Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Under the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Housing Choice Voucher Program, 42 U.S.C. 1437f, housing agencies use HUD funds to issue housing subsidy vouchers based on family size. The Montgomery County, Maryland Housing determined, based on a medical form, that Angelene has a disability and requires a live-in aide. HUD regulations mandate that any approved live-in aide must be counted in determining family size. The Commission issued Angelene a two-bedroom voucher. Angelene’s sister was Angelene’s live-in aide. Angelene decided to move to the District of Columbia. Program vouchers are portable. Angelene obtained a two-bedroom voucher from the D.C. Housing Authority. The sisters moved into a two-bedroom District apartment. Within weeks, they received a letter revoking Angelene’s right to a live-in aide and her legal entitlement to a two-bedroom voucher. They sued, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(1). The court denied motions for a temporary restraining order and to seal their complaint, medical records, and “nondispositive materials.” While the case was pending, the Authority sent another letter reaffirming that Angelene’s request for a live-in aide was denied, but stating that the decision did not reverse the two-bedroom voucher. The court dismissed, finding no allegation of injury-in-fact. The D.C. Circuit reversed with respect to the motion to seal and the dismissal. At the pleadings stage, plaintiff’s allegation that the government denied or revoked a benefit suffices to show injury-in-fact. Angelene’s loss of a statutory entitlement traces directly to the Authority’s letter and would be redressed by a court order to approve her aide request. View "Hardaway v. District of Columbia Housing Authority" on Justia Law

Henderson, Nevada executed an agreement with Developer to construct sports venues on 480 acres of federally-owned public land. The city requested the Bureau of Land Management in the Department of Interior to convey the land to Developer. After completion of the project, Developer was to transfer ownership of the land and the sports complex to the city; the city would lease back the venues to Developer. The Bureau agreed to conduct a modified competitive sealed-bid auction, so that Developer had the right to match the highest bid. After the bidding, Developer paid the balance and requested the land patent for recording. Within hours after the funds transferred to the Bureau, Developer terminated its agreement with Henderson. Henderson requested the Bureau to cancel the sale and sued Developer. The parties settled. Developer agreed to give the city $4.25 million after it recorded the patent and not to pursue any development in Henderson. The city agreed to withdraw its objection. The Department determined that the Bureau should not release a patent for the land. Developer alleged violation of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act by canceling the sale more than 30 days after it paid for the land. The district court held that the Secretary had plenary power to terminate the sale because its consummation would have been contrary to law, given that the Bureau had authorized a modified land auction, only because of the anticipated public benefits. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the Secretary’s action was arbitrary. The auction sale was rendered unlawful when Developer terminated the agreement; it did not suffer a due process violation because it never acquired a property interest in the land. View "Silver State Land, LLC v. Schneider" on Justia Law

In 1973, two Kalamazoo, Michigan hospitals formed a consortium to manage their health education programs and to train interns and residents. In the 1980s, they joined Michigan State University to form the Michigan State University Kalamazoo Center for Medical Studies (KCMS). KCMS administered graduate medical programs for residency programs for the hospitals. The hospitals agreed to incur “joint and equal responsibility for providing [KCMS] with sufficient financing to carry out its programs as negotiated on a yearly basis.” KCMS also received patient-care revenue, support from Michigan State University, and funds from contracts and grants. The hospitals sought reimbursement on their Medicare cost reports (42 U.S.C. 1395ww(h)) during fiscal years 2000–2004 for costs incurred for residents’ training at KCMS’s nonhospital clinics. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services found that the hospitals failed to show they incurred all or substantially all of the costs of their residency programs and that they failed to comply with a requirement of a written agreement detailing the financing of their offsite programs. The district court and D.C. Circuit affirmed the denials of reimbursement, rejecting an argument that the “written agreement” requirement was satisfied by a collection of documents executed over the years. None of the documents met the regulatory criteria. View "Borgess Medical Center v. Burwell" on Justia Law

