Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A municipal corporation operating a large regional commuter rail system in the Chicago area provided rail service on lines owned by a freight rail company. For decades, this service was conducted under a series of agreements, but in 2019, the freight rail company announced it would cease operating the commuter trains. Following litigation, the freight company obtained a declaratory judgment that it had no ongoing obligation to provide such service. While the commuter rail operator began transitioning to run the service itself, the parties failed to reach agreement on compensation for continued use of the lines. With no long-term agreement in place and negotiations at an impasse, the commuter rail operator applied to the federal Surface Transportation Board for terminal trackage rights, which would allow it to use the lines despite the lack of agreement.The Surface Transportation Board granted the application, finding the lines to be terminal facilities for a reasonable distance from the terminal, and that the use would be practicable, in the public interest, and not substantially impair the freight carrier’s operations. The Board did not set compensation or use conditions at that time but pledged to do so retroactively if the parties could not agree. The freight rail company sought review of this decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.The Eighth Circuit held that the Board acted within its statutory authority in granting terminal trackage rights to the commuter operator, including over the full extent of the lines at issue, and properly concluded the public interest was served. However, the court found that the Board erred by granting immediate rights without first ensuring that compensation was paid or adequately secured, as required by statute. The court vacated the Board’s order and remanded for further proceedings, allowing time for the parties to address compensation. View "Union Pacific Railroad Company v. STB" on Justia Law

A business specializing in adult products sought to open a store in downtown Fargo, North Dakota, in a zone designated for mixed-use development. The proposed store intended to sell items such as lingerie and sexual wellness products, but not sexually explicit media like books or DVDs. To proceed, the business’s landlord applied for a change-of-use permit to allow retail sales and service at the location. The City of Fargo, through its Director of Planning and Development, denied the application, concluding that the business constituted an "Adult Bookstore" as defined by the city’s municipal code, which prohibited such establishments in the downtown zone. The city’s decision was upheld by both the Fargo Board of Adjustment and the Board of City Commissioners.Following these administrative decisions, the business filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, raising constitutional claims including violations of the First Amendment, the imposition of a prior restraint, denial of procedural due process, and unconstitutional vagueness in the city’s code. The business also challenged the Commissioners’ decision under state law, arguing it was arbitrary and capricious. While the lawsuit was pending, Fargo amended its code to explicitly prohibit “Sexual Device Shops” in the relevant zone.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of all federal claims, holding that the business’s planned activities were not protected expressive conduct under the First Amendment, the permit process was not a prior restraint, and the business received adequate procedural process. The court also found the city’s ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. However, the court determined that denying the permit as an “Adult Bookstore” was arbitrary and capricious under state law, reversed the dismissal of the state-law claim, and remanded for further proceedings regarding possible relief. View "Romantix-Fargo, Inc. v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

During an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting in Sikeston, Missouri, George Holland experienced a severe mental health crisis, displaying incoherent speech and ultimately brandishing a small pistol, which he placed in his mouth. The other attendees exited safely, leaving Holland alone and armed inside. Police responded and engaged with Holland from a concealed position outside an open door, repeatedly commanding him to drop his weapon. For most of the encounter, Holland neither pointed the firearm at officers nor threatened them directly. After about fifteen minutes, Holland moved into clear view, holding the gun to his temple. In a sudden motion, he lowered the firearm and shifted his left arm toward it, prompting Officer Martin Simmerman to fire. Holland retreated, and Simmerman, followed by other officers, pursued him into the corridor, firing additional shots. Simmerman discharged fifteen rounds in total, striking Holland at least six times, resulting in Holland’s death.The Holland family brought suit against Simmerman and the City of Sikeston in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful death, battery, and Monell claims. The defendants moved to dismiss, providing body camera footage. The district court found that the video evidence contradicted key allegations in the complaint, concluded that Simmerman was entitled to qualified and official immunity, and dismissed all claims with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that while the video evidence contradicted the allegation that Holland took no menacing action before the first volley of shots, it did not conclusively show the events during the subsequent volleys. The court held that Simmerman was entitled to qualified immunity for the initial shots but not for the later volleys, as the complaint plausibly alleged excessive force as to those shots. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the excessive force claim, remanded for reconsideration of the related state-law and Monell claims, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Holland v. Simmerman" on Justia Law

