Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. 5491, Congress established a new independent agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an independent agency headed not by a multi-member commission but rather by a single Director. PHH is a mortgage lender that was the subject of a CFPB enforcement action that resulted in a $109 million order against it. PHH seeks to vacate the order, arguing that the CFPB’s status as an independent agency headed by a single Director violates Article II of the Constitution. The court concluded that CFPB’s concentration of enormous executive power in a single, unaccountable, unchecked Director not only departs from settled historical practice, but also poses a far greater risk of arbitrary decisionmaking and abuse of power, and a far greater threat to individual liberty, than does a multi-member independent agency. The court noted that this new agency lacks that critical check and structural constitutional protection, yet wields vast power over the U.S. economy. The court concluded that, in light of the consistent historical practice under which independent agencies have been headed by multiple commissioners or board members, and in light of the threat to individual liberty posed by a single-Director independent agency, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States cannot be stretched to cover this novel agency structure. Therefore, the court held that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured. To remedy the constitutional flaw, the court followed the Supreme Court’s precedents and simply severed the statute’s unconstitutional for-cause provision from the remainder of the statute. With the for-cause provision severed, the court explained that the President now will have the power to remove the Director at will, and to supervise and direct the Director. Because the CFPB as remedied will continue operating, the court addressed the statutory issues raised by PHH and agreed with PHH that Section 8 of the Act allows captive reinsurance arrangements so long as the amount paid by the mortgage insurer for the reinsurance does not exceed the reasonable market value of the reinsurance; CFPB’s order against PHH violated bedrock principles of due process; and the CFPB on remand still will have an opportunity to demonstrate that the relevant mortgage insurers in fact paid more than reasonable market value to the PHH-affiliated reinsurer for reinsurance, thereby making disguised payments for referrals in contravention of Section 8. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "PHH Corp. v. CFPB" on Justia Law

In 1992, OSHA issued the Process Safety Management Standard to protect the safety of those who work with or near highly hazardous chemicals. After a catastrophic chemical explosion at a Texas fertilizer company that qualified as an exempt retail facility, OSHA narrowed the scope of the retail-facility exemption so that the safety standard’s requirements would now apply to formerly exempt facilities like the Texas plant. Petitioners seek review of OSHA's narrowed definition of retail facilities. The court held that, when an action by OSHA corrects a particular hazard, as opposed to adjusting procedures for detection or enforcement, it amounts to a “standard.” Applying that understanding, the court concluded that the agency’s narrowing of the substantive scope of the exemption for retail facilities qualified as issuance of a “standard.” Therefore, the court has jurisdiction to review it and OSHA was required to adhere to notice-and-comment procedures. Consequently, the court granted the petitions for review and vacated OSHA's action. View "Agricultural Retailers Assoc. v. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Rothe filed suit alleging that the statutory basis of the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 8(a) business development program, Amendments to the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 637, violates its right to equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Rothe is a small business that bids on Defense Department contracts, including the types of subcontracts that the SBA awards to economically and socially disadvantaged businesses through the 8(a) program. The court rejected Rothe's claim that the statute contains an unconstitutional racial classification that prevents Rothe from competing for Department of Defense contracts on an equal footing with minority-owned businesses. The court concluded that the provisions of the Small Business Act that Rothe challenges do not on their face classify individuals by race. In contrast to the statute, the SBA’s regulation implementing the 8(a) program does contain a racial classification in the form of a presumption that an individual who is a member of one of five designated racial groups (and within them, 37 subgroups) is socially disadvantaged. Because the statute lacks a racial classification, and because Rothe has not alleged that the statute is otherwise subject to strict scrutiny, the court applied rational-basis review. Under rational-basis review, the court concluded that the statutory scheme is rationally related to the legitimate, and in some instances compelling, interest of counteracting discrimination. Finally, Rothe's evidentiary and nondelegation challenges failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment granting summary judgment to the SBA and DOD. View "Rothe Development v. DOD" on Justia Law

