Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

EPIC seeks review of the FAA's decision not to promulgate the FAA’s dismissal of its petition for rulemaking and the FAA’s omission of privacy provisions in the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). EPIC's petition relates to the Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, 49 U.S.C. 40101, which was enacted to regulate, inter alia, unmanned aircraft - i.e. drones. The court rejected EPIC's contention that "reasonable grounds" justify its untimely petition 60 days after the FAA's explicit dismissal. The court also rejected EPIC's argument that the FAA's February 23, 2015 NPRM constituted, in effect, the dismissal of its petition, triggering the 60-day clock. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Electronic Privacy Information Center v. FAA" on Justia Law

Via Christi seeks an upward adjustment of the capital-asset depreciation reimbursement paid to its predecessor hospitals under a since curtailed Medicare regulation. Via Christi argues that it received St. Francis’s and St. Joseph’s assets at a lower value, i.e., more depreciated, than was reflected in the Secretary’s earlier depreciation reimbursements. As the hospitals’ successor-in-interest, Via Christi thus seeks additional reimbursements to cover the proportional Medicare share of the depreciation. The court concluded that the Secretary reasonably interpreted the bona fide sale requirement as limited to arm’s length transactions between economically self-interested parties. The Secretary concluded that St. Francis’s transfer of its assets to Via Christi was not an arm’s-length transaction in which each party sought to maximize its economic benefit. The court concluded that the Secretary's determination was supported by substantial evidence, and was not arbitrary, capricious or otherwise unlawful. In this case, Via Christi is not entitled to additional depreciation reimbursement in the absence of a qualifying transaction. View "Via Christi Hosp. Wichita v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as a holder of U.S. public debt, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the Debt Limit Statute, 31 U.S.C. 3101. Plaintiff alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Public Debt Clause and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for lack of standing because he failed to allege plausible factual allegations to establish the constitutional minimum requirements for Article III standing, either in the first amended complaint (FAC) filed with the district court or in his proposed amended complaint filed with this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1653. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend his FAC and denied plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint on appeal. View "Williams v. Lew" on Justia Law

MSHA issued seven citations to Cactus Canyon for violations of the safety and health standards under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq. Cactus Canyon then sought to contest the citations before the Commission. After the case was assigned to an ALJ, but before any hearings were held, the Secretary decided to vacate the citations. Over the objection of Cactus Canyon, the ALJ dismissed the case without indicating whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. Cactus Canyon then filed an application for the award of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). Following this court’s precedent in Turner v. National Transportation Safety Board, the court held that Cactus Canyon is not eligible for fees because it is not a prevailing party. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. v. MSHR" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a foreign alien from Venezuela, seeks review of the TSA's determination that petitioner was a risk to aviation and national security, and denial of his application for FAA-certified flight school training. The Vara Declaration confirms that the internal agency materials express TSA’s reasoned, contemporaneous explanation for its decision. The internal agency materials, as illuminated by the Vara Declaration, offer a clear and reasonable statement of the grounds upon which TSA relied in denying petitioner’s application for flight training. Furthermore, the Declaration and the internal agency materials to which it refers are not impermissible post hoc rationalizations. Because petitioner and the court have a written statement explaining the grounds and rationale for TSA's action, and because the court found the agency action against petitioner was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court concluded that there is no need to remand the case for further review. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Olivares v. TSA" on Justia Law

Under a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), the government formally initiates prosecution but agrees to dismiss all charges if the defendant abides by negotiated conditions over a prescribed period of time. This case arises from the interplay between the operation of a DPA and the running of time limitations under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161-3174. In this case, after Fokker voluntarily disclosed its potential violation of federal sanctions and export control laws, the company and the government entered into an 18-month DPA, during which Fokker would continue cooperation with federal authorities and implementation of a substantial compliance program. In accordance with the DPA, the government filed criminal charges against the company, together with a joint motion to suspend the running of time under the Act pending assessment of the company’s adherence to the agreement’s conditions. The court held that the Act confers no authority in a court to withhold exclusion of time pursuant to a DPA based on concerns that the government should bring different charges or should charge different defendants. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of the joint motion to exclude time under the Act. The court granted the government’s petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V." on Justia Law

The Postal Service challenged the Commission's denial of its request to have one of the Service's products, the "round-trip mailer," used in the DVD-by-mail industry, classified as competitive rather than market-dominant. The Postal Service contends that streaming services and DVD-by-mail services compete with each other and, under antitrust law, should be treated as a single market. The court concluded that the Commission was reasonable in finding that the Postal Service produced no evidence to establish at what point an increase in the price the Service charged would cause Netflix and Gamefly to look elsewhere for distribution. The Service enjoys market power in the (upstream) distribution market regardless of conditions in the (downstream) content market because it does not face any competition in the distribution market. The court rejected the Postal Service's claim that Netflix has sufficient economic clout to counter the Service's market power because Netflix and GameFly have no alternative means to transport DVDs by mail. Finally, the court concluded that the Commission was not unreasonable to hold that the potential technological evolution suggested by the Service was too speculative to condition its market power analysis here. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "USPS v. PRC" on Justia Law

Judicial Watch filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, to compel disclosure of documents that had been placed under seal. The district court granted summary judgment for the Department. The court concluded that the intended effect of the district court's order is ambiguous because the judge's statement, "I don't want to know," bars the parties from divulging the contents of their settlement discussions. Nor has the Department pointed to extrinsic evidence, such as information that the district court customarily protects the confidentiality of settlement discussions before a case is referred to mediation, that supports its preferred reading. An ambiguous court order does not protect a record from disclosure pursuant to the FOIA. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded this matter to the judge in order to give the Department an opportunity to seek clarification from her regarding the intended effect and scope of her order. View "Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs seek a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to act within Congress's prescribed specific time frames, 42 U.S.C. 1395ff, for the Secretary to reach decisions on various stages of administrative appeals of Medicare reimbursement claim denials. The district court concluded that mandamus relief was unwarranted. The court concluded that the statute imposes a clear duty on the Secretary to comply with the statutory deadlines, that the statute gives the Association a corresponding right to demand that compliance, and that escalation—the only proposed alternative remedy—is inadequate in the circumstances of this case. Because the Association has demonstrated that the threshold requirements for mandamus jurisdiction are met, and because the Secretary’s other jurisdictional arguments fail, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. On remand, the district court should determine whether “compelling equitable grounds” now exist to issue a writ of mandamus. View "American Hospital Ass'n v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Jefferson Morely, a journalist and news editor appealed for a second time from the district court’s denial of his request for attorney’s fees and costs under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(E)(i), as a prevailing party. Morely submitted a FOIA request to the CIA for all records related to a CIA officer. Morely believed that the information on the officer could shed new light on President Kennedy's assassination. The district court concluded that the public-benefit factor weighed strongly against a fee award because the actual documents produced by the CIA provided little if any public benefit. The court concluded, however, that the district court improperly analyzed the public-benefit factor by assessing the public value of the information received rather than the potential public value of the information sought. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded again. View "Morley v. CIA" on Justia Law