Three individuals residing in Missouri, each of whom had significant difficulties applying for or recertifying their eligibility for SNAP benefits due to problems with the Missouri Department of Social Services (DSS) call center and application procedures, brought a lawsuit. They alleged wrongful denial of benefits and failure to provide reasonable accommodations for disabilities. All three eventually received SNAP benefits after joining the lawsuit but expected to need continued assistance. Empower Missouri, a nonprofit organization, also joined the suit, asserting that DSS’s practices forced it to divert resources to address these systemic problems.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, the plaintiffs claimed violations of specific provisions of the SNAP Act, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court found that all plaintiffs had standing, rejected arguments that their claims were moot, and determined that DSS’s practices violated their due process and ADA rights. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a broad remedial order requiring systemic changes to DSS’s SNAP administration, including detailed operational requirements and ongoing reporting.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the individual plaintiffs had standing for their due process and ADA claims, but Empower Missouri did not, as its advocacy expenditures alone did not confer standing. The court determined that the SNAP Act provisions cited did not create individual rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or an implied private right of action. It affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the individual plaintiffs on their due process and ADA claims, except for one plaintiff’s ADA claim, which lacked evidence of a requested accommodation. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s permanent injunction, finding it overbroad and issued without proper consideration of adequate legal remedies, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Holmes v. Bax" on Justia Law

A residential contractor in Iowa received warning notices from the Iowa Insurance Division, alleging that its business activities and advertising involved unlicensed public adjusting, which is regulated by two Iowa statutes. These statutes require public adjusters to be licensed and prohibit residential contractors from representing or negotiating insurance claims on behalf of property owners for the same project on which they perform work. Violations can lead to significant penalties. After the contractor was notified of alleged violations related to its advertising and communications with consumers, it challenged the constitutionality of the statutes, claiming they are void for vagueness and infringe upon First Amendment rights, both facially and as applied.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed the contractor’s suit. The court found that the State of Iowa and its Insurance Division were immune under the Eleventh Amendment. It further held that the contractor failed to state a cognizable claim under the First or Fourteenth Amendments, concluding the statutes regulated conduct, not speech, and were not unconstitutionally vague.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appellate court held that the statutes are not facially unconstitutional and are not void for vagueness. However, the court found that the district court erred by not adequately analyzing the contractor’s as-applied First Amendment challenge. Specifically, when the statutes were applied to restrict the contractor from telling insureds that it would assist or advise them in navigating the insurance claims process, the law regulated speech. The court reversed the dismissal of the as-applied First Amendment claim and remanded for further proceedings, while affirming the rejection of the facial and vagueness challenges. View "Shamrock Hills, LLC v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

In 2004, a fourteen-year-old girl was sexually assaulted in Anoka County, Minnesota. She provided evidence for a rape kit, which was submitted to the Anoka County Sheriff’s Office. Detective Johnson was assigned to her case and assured her mother that no DNA was obtained, though in reality the kit was never tested. The suspect was charged but not convicted. In 2015, it was discovered that the Sheriff’s Office had hundreds of untested rape kits, including hers. Sixteen years after the assault, her kit was finally tested, revealing DNA evidence implicating the original suspect, and criminal charges were pursued again.After these events, she brought suit against Anoka County, Sheriff Stuart, and Detective Johnson in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. She asserted claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution for equal protection violations, a claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, a “failure to train” claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state tort claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court dismissed her MHRA and negligence claims but allowed the other claims to proceed, finding she had standing in light of Eighth Circuit precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring her federal constitutional claims for alleged failures to investigate or train, following Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent holding that crime victims generally lack standing to challenge law enforcement or prosecutorial discretion in investigating crimes, even when alleging class-based discrimination. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment on the federal claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims for lack of standing. The court remanded the IIED claim for the district court to determine whether standing existed for that state-law claim. View "Doe v. Anoka County" on Justia Law

