order, arguing that the CFPB’s status as an independent agency headed by a single Director violates Article II of the Constitution. The court concluded that CFPB’s concentration of enormous executive power in a single, unaccountable, unchecked Director not only departs from settled historical practice, but also poses a far greater risk of arbitrary decisionmaking and abuse of power, and a far greater threat to individual liberty, than does a multi-member independent agency. The court noted that this new agency lacks that critical check and structural constitutional protection, yet wields vast power over the U.S. economy. The court concluded that, in light of the consistent historical practice under which independent agencies have been headed by multiple commissioners or board members, and in light of the threat to individual liberty posed by a single-Director independent agency, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States cannot be stretched to cover this novel agency structure. Therefore, the court held that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured. To remedy the constitutional flaw, the court followed the Supreme Court’s precedents and simply severed the statute’s unconstitutional for-cause provision from the remainder of the statute. With the for-cause provision severed, the court explained that the President now will have the power to remove the Director at will, and to supervise and direct the Director. Because the CFPB as remedied will continue operating, the court addressed the statutory issues raised by PHH and agreed with PHH that Section 8 of the Act allows captive reinsurance arrangements so long as the amount paid by the mortgage insurer for the reinsurance does not exceed the reasonable market value of the reinsurance; CFPB’s order against PHH violated bedrock principles of due process; and the CFPB on remand still will have an opportunity to demonstrate that the relevant mortgage insurers in fact paid more than reasonable market value to the PHH-affiliated reinsurer for reinsurance, thereby making disguised payments for referrals in contravention of Section 8. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "PHH Corp. v. CFPB" on Justia Law

In 1992, OSHA issued the Process Safety Management Standard to protect the safety of those who work with or near highly hazardous chemicals. After a catastrophic chemical explosion at a Texas fertilizer company that qualified as an exempt retail facility, OSHA narrowed the scope of the retail-facility exemption so that the safety standard’s requirements would now apply to formerly exempt facilities like the Texas plant. Petitioners seek review of OSHA's narrowed definition of retail facilities. The court held that, when an action by OSHA corrects a particular hazard, as opposed to adjusting procedures for detection or enforcement, it amounts to a “standard.” Applying that understanding, the court concluded that the agency’s narrowing of the substantive scope of the exemption for retail facilities qualified as issuance of a “standard.” Therefore, the court has jurisdiction to review it and OSHA was required to adhere to notice-and-comment procedures. Consequently, the court granted the petitions for review and vacated OSHA's action. View "Agricultural Retailers Assoc. v. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Rothe filed suit alleging that the statutory basis of the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 8(a) business development program, Amendments to the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 637, violates its right to equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Rothe is a small business that bids on Defense Department contracts, including the types of subcontracts that the SBA awards to economically and socially disadvantaged businesses through the 8(a) program. The court rejected Rothe's claim that the statute contains an unconstitutional racial classification that prevents Rothe from competing for Department of Defense contracts on an equal footing with minority-owned businesses. The court concluded that the provisions of the Small Business Act that Rothe challenges do not on their face classify individuals by race. In contrast to the statute, the SBA’s regulation implementing the 8(a) program does contain a racial classification in the form of a presumption that an individual who is a member of one of five designated racial groups (and within them, 37 subgroups) is socially disadvantaged. Because the statute lacks a racial classification, and because Rothe has not alleged that the statute is otherwise subject to strict scrutiny, the court applied rational-basis review. Under rational-basis review, the court concluded that the statutory scheme is rationally related to the legitimate, and in some instances compelling, interest of counteracting discrimination. Finally, Rothe's evidentiary and nondelegation challenges failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment granting summary judgment to the SBA and DOD. View "Rothe Development v. DOD" on Justia Law

Scenic filed suit challenging a guidance memorandum issued by the FHWA in 2007, which interpreted the prohibition on “flashing, intermittent or moving” lights to permit state approval of those digital billboards that met certain timing and brightness requirements. The Highway Beautification Act (HBA), 23 U.S.C. 131, requires the FHWA and each state to develop and implement individual federal-state agreements (FSAs), detailing, among other things, “size, lighting and spacing” standards for the billboards now found towering over many of our country’s interstate highways. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to hear Scenic's notice-and-comment claim because Scenic failed to demonstrate that it has standing to bring that challenge. The court concluded that Scenic has standing to bring a claim under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and that the Guidance constitutes final agency action. On the merits, the court concluded that, because the FHWA’s interpretation of the FSA lighting provision was reasonable, the interpretation cannot be “contrary to customary use.” Accordingly, Scenic's claim under section 706 fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for dismissal of Scenic's notice-and-comment claim. View "Scenic America, Inc. v. US DOT" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Labor exercised his authority under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290, to promulgate regulations that require mine operators to test the continuity and resistance of “grounding systems” for mining equipment. At issue is whether the Secretary properly determined that power cables and extension cords are regulated parts of those “grounding systems.” The court upheld the Secretary’s decision because, under the regulations’ plain language, power cables and extension cords are most naturally considered components of “grounding systems.” Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Tilden Mining Co. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law