Scenic filed suit challenging a guidance memorandum issued by the FHWA in 2007, which interpreted the prohibition on “flashing, intermittent or moving” lights to permit state approval of those digital billboards that met certain timing and brightness requirements. The Highway Beautification Act (HBA), 23 U.S.C. 131, requires the FHWA and each state to develop and implement individual federal-state agreements (FSAs), detailing, among other things, “size, lighting and spacing” standards for the billboards now found towering over many of our country’s interstate highways. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to hear Scenic's notice-and-comment claim because Scenic failed to demonstrate that it has standing to bring that challenge. The court concluded that Scenic has standing to bring a claim under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and that the Guidance constitutes final agency action. On the merits, the court concluded that, because the FHWA’s interpretation of the FSA lighting provision was reasonable, the interpretation cannot be “contrary to customary use.” Accordingly, Scenic's claim under section 706 fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for dismissal of Scenic's notice-and-comment claim. View "Scenic America, Inc. v. US DOT" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Labor exercised his authority under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290, to promulgate regulations that require mine operators to test the continuity and resistance of “grounding systems” for mining equipment. At issue is whether the Secretary properly determined that power cables and extension cords are regulated parts of those “grounding systems.” The court upheld the Secretary’s decision because, under the regulations’ plain language, power cables and extension cords are most naturally considered components of “grounding systems.” Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Tilden Mining Co. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, identified as an anarchist extremist by an FBI agent, filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., with the FBI, seeking information about himself. The FBI released some records but withheld others, citing various grounds. The district court upheld the FBI's withholdings and redactions in full and granted summary judgment to the agency. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government on the claims under Exemption 7(D) and under the exclusion set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552(c)(1); reversed the grant of summary judgment on both challenges to withholdings under Exemption 3 and remanded for further proceedings; and vacated the district court’s opinion with regard to Exemption 7(A). View "Labow v. DOJ" on Justia Law

In 42 U.S.C. 433, Congress authorized the President to enter into social security coordination agreements - known as totalization agreements - with other countries. This case involves a totalization agreement between the United States and France. At issue is whether or not two French taxes enacted into law after that totalization agreement was adopted amend or supplement the French social security laws covered by the agreement, and thus fall within the agreement’s ambit. The court concluded that the trial court committed legal error in declaring the status of those French laws not by analyzing the text of the totalization agreement or the understanding of the parties, but by resorting to American dictionaries. The court reversed and remanded because insufficient consideration was given to the text and the official views of the United States and French governments. View "Eshel v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Association and Military-Veterans Advocacy filed suit challenging the VA's policy requiring "blue-water" veterans to prove on a case-by-base basis that they were exposed to Agent Orange during their military service in order to be considered for certain benefits. Plaintiffs argued that the policy was arbitrary and capricious and otherwise unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2). Plaintiffs sought injunctive and mandamus relief to prevent the VA from denying the presumption of Agent Orange exposure to blue-water veterans. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing 38 U.S.C. 511(a), which bars review in district court of VA decisions “under a law that affects the provision of” veterans benefits. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Congress stripped the district court of jurisdiction over the claims at issue. View "Blue Water Navy Vietnam v. McDonald" on Justia Law

AILA submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., requests for disclosure of records related to complaints about the conduct of immigration judges. The government disclosed thousands of pages of records, but redacted information in those records that it believes is either statutorily exempt from disclosure or non-responsive to the request. The district court upheld both categories of redactions. The court concluded that the government's across-the-board approach of redacting the immigration judges’ names from all of the disclosed records cannot be sustained in light of the variety of privacy and public interests that may be at stake in connection with the disclosure of an immigration judge’s name. Therefore, the court remanded for a more individualized inquiry into the propriety of redacting judges’ names. In this case, the government, after determining that records were responsive to AILA’s request, redacted discrete information within the records on the basis of non-responsiveness even if no statutory exemption shielded the information from disclosure. The court concluded that such an approach cannot be squared with the statutory scheme. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that complaint resolutions fall outside the statute’s affirmative disclosure mandate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "American Immigration Lawyers v. Exec. Office for Immigration" on Justia Law

The Mackinac Tribe filed suit to compel the Secretary of the Interior to convene an election allowing the Tribe to organize under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 476(a). Although the Mackinac Tribe does not appear on the Secretary’s list of federally acknowledged tribes and has not been acknowledged through the Secretary’s Part 83 process, see 25 C.F.R. pt. 83, the group alleges it is federally recognized for IRA purposes because it is the historical successor to a tribe the federal government previously recognized via treaty. The district court found that the Mackinac Tribe failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by first seeking acknowledgment through the Part 83 process. As the district court did, the court reserved the question whether a group must be recognized to be eligible to organize under the IRA and whether that recognition must be marked by the group’s appearance on the Secretary’s list of federally recognized tribes. The court read the Tribe's complaint as seeking a writ of mandamus. The court declined the requested mandamus because review will be possible after the Mackinac Tribe has completed the Part 83 procedure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Mackinac Tribe v. Jewell" on Justia Law