Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two Italian pasta manufacturers, La Molisana S.p.A. and Valdigrano Di Flavio Pagani S.r.L., challenged the United States Department of Commerce's final results from the twenty-third administrative review of an antidumping order on certain pasta from Italy. The dispute centered on Commerce's methodology for determining the protein content of pasta, which affects the classification of pasta as either standard or premium quality. Commerce used the protein content listed on product labels, which is subject to U.S. FDA rounding rules and different nitrogen-to-protein conversion factors in the U.S. and Italy. La Molisana argued that this methodology caused inaccuracies in comparing pasta products.The United States Court of International Trade sustained Commerce's final results, concluding that La Molisana had not demonstrated that the alleged flaws in Commerce's methodology were commercially significant. The court found that Commerce's reliance on packaging labels for protein content fostered transparency and consistency, and that La Molisana's evidence, including a market report and a new definition from the Bologna Grain Exchange, was insufficient to compel a change in the protein breakpoint from 12.5% to 13.5%.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that Commerce's methodology failed to compare products based on identical physical characteristics, as required by statute. The court held that the FDA rounding rules and different nitrogen conversion factors introduced inaccuracies that Commerce could not dismiss as commercially insignificant. However, the court agreed with Commerce and the Trade Court that La Molisana's evidence did not provide a compelling reason to change the protein breakpoint. The Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court's judgment regarding the rounding rules and nitrogen conversion factors, affirmed the judgment on the protein breakpoint, and remanded for further proceedings. View "La Molisana S.p.A. v. United States" on Justia Law

Larry B. Herrington, a veteran who served in the U.S. Air Force, filed a claim in September 2009 for service connection for several gastrointestinal conditions, including Barrett’s disease, chronic gastritis, reflux disease, and hiatal hernia. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office awarded service connection for gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) with a non-compensable evaluation. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) later awarded a 30% evaluation for GERD by analogy to the diagnostic code for hiatal hernia, Diagnostic Code (DC) 7346, but denied an evaluation in excess of 30%.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that the Board’s selection of DC 7346 was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Mr. Herrington appealed this decision, arguing that the Veterans Court should have applied a de novo standard of review rather than the deferential standard set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the selection of an analogous diagnostic code for rating unlisted conditions involves questions of fact or the application of law to facts, which requires a deferential standard of review. The court concluded that the Veterans Court applied the correct standard of review and affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s selection of DC 7346 for rating Mr. Herrington’s GERD was appropriate and supported by the evidence. View "HERRINGTON v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Kevin Steele, a Marine veteran, filed an original claim in 1991 for a head injury sustained during service, which he attributed to a 1980 training incident. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) examiner noted that Steele experienced occasional headaches as a residual of the head injury but deemed them non-disabling. The VA Regional Office (RO) granted service connection for the scar on Steele's scalp but did not explicitly address the headaches in its decision. Steele did not appeal this decision.In 2013, Steele filed a new claim for various conditions, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), and was awarded a 50% disability rating effective from March 6, 2013. In 2016, he filed a claim for service connection for headaches, which the RO granted with an effective date of October 14, 2015. The Board of Veterans Appeals later adjusted the effective date to March 6, 2013. Steele appealed, arguing that his 1991 claim for headaches remained open and should entitle him to an earlier effective date.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's decision, holding that Steele's 1991 claim for headaches was implicitly denied and thus finally adjudicated in 1991. The court applied the implicit denial rule, which provides that a claim can be deemed denied if the VA's decision provides sufficient notice that the claim was considered and rejected. The court found that the 1991 RO decision and notice letter provided Steele with reasonable notice that his claim for headaches was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, agreeing that the Board and the Veterans Court did not legally err in their application of the implicit denial rule. The court held that the reasons provided for the explicit denial of Steele's head injury claim in 1991 were sufficient to implicitly deny the related claim for headaches, thus closing off the earlier filing date. View "STEELE v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., and Marmen Energy Co. (collectively, “Marmen”) appealed the U.S. Court of International Trade’s (CIT) decision that sustained the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (Commerce) final determination of a 4.94% dumping margin for utility-scale wind towers from Canada. Commerce had initiated an antidumping (AD) investigation in July 2019, and in June 2020, issued its final AD determination. Marmen challenged Commerce’s decision on three grounds: the weight-averaging of steel plate costs, the rejection of a USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation, and the use of the average-to-transaction (A-to-T) methodology based on Cohen’s d test.The CIT affirmed Commerce’s weight-averaging of Marmen’s steel plate costs but remanded the case on the other two issues. Commerce again rejected the USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation on remand, arguing it would double count an exchange-rate adjustment. Commerce also maintained its use of Cohen’s d test, despite concerns raised by the Federal Circuit in Stupp Corp. v. United States. The CIT sustained Commerce’s determination on both issues, leading to Marmen’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Commerce’s rejection of the USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation was not supported by substantial evidence, as the proposed adjustment did not duplicate other adjustments and was reliable. The court also concluded that Commerce’s use of Cohen’s d test was unreasonable because the data did not meet the necessary assumptions of normal distribution, equal variability, and sufficient size. The court vacated Commerce’s calculated dumping margin and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MARMEN INC. v. US " on Justia Law