A man named Austen May died by suicide while incarcerated at a Missouri Department of Corrections (MODOC) facility in July 2021, following a prior suicide attempt and ongoing mental health treatment. Correctional officers and a supervising sergeant failed to perform required periodic checks of May’s cell for nearly three hours, during which May obscured the cell window. When officers eventually entered, May was found deceased. Kristine Williams, May’s mother, filed suit against MODOC and several employees, alleging state law wrongful death and federal constitutional claims, including deliberate indifference to a suicide risk.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied motions to dismiss brought by MODOC, Loflin, Yount, and Noisworthy. The court held that MODOC was not entitled to sovereign immunity because Williams plausibly alleged a dangerous condition exception under Missouri law. It also found that the correctional officers and sergeant were not entitled to qualified immunity on the constitutional claim, reasoning that Williams sufficiently alleged they knew of May’s suicide risk and were deliberately indifferent. Additionally, the court denied official immunity for the state wrongful death claim, concluding that the required checks were ministerial duties and thus not protected, and found the public duty doctrine did not bar the claim.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that Williams’s allegations did not plausibly establish a dangerous condition under Missouri law, so MODOC was entitled to sovereign immunity. It also found Williams failed to allege that the officers had actual knowledge of May’s suicide risk, entitling them to qualified immunity. Lastly, the court determined the duties in question were discretionary, not ministerial, so official immunity applied. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. MO Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Northland Management & Construction, LLC developed four lots in a Missouri subdivision, including Lot 9. The City of Parkville had approved the subdivision’s Sixth Plat, which contemplated grading Lot 9 at a continuous slope to its southern property line. During construction, Northland filled in an existing swale, installed piers to stabilize the home, and created a new swale that diverted stormwater runoff to both Lot 9 and neighboring Lot 3. The City became concerned about erosion and water flow, ultimately requiring Northland to seek a grading permit under Section 520 of the municipal code. Northland refused, believing the permit was unnecessary due to the approved plat. The City denied a final Certificate of Occupancy (CO), prompting Northland to file suit for the CO and damages for the inability to sell Lot 9 at full value.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri held a bench trial, where it ruled in favor of Northland on its Missouri state law inverse condemnation and equal protection claims. The court ordered the City to issue a final CO and awarded damages based on the difference in the lot’s value with and without a CO. The City complied with the order but appealed, challenging both the legal and factual bases for the district court’s rulings and the calculation of damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings that Northland graded Lot 9 consistent with the approved plat and accepted practice, and that the City’s application of Section 520 was unreasonable. The appellate court also upheld the equal protection claim, finding Northland was treated differently from similarly situated property owners without rational basis. However, the court reversed the damages award, holding that compensation must reflect only the temporary diminution in value during the period the CO was withheld, and remanded for recalculation of damages. View "Northland Management & Construction, LLC v. City of Parkville" on Justia Law

In 2024, Iowa enacted legislation (HF 2677) prohibiting the manufacture and sale of electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) that had not received marketing authorization from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The law required manufacturers to certify their compliance with federal premarket approval requirements or demonstrate that their products were pending FDA review. Several manufacturers, retailers, and consumers challenged the law, contending it was preempted by federal law, specifically the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, and that it violated constitutional equal protection guarantees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted a preliminary injunction, halting enforcement of the law. The district court found that at least one plaintiff had standing, was likely to succeed on the merits of the preemption claim, and was not required to post a security bond. It dismissed claims against the Iowa Department of Revenue based on Eleventh Amendment immunity but allowed the case to proceed against the Director in her official capacity. The Department voluntarily stayed enforcement while the litigation continued.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The Eighth Circuit held that at least one retailer plaintiff had Article III standing, as they plausibly alleged injury from the credible threat of enforcement. However, the appellate court concluded the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their preemption claim. The court determined that HF 2677 was not preempted by federal law, as it fell within the scope of the Tobacco Control Act’s savings clause, which permits state requirements relating to the sale and distribution of tobacco products. The Eighth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Iowans for Alternatives v. Mosiman" on Justia Law

Jackie Lackie owned property adjacent to Greers Ferry Lake, a federally managed lake in Arkansas. In January 2022, park rangers discovered sixty-nine trees had been cut down on government land between Lackie’s property and the lake. The Army Corps of Engineers identified Lackie as responsible, filed a notice of trespass, and sent Lackie a letter offering to settle the violation if he paid for the tree damage. The letter also indicated the Corps was recommending revocation of his shoreline use permit for a boat dock. Enclosed was a settlement agreement stating the parties intended to settle “all known disputes” regarding the public lands. Lackie signed the agreement and paid the requested sum, but the Corps subsequently revoked his shoreline use permit.Lackie challenged the revocation in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, seeking judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. He argued the Corps’s action breached the settlement agreement, which he contended had resolved all disputes, including the permit issue. The district court affirmed the Corps’s decision, reasoning that the letter accompanying the settlement made clear that the permit revocation was not resolved by the agreement, so the Corps did not violate the agreement by revoking the permit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that under the applicable federal common law, guided by Arkansas law, the unambiguous language of the settlement agreement encompassed “all known disputes,” including the dispute over Lackie’s permit. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Corps’s revocation of Lackie’s permit contravened the settlement agreement and constituted unlawful agency action. The court reversed the district court’s judgment, remanding with instructions to set aside the Corps’s permit revocation. View "Lackie v. Noe" on Justia Law