The Service has long allowed American hunters who shoot Tanzanian elephants to repatriate their trophies because, according to the Service, doing so “would not be detrimental to the survival of the species.” However, in 2014, the Service changed course and indefinitely suspended issuance of import permits due in part to a “significant decline in Tanzania’s elephant population.” Two organizations representing hunters challenged the suspension in district court as substantively and procedurally flawed. The district court dismissed for lack of final agency action and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that the de facto permit denial gives Safari Club Article III standing. The court also rejected the Service's claims of mootness and concluded that the relief Safari Club seeks extends well beyond the two 2014 findings. Because Safari Club is unable to fully litigate a challenge to the findings underlying the suspension without taking on risk that the permitting scheme is designed to avoid, the controversy evades review. Finally, the court rejected the Service's arguments regarding finality and exhaustion. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Safari Club International v. Jewell" on Justia Law

The Postal Service contends that the Commission’s action denying its parcel reclassification request was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), for failing to acknowledge, much less explain, its decision to depart from precedent granting similar requests. The court found, in the challenged order, that the Commission neither acknowledged a change in course nor explained it. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. View "USPS v. PRC" on Justia Law

The Union petitions the court for review of the PRC's denial of its complaint, alleging that the Postal Service failed to comply with First-Class Mail service standards. The court concluded that the PRC reasonably determined that whether service standards are violated must be evaluated in reference to external performance goals. Based on this interpretation, the court concluded that the PRC logically construed the Union’s amended complaint as asserting a claim for violation of service standards in the aggregate, in accordance with the relevant performance goals. The PRC’s subsequent dismissal of this amended complaint was not arbitrary or capricious because the amended complaint failed to allege new issues of material fact or law. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "American Postal Workers Union v. PRC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, diagnosed with Insulin Treated Diabetes Mellitus (ITDM), seeks the first class medical certificate necessary to serve as a commercial airline pilot. Plaintiff holds a third class medical certificate authorizing him to pilot non-commercial flights in the United States. The FAA contends it did not issue a final order regarding plaintiff's first class medical certificate application; it purportedly ruled solely on his independent request for a third class medical certificate and specifically indicated the first class certificate remained under review. The court concluded, however, that the specific facts presented here establish a constructive denial of plaintiff's application for a first class certificate. The court held that where, as here, an agency has clearly communicated it will not reach a determination on a petitioner’s submission due to petitioner’s recalcitrance but simultaneously refuses to deny the petitioner’s submission on those grounds, it has engaged in final agency action subject to the court’s review. Although plaintiff's case is subject to judicial review, the court noted that there is a complete absence of a relevant administrative record to review. Accordingly, the court remanded to the FAA to offer reasons for its denial of plaintiff's application for a first class medical certificate. View "Friedman v. FAA" on Justia Law

In Order No. 1926, the Commission—recognizing that the Great Recession of 2008 was an exigent circumstance—allowed for a rate increase but also sought to calculate the extent to which decreased mail volume was “due to” the economic downturn in order to determine how long that rate increase should remain in effect. The Commission created a “new normal” test to determine when the “extraordinary or exceptional circumstances” no longer supported a rate increase. The Postal Service petitioned the court for review of the "new normal" test and the court upheld the Commission's approach. The Postal Service now seeks reconsideration, claiming that the Commission altered its original decision. The court dismissed the Postal Service's petition for lack of jurisdiction because the Commission's denial of reconsideration is unreviewable. View "USPS v. PRC" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of two Notices issued by FERC as part of ISO New England’s eighth forward-capacity market. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that FERC did not engage in collective, institutional action when it deadlocked on FCA 8’s rates. Consequently, the Notices describing the effects of that deadlock are not reviewable orders under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824d-824e. View "Public Citizen, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

CalPortland seeks review of the Commission's decision ordering CalPortland to temporarily reinstate Jeffrey Pappas, pursuant to section 105(c)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(2), pending final order on Pappas’s underlying discrimination complaint currently pending before the Commission. The court concluded that the Commission’s order directing CalPortland to hire Pappas is immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Because the Commission’s temporary reinstatement order satisfies the requirements of the collateral order doctrine, the court has jurisdiction to hear this petition for review. The court also concluded that the text and structure of section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act preclude the Commission from directing an owner or operator to temporarily “reinstate” a complainant who has never been employed by that owner or operator. Because Pappas was an “applicant for employment” who was not eligible for temporary reinstatement pending final order on his complaint, the court granted CalPortland’s petition for review and vacated the Commission’s decision and order. View "CalPortland Co., Inc. v. MSHR" on Justia Law