Target Corporation (Target) imported goods subject to an antidumping duty order and paid duties at a lower rate than specified in a final judgment. The United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) later realized the error but did not correct it within the statutory 90-day window. The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) ordered Customs to reliquidate the entries at the correct rate, despite the statutory finality provisions.In the lower court, the CIT granted the government's motion to dismiss Target's challenge to the reliquidation, relying on its previous decision in Home Products International, Inc. v. United States. The CIT held that it had the authority to enforce its judgments and that the principle of finality in 19 U.S.C. § 1514 did not bar correcting Customs' errors in liquidating entries covered by a trade action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the CIT's decision. The Federal Circuit held that the case was governed by its precedent in Cemex, S.A. v. United States, which established that Customs' liquidation decisions, even if erroneous, are final and conclusive under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) unless specific statutory exceptions apply. The court rejected the CIT's interpretation that it could use its equitable powers to override the statutory finality provisions. The Federal Circuit emphasized that Congress has carefully crafted a statutory scheme for finality and that any remedy for the harshness of the statute should come from Congress, not the courts. View "TARGET CORPORATION v. US " on Justia Law

United Water Conservation District (United) filed a lawsuit against the United States, seeking just compensation for an alleged taking under the Fifth Amendment. United claimed that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) required it to increase the amount of water bypassing its diversion dam to protect an endangered species of trout, resulting in a loss of water that United could otherwise use for beneficial purposes.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed United's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, determining that the claim should be evaluated as a regulatory taking. The court reasoned that United had not yet exhausted its administrative remedies by applying for and being denied an incidental-take permit under the Endangered Species Act, making the claim not ripe for adjudication.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court agreed that United's claim was regulatory in nature, as the NMFS's actions did not constitute a physical appropriation of water already diverted by United. Instead, the actions required more water to remain in the river, representing a regulatory restriction on United's use of the water. The court held that United's claim was not ripe because it had not yet obtained a final agency action by applying for and being denied an incidental-take permit. Therefore, the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was appropriate. View "UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT v. US " on Justia Law

George Roseberry, a U.S. Army veteran, sustained a lower back injury during his service from 1977 to 1989. In March 1994, he filed a claim for service connection related to degenerative disc disease, which was denied three months later. Between 1998 and 2005, he made several unsuccessful attempts to reopen his claim. On July 20, 2021, the Veterans Court remanded his case to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, concluding his appeal on October 12, 2021. On November 13, 2021, Roseberry filed an application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which was one day late.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed Roseberry’s EAJA application as untimely. The court found that the application was due on November 12, 2021, 30 days after the effective date of the mandate, October 12, 2021. Roseberry’s counsel had mistakenly relied on the date the mandate was entered on the docket, October 15, 2021, leading to the late filing. The court determined that equitable tolling was not warranted as there were no “extraordinary circumstances” to justify the delay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit agreed that the correct standard for equitable tolling is “extraordinary circumstances,” as established by precedent. Roseberry’s late filing was due to ordinary neglect, which does not meet the threshold for equitable tolling. Consequently, the Federal Circuit upheld the dismissal of Roseberry’s EAJA application as untimely. View "ROSEBERRY v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Larry Williams served in the U.S. Navy from August 1972 to March 1974 and filed a claim for compensation for schizophrenia in April 1978. The VA's Regional Office (RO) denied the claim in July 1978. Williams filed a Notice of Disagreement in January 1979, and the VA received additional evidence, including a hospital report diagnosing chronic schizophrenia. In June 1979, the RO confirmed the denial of service connection for schizophrenia but did not send this decision to Williams. Instead, the RO issued a Statement of the Case, which included the new evidence and confirmed the denial.Williams did not perfect his appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. In 2009, he submitted a claim to reopen his previously denied claim and was eventually granted a 100 percent disability rating effective June 4, 2009. Williams sought an earlier effective date, but the Board denied this request. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's decision, finding that the VA had complied with 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b) in the 1979 Statement of the Case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court's decision. The Federal Circuit held that the VA met the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b) by issuing the 1979 Statement of the Case, which included the new evidence and confirmed the denial of service connection. The court found that the Statement of the Case provided sufficient indication that the VA considered the new evidence in connection with the pending claim, thus satisfying the regulatory requirements. View "WILLIAMS v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Realtek Semiconductor Corporation appealed a decision by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) regarding a motion for sanctions against DivX, LLC. DivX had filed a complaint alleging a violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 by Realtek and others, which was later withdrawn. Realtek then sought sanctions against DivX for alleged misconduct occurring months prior. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the motion on procedural grounds, and the ITC adopted this decision without comment.Realtek petitioned for the ITC to issue a show cause order sua sponte, which the ITC declined to do. Realtek argued that the ITC's failure to issue the order violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The ITC and DivX contended that the appeal should be dismissed due to lack of standing, jurisdiction, and because the decision was unreviewable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the ITC's decision not to issue a show cause order sua sponte was within its discretion and thus unreviewable under the APA. The court noted that such decisions are committed to agency discretion by law and are not subject to judicial review. Consequently, the court dismissed Realtek's appeal. View "REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC " on Justia Law

Vandewater International Inc. requested a scope ruling from the U.S. Department of Commerce to determine if its steel branch outlets were subject to an antidumping duty order on "butt-weld pipe fittings" from China. Vandewater argued that its products did not meet the definition of "butt-weld pipe fittings" as they had contoured ends and were used differently. Commerce determined that Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order, leading to an appeal.The U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed the case and initially found that the term "butt-weld pipe fittings" was ambiguous, requiring further analysis. The CIT remanded the case to Commerce to conduct a full scope inquiry using the (k)(2) criteria, which include physical characteristics, expectations of purchasers, ultimate use, channels of trade, and manner of advertisement. Commerce reaffirmed its decision that Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order based on these criteria.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decision. The court held that the term "butt-weld pipe fittings" was ambiguous and that Commerce's determination using the (k)(2) criteria was supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that the (k)(1) sources were not dispositive in determining whether Vandewater's products were within the scope of the order. Additionally, the court dismissed SCI's challenge to Commerce's suspension of liquidation instructions as moot, as there were no unliquidated entries of Vandewater's products before the relevant date. View "Vandewater International Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law